KANT AND SOME POST-KANTIANS:

A Tercentenary Exhibition

KANT AND SOME POST-KANTIANS:

A Tercentenary Exhibition


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025 with funding from
University of Toronto

https://archive.org/details/kantsomepostkant00fmic

KANT AND SOME POST-KANTIANS:

A Tercentenary Exhibition

Exhibition and Catalogue

by

F. Michael Walsh

The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library,
University of Toronto
21 May–9 August 2024

Exhibition and catalogue by F. Michael Walsh
Exhibition designed and installed by Maia Balint
Photography by Paul Armstrong
Catalogue designed by David Moratto
Catalogue printed by Andora Graphics
Front cover image: Johann Gottlieb Becker, *Immanuel Kant*, 1768.
Deutsches Literaturachiv, Marbach
Back cover image: Daniel Berger, aquatint after 1793 watercolour of
Immanuel Kant by Johann Theodor Puttrich, (Königsberg: Unzer, 1798).

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Title: Kant and some post-Kantians : a tercentenary exhibition / exhibition and catalogue by F. Michael Walsh.

Names: Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, host institution, publisher. | Walsh, Michael F., author.

Description: Catalogue of an exhibition held at the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library from May 21 to August 9, 2024. | All of the exhibited books have been selected from the Walsh Philosophy Collection, which is part of The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library at the University of Toronto. | Includes bibliographical references

Identifiers: Canadiana 20240310861 | ISBN 9780772710840 (softcover)

Subjects: LCSH: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804—Exhibitions. | LCSH: Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854—Exhibitions. | LCSH: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831—Exhibitions. | LCSH: Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860—Exhibitions. | LCSH: Philosophy, German—18th century—Bibliography—Exhibitions. | LCSH: Philosophy, German—19th century—Bibliography—Exhibitions. | LCGFT: Exhibition catalogs.

Classification: LCC B2798 .T46 2024 | DDC 193—dc23

ABBREVIATIONS OF FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS:

Immanuel Kant:

Citations are to the volume number and pagination of the *Akademie* edition of *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900–), except for *CPR* which are to the line numbers of either or both of the first 'A' (1781) or revised second edition 'B' (1787).

CPR — *Critique of Pure Reason.* Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996).

PFM — *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science.* Translated by Peter G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953).

G — *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.* Translated by Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

CPrR — *Critique of Practical Reason.* Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002).

CJ — *Critique of Judgment.* Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987).

Rel — *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason.* Translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2009).

Corr. — *Correspondence.* Translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Other works:

Adickes — Erich Adickes. *German Kantian Bibliography.* Originally printed in numbers 9–18 (1893–1896) of *The Philosophical Review*, then reprinted by Ginn & Company (Boston, 1896). Citations are to its numbered entries.

D18GP *The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers.* Edited by Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn. (London: Continuum, 2010) Three volumes, continuously paginated. Citations are to double-columned page numbers.

Kant and Some Post-Kantians

INTRODUCTION

THE OCCASION FOR this exhibition is the 300th anniversary of the birth of Immanuel Kant on 22 April 1724. Kant is often accorded the honour of being the most important philosopher since Plato and Aristotle. His influence has been immense, so much so that he is '... the single unavoidable thinker in modern philosophy.'[1]

The focus of the exhibition is Kant's writings and some contemporaneous responses to his work. It also provides an opportunity to exhibit the principal works of four important philosophers, all born within one generation, who reacted to Kant's writings in creating their own philosophies: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Although their ideas differ very significantly, the first three of these thinkers are usually grouped together in a movement known as German Idealism. Schopenhauer, in contrast, reacted very strongly against their thought, which he argued was a betrayal of Kant, not his fulfillment as they claimed. Indeed, he believed that his own philosophy provided the necessary development of Kant's 'critical philosophy'.

The approach taken in this catalogue is to provide a brief biographical and philosophical introduction to each of the five philosophers, but not a general introduction to the philosophy of the time or of every author. Other than for Kant, the introductions are mostly limited to a sketch of the central doctrine of each; however, the individual book descriptions provide further background

and details of authorship and publication. German philosophy books of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries offer few delights for the eye; however, portraits and a number of title pages have been chosen for illustration.

A word of caution is in order regarding the introductions, which, except for the biographical sections, are much more difficult to understand than for most Fisher catalogues. This exhibition is in the history of ideas, and the philosophies of Kant and these post-Kantians are among the most difficult to understand in the long history of philosophy. A catalogue which failed to convey at least a summary of their ideas, as recondite as they are, would fail to serve a vital purpose. Most readers, even those with a pre-existing interest in philosophy, will have a common sense point-of-view regarding reality and our ability to *know* its objects, which philosophers refer to in a non-pejorative sense as 'naïve realism', whereas none of the central ideas of these five philosophers conform with common sense; quite the contrary, they argue that this common sense view of the world is fundamentally wrong. Setting it aside, however, is a big hurdle for nearly all readers to get over. To make matters worse, their writings are unusually dense and very technical, the arguments complex, the ideas extremely abstruse, and invented terminology and ordinary words used in novel ways are utilized to explain their philosophies. So much so that many professional philosophers simply give up trying to read and understand Kant, for example, agreeing that while his philosophy is truly important, it is best left to the experts. And, even those experts often struggle to make the philosophy of Kant accessible to the general reader. Although an amateur, with their help, I will try.

All of the exhibited books have been selected from the Walsh Philosophy Collection, which is part of The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library at the University of Toronto. Although the Collection was initially gifted by Michael and Virginia Walsh in 1999, many of the books in this exhibition have been added since that time with their ongoing financial support and Michael's enthusiastic book-hunting.

IMMANUEL KANT (1724–1804): Kant was born, educated, and taught in Königsberg, a thriving Baltic port in East Prussia (now Kaliningrad and part of the Russian Federation). Raised in a family of modest means—his father was a master harness maker—Kant's intellectual abilities were recognized early, and he was assisted by his pastor and then by his uncle Richter, a master shoemaker, so that he could attend first the Collegium Fridericianum and then the University of Königsberg. Kant also benefited from being a skilled billiards and card player, as his regular winnings helped to sustain him. He then worked as a *Hofmeister*, a tutor in private homes, in the Königsberg area from 1748 to 1755, before returning to the University as a *Privatdozent,* that is, an unsalaried lecturer whose income depended on attracting students who paid fees to attend his lectures. Indeed, Kant needed to lecture on an unusually wide range of subjects in order to make ends meet. Other than a poorly paid short-term position as an assistant librarian, his first salaried position did not come until 1770, when he was appointed *ordinarius* professor of logic and metaphysics. During this period, he published extensively on both scientific and philosophical topics.

At the time of his professorial appointment, a significant change occurred in his thinking, and for the next decade he worked to shape his radically new 'critical philosophy' which came to fruition in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787) {#s 9 & 10}, the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) {# 15}, and the *Critique of Judgement* (1790) {# 16}. By this time, his fame and influence were great; however, the liberalism of his *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (1793) {# 18} led to an interdict forbidding his writing or teaching on religious topics.

While he never travelled far from the environs of Königsberg, Kant was a true cosmopolitan who interested himself in global affairs, often surprising more well-travelled meal companions by his wide knowledge of the world and current events. Although raised in a strict Pietist[2] family, Kant later came to disdain public display of religiosity, but without losing his sympathy for the needs that underlay religious belief. Kant never married, but he was a convivial man who built long-lasting friendships and who mixed in Königsberg society.

For an academic who had begun with nothing, Kant left a quite substantial estate of 20,000 thalers.[3] Although his salary as a new Professor was just 220 thalers in 1770, he was able to accumulate this large sum because of increases in salary as his stature grew, the student fees he continued to receive from private lectures and tutorials, his careful although not-stingy spending habits, and perhaps most importantly the wise stewardship of his savings. These Kant had invested with the firm of Green and Motherby, Joseph Green, a prosperous and well-read British merchant resident in Königsberg, having long been his closest and most trusted friend.

Kant retired from lecturing in 1797 but continued to write until the onset of dementia in his last few years made this impossible. He had never been a particularly healthy man, but he had also never suffered from serious illness. However, he was a hypochondriac and complained of numerous minor health problems, often involving his digestive system. Perhaps because he always felt he was on the verge of illness he led a very careful and regular routine in respect of his meals, sleep, and activities in order to preserve his health. As it turned out, he outlived most of his contemporaries and all of his good friends. He died on 12 February 1804, shortly before his eightieth birthday.

One of the more discerning assessments of Kant's intellectual integrity and personality was that of the critic and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who was first Kant's student and friend but later a passionate opponent, who nonetheless wrote in a letter that Kant '... was indifferent to nothing worth knowing. No cabal, no sect, no prejudice, no desire for fame, could ever tempt him in the slightest from broadening and illuminating the truth. He incited and gently forced others to think for themselves; despotism was foreign to his nature.'[4]

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY: It is often remarked that Kant was a 'late bloomer' in philosophy because the *Critique of Pure Reason* was not published until 1781, when he was fifty-seven years of age. However, this is true only in part for Kant's earlier works were also of high quality, if not as revolutionary in their character or impact. Several show the breadth of his interests and knowledge, particularly of the sciences. His self-published first book, written when he was

still a student, *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* (1746) {# 1}, is a work in natural philosophy. In 1755 he published *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* {# 2} which anticipated by forty years Pierre-Simon Laplace in advancing the nebular hypothesis—i.e., that our solar system resulted from the gravitational collapse of a spinning cloud of gases.[5] The topic of Kant's *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy* (1763) {# 5} is the philosophy of numbers and of arithmetic.

Of course, there are other books from what is usually referred to as Kant's 'pre-critical' period that deal with subjects more typically those of philosophers: *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* {#3} is a critique of syllogistic logic, and *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763) {# 4} anticipates the devastating attack on the traditional proofs for God's existence that he makes in the first *Critique.* Kant's *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) {# 6} advances ideas regarding the sublime, in particular, that had an impact on the later rise of German romanticism. His *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (1764), an essay written for a competition of the Berlin Academy (Kant won the second prize, Moses Mendelssohn the first), seeks to answer their question: whether metaphysical truths admit of distinct proofs. *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (1766) {# 7} is ostensibly a satirical attack on the visions of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), yet it also raises serious issues regarding the limitations of metaphysics, later a central concern of the first *Critique.*

It is, however, his 1770 inaugural dissertation as a professor at Konigsberg, *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* {# 8}, that points towards the philosophical revolution for which he is famous. Therein Kant argued that there was an important difference between sensible and conceptual knowledge. While sensible knowledge is based upon the fact that space and time are necessary forms of sensibility, conceptual or intelligible knowledge connects objects in ways that require metaphysical concepts. Kant believed that he would be able to quickly publish one or more substantial works that would clarify and argue more adequately for this distinction. Indeed, on 21 February 1772 he wrote in a long letter to Marcus Herz, a former student, that he was now 'in a position to bring out a critique of pure reason ... With respect to the first [theoretical] part ... to publish [it] within three months.'[6] However, as he explored the issues their depth and complexity revealed themselves. As it turned

out, he required nearly ten years before he was satisfied enough with the result to publish his *Critique of Pure Reason*. He published nothing of significance in the interim, and as a result this is called Kant's 'silent decade'.

Near the conclusion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states that philosophy ultimately seeks to answer three questions: 'What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?' (*CPR* A805/B833) The first *Critique* is primarily an answer to the first question. Kant asks: Why is it that all previous systems of metaphysics either contradict each other or within themselves generate unresolvable antinomies, that is, contradictions between two assertions or conclusions that are in themselves each reasonable? Perhaps this is because philosophers have taken the wrong approach, looking outward before first settling more solidly the foundation for their acquisition of knowledge—that is, looking inward.

He states that the task of a critique of pure reason is to ascertain what can rightfully be asserted independently of experience, i.e., *a priori,* as opposed to being based on experience, i.e., *a posteriori*. In the preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he writes: 'For the main question is always this: what, and how much, can understanding and reason cognize independently of all experience.' (*CPR* Axvii) In the preface to the second edition of that *Critique* he answers his question, saying that we must adopt a new way of thinking, '... that all we cognize [of objects] *a priori* is what we ourselves put into them.' (*CPR* Bxviii)

Kant held that there were three phases in the cognitive process: a sensible phase, a conceptual phase, and a phase of judgment. It is the combination of sensible intuition, the reception of sensory data, with understanding, subsuming that data under concepts, that allows us to synthesize experience, on the basis of which we make judgments. We have knowledge when we combine sensible intuitions with understanding and judge whether a particular intuition falls under the appropriate concept: 'dolphins are sea mammals' or 'look closely, it's a wolf not a dog'.

Sensibility and understanding are cognitive faculties, the first being passive and the second active. By 'faculty' Kant means an ability or power of the mind. The knowledge that we, as *subjects*, have of a world of experienced *objects*, is formed by these faculties. The empirical world is known to us only as a unity of interconnected appearance whose existence and nature are determined by these cognitive faculties—therefore, the empirical world is known to us *only* as appearance. What we must not do is claim that we experience *things in themselves* as

such, since such claims would require going beyond these necessary and limiting cognitive faculties which not only make experience possible but constitute its very nature.[7] Our ability to know the nature of ultimate reality, the thing in itself, is precluded by the character of our cognitive capacities. By 'in itself' what Kant means is a thing or world existing independently of these faculties. Our knowledge is restricted to objects of possible experience, i.e., appearances or *phenomena*; however, despite this, we have no right to assert that there is only appearance, that there is no reality other than the phenomenal—indeed, Kant asserts there are *noumena*, that is, the thing in itself insofar as it is not an object of sensible intuition[8] and the categories that we employ in understanding phenomena. As he writes in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic* (1783) {# 11}: '... if we regard the objects of the senses, as is proper, as mere appearances, we admit at the same time by so doing that they have a thing in itself as their ground, although we do not know what it is like in itself, but only know its appearance, i.e., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.' (*PFM* 4:315) The understanding '... limits sensibility by calling things in themselves ... noumena. But it immediately sets bounds for itself also: it acknowledges not cognizing things in themselves through any categories, and hence only thinking them under the name of an unknown something.' (*CPR* A256/B312)

Kant did not doubt the existence of an external world of real objects as in the 'immaterialism' of George Berkeley (1685–1753). He insisted that appearances had to be appearances of 'something' that was the cause or ground of sensible intuition.[9] However, as we will note later, his critics said that because Kant argued we cannot *know* the nature of such a reality, he had no right to even assert that there were things in themselves at all.[10]

Kant called this philosophy 'transcendental idealism' because it held that the experiential knowledge we undoubtedly have from daily life and the natural sciences was possible only because our mind substantially contributes that which we know.[11] The 'transcendental' concerns the mode of our knowledge of objects, not the objects themselves. Most importantly, 'transcendental' refers to that which is *prior to* or required for experience; it must not be confused with 'transcendent' or that which goes *beyond* experience. Despite which, the word 'transcendental' having engendered so much misunderstanding from his readers, Kant soon wrote that he would 'prefer to take this name back and will have it called critical idealism.' (*PFM* 4:294) Often, he just referred to his work as 'critical philosophy'.

How is it that we are limited in this way? Primarily it is because sensible intuitions are spatio-temporal. That is to say, *space* and *time* are forms of sensible intuition, they are *a priori* universal and necessary constitutive principles underlying experience. Space and time, the outer and inner forms of sensibility, are not drawn from experience but rather determine it.

Kant importantly asserts that judgements are not exclusively analytic or synthetic,[12] but that there are also synthetic *a priori* judgements, which, unlike analytic judgments, involve predicates not contained within their subject concept. As well, these judgments are also universal, necessary, and not drawn from experience, i.e., they are *a priori*. He gives as an example: 'Everything that happens has its cause.' The concept 'cause' is not contained within that of 'what happens'. But our understanding nonetheless thinks 'cause' must be connected to 'what happens'. We do not, however, derive this connection from experience but do so 'entirely a priori and on the basis of mere concepts.' (*CPR* A9/B13) We make a judgement that while not derived from experience is rightly applied to *all* experience, being universal and necessary. Indeed, causality is a necessary *a priori* concept that is required for sensibility. Our judgement that B, a sensible intuition, is caused by A, a source or object of that intuition, combines a sensation with our internal concept of causality to yield a presentation.[13] Sensible intuition and understanding are both necessary for experience—with appearances being *given* and concepts being *thought*.

Causality is one of twelve categories, pure concepts or forms of understanding, which are necessary for the experience of objects in general, that is, concepts which we apply to sensible intuitions *a priori*, thus making it possible for something to be an 'object' for a 'subject'. Drawing upon the traditional logic of his time, Kant argued that there were twelve forms of possible judgments, for each of which there was a parallel category for the types of things we might say or predicate about an object; for example, 'causality or dependence' being one of the three categories, along with 'substance' and 'community' which are constitutive of a *relational* judgment, e.g., A *caused* B.[14] The categories are not something we derive from experience but something we bring to experience: they are pure *a priori* forms of understanding—logical functions by which we subsume a sensible intuition under one or more concepts. Importantly, concepts are applicable to appearances, *phenomena*, not to things in themselves, *noumena*. One might say that in a fundamental way we are pre-wired to sense; form and use concepts; and make judgments of a particular sort about the

phenomenal world. Importantly, for Kant, sensory cognition and intellectual cognition are interdependent: 'Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.' (*CPR* B75)[15]

In his critique of traditional metaphysics, Kant focuses on three classic questions: the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, and concludes that we cannot demonstrate or prove these beliefs. The details of his negative arguments in each case go beyond the scope of this introduction; however, Kant's arguments are based on his belief that knowledge, being conditioned by the nature of our cognitive faculties, is limited to the world of appearances. However, with these and similar questions our reasoning naturally strives beyond that to the unconditioned, to the *noumenal*—to that which transcends our cognitive limitations and thereby results in metaphysical illusions. Causality 'holds only within the realm of experience' (*CPR* B644), whereas metaphysics claims knowledge that transcends experience. A simple example is Kant's rejection of the cosmological proof for the existence of God—that we *know* the world must have a first cause—because, he says, such knowledge is beyond possible experience. It is important to remember, however, that Kant also argues that the same cognitive limitations dictate that we cannot disprove these beliefs, something that is too often forgotten when writing about Kant. Indeed, he asserts that while we do not have theoretical grounds for such beliefs, we do have moral grounds. Our commitment to morality depends upon a feeling of obligation to a highest good, i.e., God. Similarly, although Kant accepts that all events in the *phenomenal* world must result from a cause, he also believes in the moral necessity of freedom, which must leave open the possibility of an ultimate *noumenal* reality in which moral choice is possible. For Kant, the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality are not properly ideas of theoretical reason but postulates of practical reason: 'I therefore had to annul *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*.' (*CPR* Bxxx)

Kant's favorite metaphor for the limitations of reason is that of a 'boundary': '... appearance brings forth truth so long as it is used in experience, but as soon as it goes beyond the boundary of experience and becomes transcendent, brings forth nothing but illusion.' (*PFM* 4:292) Again: '... I used the metaphor of a *boundary* in order to fix the limits of reason in respect of its appropriate use ... reason partakes in real positive knowledge merely by extending itself up to this boundary, but in such a way that it does not try to go beyond this boundary.' (*PFM* 4:361) However, this does not mean there *is* nothing beyond this

boundary. Indeed, as noted above, there is the *noumenal*. While we cannot know the *noumenal* Kant asserts that we *must* think it, for example, God as the subjective ground for order or design in the universe. And, because our cognitive functions limit knowledge to the *phenomenal*, we can hope, although not know, that necessity does not apply to the *noumenal*.

In addition to his critique of theoretical reason, as introduced above, Kant made a major contribution to explaining reason's use in actions or practice. His writings on ethics are contained primarily in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) {# 13}, the *Critique of Practical Reason,* published three years later, and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) {#s 25 & 26}.

There is but one Reason, but it can be used both theoretically to obtain objective knowledge, as discussed in the preceding, and practically to guide one's actions other than in the search for knowledge. Kant might say that we are not only thinkers but also doers, engaged in the world as moral agents. Kant's goal in this practical sphere is first to provide a new 'groundwork' or foundation for morality and in so doing to also establish the basis for autonomy or freedom of the will. Moral philosophy, he wrote, has three tasks: (i) to identify the supreme principle of morality, (ii) to examine critically pure practical reason, and (iii) to establish a metaphysics of morals. The first task Kant accomplished in the *Groundwork*, the second in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the third in *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

Animals act only by laws of nature, whereas humans act also using laws or principles derived rationally which we apply in either personal or public morality, for example, in political governance. We are guided by principles of action or maxims: 'do not steal' or 'share with those in greater need'. However, Kant says these maxims either alone or collectively do not provide the required foundation: 'There is nothing it is possible to think of ... that can be held to be good without limitation, excepting only a *good will*.' (*G* 4:393) That is to say, which is good in itself, without reference to some other purpose, for example, producing happiness. Whether an action is morally good cannot be decided by just considering the characteristics or consequences of the action itself, but rather is decided by determining the cause of that action, the will. The good will acts dutifully, but not just in fulfilling any duty, such as that of the soldier who stands on guard under orders, but rather acts dutifully for the sake of duty itself. As well, moral freedom, autonomy, results only with independence of the rational will from instincts and passions.

But how do we decide which acts are moral? Kant maintains that we require a principle which is necessary and universal, i.e., is *a priori*, that holds for all cases without reference to a particular end—it must be 'categorical', applying not just to myself but to all rational beings. It also asserts a *moral law*, establishing an *ought* or command that we act in a certain way—it is 'imperative'—while yet allowing us to act freely. Kant's Categorical Imperative states: 'Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.' (*G* 4:421) And: 'Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means.' (*G* 4:429)

In the broadest sense, a maxim is a general principal for life; however, it can have a narrower scope, e.g., 'keep your promises'. Further, for morality a maxim must be self-legislated, i.e., willed or followed freely, not legislated by others like the dutiful act of the soldier. 'Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them ... the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e., freedom.' (*CPrR* 5:33)

Theoretical reason is fundamentally *determined* by our cognitive faculties. Practical reason, on the other hand, directs the will freely. The relationship between the *ideas* of theoretical reason and practical reason arise ultimately from the condition that practical reason demands or must postulate *immortality*, *freedom*, and the *existence of God*.

> The *first* flows from the practically necessary condition of the adequacy of [one's] duration [i.e., that we are mortal] to the complete fulfillment of the moral law; the *second*, from the necessary presupposition of independence from the sensible world and of the ability to determine one's will according to the law of an intelligible world, i.e., the law of freedom; the *third*, from the necessity of the condition for such an intelligible world, in order for it to be the highest good, through the presupposition of the highest self-dependent good, i.e., the existence of God. (*CPrR* 5:132)

It must be remembered, of course, these are not facts that might be *known*, but rather rational presuppositions, what he sometimes calls 'regulative ideas', that are open to *belief*.[16] For example, while Kant argues that we cannot *know*

ourselves to be free, our experience as moral persons gives us a right to *believe* in the reality of freedom—to act as *responsible* moral agents; or to *believe* in a created, orderly, and purposive world, despite the fact that we cannot know this to be the case.[17]

Both the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* concentrated on developing the foundation of a theory of morals and said little regarding specific principles of public and private morality. Kant realized this and he promised his readers that he would deal with these in a future publication. *The Metaphysics of Morals* was published in two parts: (I) *The Metaphysical Principles of Justice* {# 25} and (II) *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue.* {# 26} The first concerns the doctrine of 'right' and of public and private law—the juridical rights of the state and of equity, e.g., the right to private property. Kant argues that freedom requires law and a government to enforce its provisions. Part II concerns one's duties to oneself and to others, e.g., truthfulness, self-respect, and respect for others. Part I also puts forward Kant's ideas regarding international law, which are credited with providing part of the background for the formation of the League of Nations (1920) and its successor the United Nations (1946).

The *Critique of Pure Reason* addressed the question: What can I know? The *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason* the question: What ought I to do? Kant's third question: What may I hope? remained to be answered. In 1793 he published *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* to provide at least part of his answer.

The common view at that time was that morality has its ultimate source in religion; however, Kant reversed this, arguing that religion actually proceeds from morality. 'Morality ... leads inescapably to religion, through which it expands to the idea of a powerful moral legislator, outside the human being, in whose will the final purpose (of the world's creation) is that which at the same time can be, and ought to be, the final purpose of the human being.' (*Rel* 6:6) Kant believed that the purpose of religion was to make better human beings, and for this he argued that morality requires a final end—Christian theology provides such an end because it holds that God and personal salvation is the goal of our religious lives. Although in the sphere of theoretical reason we could not know this to be the case, in the sphere of practical reason it is both compelling and rational to believe and hope that it so.[18] Note, however, that God wishes us to fulfill our duties to him autonomously, that is, not because he has commanded us to do so, but by carrying out the self-legislated moral law for its

own sake by fulfilling our duties to humankind. One can be moral without being religious; however, when one is religious, morality may be deepened through a belief that the maxims we live by are *also* divine commands and that our actions are pleasing to God.

The *Critique of Judgement* is divided into two parts: the longer first part is concerned with the beautiful and the sublime; the second with teleology, the explanation of something by the *purpose* or end that it serves. These seemingly diverse subjects are connected through the concepts of 'purpose' and 'purposiveness'.[19] In aesthetic judgments, we experience art as having the form of purposiveness but without having a purpose. Art is understood aesthetically when thought *as if* it was created for some purpose; whereas the parts of an organism are so arranged that the possibility of such an arrangement can only be understood as the consequence of a purpose. Judgment of purpose is objective, whereas judgment of purposiveness is subjective.

If so, Kant asks: How is it that an aesthetic judgment, e.g., 'that picture, poem, etc. is beautiful' can be subjective, the result of feelings, a personal sense of pleasure that we, as individuals, have of the object, and yet we think that others *ought* to agree with us, that there is something about this object or natural scene and our experience that justifies such a claim? Kant answers that the universality we expect is not a logical universality, such as that we might demand when doing math or science, but a subjective universality that is due to the capacities that we all have in common when we experience such objects, at least those of us with 'aesthetic taste'. However, it is also due to the fact that our judgment of taste is disinterested: '*Taste* is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking *devoid of all interest.* The object of such a liking is called *beautiful.*' (*CJ* 5:211)[20] Again, the answer lies in what we bring to the object in making an aesthetic judgment: the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding which we share, and which allow us to see the form of purposiveness in the object without it being the result of serving a purpose, unlike objects in nature. Even in judgments of natural beauty, we see this difference: the arborist might tell us: 'That is a red not a white oak—you see, its leaf lobes are bristly.' Whereas the aesthete might say: 'Those red oaks make this the most beautiful Fall in years.'

The situation is different with the natural world, which we irresistibly think as purposive: The Sun's gravitational pull holds the planets in their elliptical orbits; atoms, ions or molecules bond to form chemical compounds;

organisms have parts which must function together to sustain the plant or animal. Here, we believe that the nature of things can only be explained teleologically, i.e., as the product of purpose. Nature, the *Critique of Pure Reason's* totality of the objects of possible experience, is thought on the analogy of Art *as if* ordered and purposive. However, purpose here is a *regulative* idea, a guide for our inquiry, not something that we can prove or disprove. Kant writes that 'teleological judging is reflective, not determinative ... hence, it holds only subjectively, i.e., for us, rather than objectively; i.e., for ... things themselves.' (*CJ* 5:360,413)

For Kant, our cognition of nature is dependent on a maxim or principle that everything in nature is designed for a unique good—the existence of moral beings who will achieve the highest good of uniting virtue with happiness. He says that while this maxim is merely regulative it determines our concept formation and scientific practice. However, it is not constitutive, i.e., it does not determine the nature of reality. Kant maintains that when confronted with a seemingly ordered world we have a fundamental need to *believe* such a world to be the result of purpose or design, for this is the only way we can satisfy our moral hopes; as a result, such a belief is rational. However, this does not entitle us, like the speculative metaphysician, to assert that we *know* that nature is purposive or that there is a designer who has provided the apparent order of the world.

The *Critique of Judgement* was intended to bridge some of the gaps in Kant's philosophy between the theoretical philosophy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the moral philosophy of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Here, tensions which inhere in Kant's transcendental idealism rise to the surface. It provides us with a glimpse into the actual workings of the mental faculties that Kant sought to chart in the first two *Critiques*. For this very reason, it provided the point of departure for much of the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

Some say that Kant's principal achievement was to show how the ambitions of metaphysicians led to interminable disputes because they failed to recognize the limitations of reason—they believed they could cross the 'boundary'. It is striking then that his most famous successors believed they could do exactly that, while each argued that he was developing Kant's thought. The notable historian of philosophy Frederick Copleston summarized:

> In the German philosophical world during the early part of the nineteenth century we find one of the most remarkable flowerings of metaphysical speculation which have occurred in the long history of western philosophy. We are presented with a succession of systems, of original interpretations of reality and of human life and history, which possess a grandeur that can hardly be called in question . . . For each of the leading philosophers of the period professes to solve the riddle of the world, to reveal the secret of the universe and the meaning of human existence.[21]

Exactly what Kant said one cannot do! To do so, each thought he had to rid philosophy of Kant's unknowable *thing in itself* and proceed to characterize the nature of Reality. Indeed, their key criticism of Kant was that he was inconsistent—that given his arguments he had no right to still assert the existence of things in themselves—an unknowable something or *noumenon* that underlies or grounds our experiences. After all, causality in Kant's system *only* finds application to experience or appearances, it cannot reach beyond such experience to a ground. On the contrary, his critics said, if we do have such a right, then we also must be free to characterize the fundamental nature of Reality, which these successors set out to do.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762–1814): After an unpromising start—he was the son of a Saxon ribbon weaver and herded geese as a child—Fichte displayed great intellectual gifts by the age of nine, which led to the generous support of a local baron who sponsored his education, first at the prominent Pforta boarding school and later at the universities of Jena and Leipzig. From 1785 to 1793, he worked as a private tutor while writing tracts on political topics which supported the ideals of the French Revolution and

advocated for democratic principles. While doing so he discovered the works of Kant, the great impact of which caused him to travel to Königsberg to meet Kant, who was initially unresponsive to the young acolyte. Fichte resolved to gain his interest with a sample of his own work, which he inscribed to 'The Philosopher'. Kant read and approved Fichte's manuscript of an *Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation* (1792) {# 39} and even helped him find a publisher. However, for an unknown reason, Fichte's book was printed without any author's name, leading many to suppose that it was a long-anticipated book on this topic from Kant. When Kant said that he was not the author and praised Fichte's book, this resulted in its success and Fichte's early fame. Among those who were impressed by Fichte's book was the polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), then an influential counselor at the court of Weimar, who proposed Fichte for a then vacant chair in philosophy at Jena. Fichte held this from May 1794 to April 1799, when he was dismissed on charges of atheism. He argued that his dismissal was due to a gross misunderstanding of his work by Jena's conservative professors of theology.[22] Fichte then moved to Berlin, where he lived by his pen and gave private lectures. He was a very prolific author, not just of books aimed at his fellow philosophers but also of some which sought a wider readership. He returned to academia in December 1809, when he helped found the University of Berlin, not only becoming dean of its philosophical faculty but also being elected the University's first rector. Fichte was a very popular lecturer until January 1814, when he died of a typhus infection that he had caught from his wife who was volunteering as a nurse in a military hospital during the Napoleonic Wars.

FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY: Fichte always considered himself loyal to the spirit of Kant's philosophy, but he could not accept Kant's *thing in itself*. Indeed, he went so far as to say that it 'is a piece of whimsy, a pipe dream, a nonthought.'[23] Like Kant, he agreed that philosophy must first look inward; indeed, the foundation of Fichte's philosophy is self-consciousness. So much so that, for Fichte, the 'outer' is incorporated into the 'inner'. Influenced by his reading of Benedict Spinoza (1632–77), Fichte was at first a determinist, believing that we, like the rest of Nature, are simply at the end of a long causal chain, each link determined by the one before it. However, he was soon uncomfortable with this

position as it seemed to do away with morality which required that we be able to act freely.

Fichte introduced his own philosophy in *On the Idea of a Theory of Science* (1794) {# 40}. *Wissenschaftslehre*, i.e., 'Doctrine or Theory of Science', was the name Fichte coined for his new philosophy. His use of the term 'science' is more comprehensive than what is usual now, encompassing not only the natural sciences: physics, chemistry, biology, and so on, but really all knowledge—what we might now call a 'theory of knowledge'. Fichte repeatedly developed and significantly revised his *Wissenschaftslehre* in lectures and publications, making it difficult to pin down or characterize exactly what his system is because it never seems to stand still for long. For example, very soon thereafter he published a more comprehensive work *Foundations of the Entire Theory of Science* (1794/95), {# 42} which was based on his Jena lectures. Indeed, Daniel Breazeale has written that in his lectures, which are often the basis for his publications, Fichte '... produced no less than fifteen radically different presentations of this system, each of which possesses its own unique starting point, deductive strategy, principle of organization and even vocabulary.'[24] The final, although not necessarily definitive, presentation was in *The Science of Knowledge Presented in its General Outline* (1810), a pamphlet-length summary of a late lecture.[25] Not only did Fichte's presentations frequently change, but his writings are very difficult to understand. This frustrated even Fichte, indeed in 1801, after losing his Jena professorship, he published a work addressed not just to scholars that had the remarkable title: *A Report, Clear as the Sun, for the General Public on the Real Essence of the Latest Philosophy: An Attempt to compel the Reader to Understand.*[26]

Fichte was shaken by a criticism of Kant made by Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761–1833) in his *Aenesidemus* (1792). Schulze argued that given the restrictions that Kant put on our cognitive faculties it was contradictory of him to then claim that the thing in itself even existed—because the concept of 'cause', by which Kant links object and appearance, is an *a priori* form of cognition and thus is itself subjective in origin. In a late 1793 letter, Fichte wrote: '*Aenesidemus* ... has convinced me ... that even after the labors of Kant and Reinhold [an early supporter of Kant], philosophy is still not a science ... I have been forced to construct a new system. I am convinced that philosophy can become a science only if it is generated from one single first principle, but that it must then become just as self-evident as geometry.'[27] To avoid Kant's 'contradiction' Fichte believed this principle must be grounded in a more radical subjectivity, a pure

idealism. Kant had erred, he thought, in deeply divorcing the object of cognition, the thing in itself, from our apprehension of it, giving it a seemingly separate existence. Instead, Fichte believed that knowledge and reality must be deduced from a single principle of an absolute ego or 'I' striving for self-consciousness. Fichte's is not a being *in itself*, but a being *for consciousness* —indeed, the objective world exists only for consciousness.

Fichte's deduction of consciousness is detailed and, for this reader, very obscure; the following is a severely truncated version. He insists the first principle of philosophy, because it is 'first', cannot be proved but must simply be posited.[28] Fichte's first principle is the act of a self-positing ego or 'I', which in positing itself, also posits the 'not-I', that which limits it. In turn the 'not-I' is limited by the 'I'. This self or ego, which cognition presupposes, is an 'I' that is in action, not just thinking but also as an agent with a will acting in the world. The 'I' has absolute, theoretical, and practical capacities. The 'absolute I' is the supra-individual subject of general cognition. Importantly, the 'absolute I' is not an entity or being, but pure activity, which posits everything, including individual selves and all that is 'not-I'. The 'absolute I' strives for self-consciousness and does so through individual consciousnesses, i.e., the finite individuals which it has posited. Importantly, each individual or 'finite-I' is determined only by itself. That is to say, each is free, not necessitated, but only limited by the need to recognize the freedom of others. All are engaged together as part of a historical progression or striving towards full self-consciousness, which, however, remains for each an unreachable ideal. Indeed, for us to be truly free there must be nothing outside of consciousness that could curtail our moral decisions.[29]

In an open letter of 7 August 1799, Kant stated his highly negative opinion of Fichte's philosophy: 'I hereby declare that I regard *Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre* as a totally indefensible system ... I have advised him, in a letter, to turn his fine literary gifts to the problem of applying the *Critique of Pure Reason* rather than squander them in cultivating fruitless sophistries.'[30]

Fichte's late theoretical works moved away from this transcendental philosophy of consciousness towards a philosophy of Being, which now was seen to be presupposed by consciousness, and which was somewhat closer to conventional religious ideas regarding God.

In addition to his more theoretical works, Fichte had a strong interest in political and social matters, and his writings on such topics were widely read. He had a special interest in the role of the intellectual in society, and his *Some*

Lectures Concerning the Vocation of the Scholar (1794) is still relevant and much admired.[31] Building on his Jena lectures, one of the more important books was the *Foundation of Natural Right* (1796/97) {# 44}, an exposition of the principles of natural law. This was followed by his *System of Ethics* (1798) {# 45}, which Fichte believed could be soundly deduced from his epistemological and metaphysical system. *The Vocation of Man* (1800) {# 46} was one of Fichte's more popular books, both when published and today. *The Characteristics of the Present Age* (1806) {# 47} is based upon Berlin lectures and points out the many shortcomings of the present epoch, despite which this age can be a basis for advancing humankind to its goal of a life led according to Reason. *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808) {# 48} are lectures that Fichte delivered after Prussia's disastrous defeat by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1806, and again builds on the principle that scholars have a moral responsibility to use their knowledge to improve society. Unfortunately, Hitler and the Nazis were able much later to twist some of its patriotic fervour to serve their diabolical ends.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING (1775–1854): Schelling, the son of a Lutheran pastor and professor of Oriental languages, attended the Lutheran seminary in Tübingen, the Tübinger Stift, where, although five years their junior, he was a room-mate of Hegel and the future poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Extremely precocious, he had learned Greek and Latin by eight and he entered the seminary at fifteen, although the usual minimum age was twenty. Schelling's star rose more quickly than that of his room-mates. He published *On the Possibility of a Form for all Philosophy* in 1794 when he was only nineteen. And, in 1798, with Goethe's assistance he became a professer at Jena, soon occupying the dismissed Fichte's chair. In that first book, Schelling attempted to provide an ultimate foundation for Kant's philosophy. Drawing ideas from Fichte and Spinoza, he developed what he named *Naturphilosophie*, which

system received its fullest explication in 1800 in *The System of Transcendental Idealism* {# 52}. The publication in 1801 of *Bruno, or about the Divine and Natural Principles of Things* {# 53} marks a shift to his 'philosophy of identity'. He and Hegel edited a short-lived[32] journal, the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, a good bit of which consisted of their own essays. However, the two argued in 1807 over Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which book Schelling was disappointed to find was no longer faithful to his ideas. From 1803 to 1806 Schelling taught at the University of Würzburg, moving from there to Munich where he became general secretary and later president of the Academy of the Beautiful Arts. In 1841 he returned to university teaching in Berlin, lecturing until 1846.

Schelling was a prolific author, particularly in his early years; however he was deeply affected by the early death in 1809 of his wife Caroline Schlegel-Schelling[33] and published his last important book *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* {# 58} when he was just thirty-four. He ended his teaching career by accepting a lucrative professorship in Berlin, where ten years before Hegel had been a professor. There was a certain irony in this, as Hegel had derived some of his leading ideas from Schelling. Hegel resented the fact that the five-years younger Schelling blossomed early, while he did not; however, Schelling later came to resent the fact that Hegel's fame soon passed him by.

In his later years, Schelling's thought became increasingly conservative, especially with respect to religion, and he came to believe that philosophy, especially metaphysics, could be best explained through Christian religious concepts, for example, the impersonal Absolute becomes a personal God. Schelling was ennobled in 1808, and he was very much at home with the aristocracy, indeed, tutoring one or the other of its members for much of his professional life, one of whom was the future King Maximilian II.

SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY: Schelling's thought can be divided into four periods; only the first (1797–1800), his philosophy of Nature, and the second (1800–1807), his Identity philosophy, are sketched in what follows.[34] His early writing was greatly influenced by Fichte's philosophy of consciousness, an in-

fluence that declined but was never totally lost. His primary criticism of Fichte was that his emphasis on consciousness or the ego, i.e., the subject, resulted in a neglect of Nature, the object.

Schelling believed that Kant's agnosticism regarding our knowledge of the *thing in itself* could be resolved if the gap between the experiencing subject and the objective world was closed. The subject, the ego or self, requires a bridge to the object, the natural world. This bridge, he said, could be provided by an Absolute which not only bridged but also encompassed both subject and object. There is nothing outside the Absolute. But what ground was there for asserting that such an Absolute existed? Schelling argued that this was not something that could be successfully argued for; however, it could be intellectually intuited—we must simply *see* that it is the case.

Schelling thought neither Kant nor Fichte had recognized the importance of Nature. For him, Nature is not just an experienced object, but itself develops in a teleological manner upwards towards Spirit or the all-encompassing Absolute. The lower is not only the foundation for the upper but is subsumed and explained by it. Whereas Fichte had made the Ego the foundation of his philosophy, Nature played this role for Schelling. However, in contrast to what is normally thought, it is not Nature as object but as subject, that is, Nature conscious of itself, that is key for Schelling. We are each part of Nature, and when we are self-conscious the subject experiences itself as object—the *self* is both subject and object of the same thought, *self* and *it*self are one and the same.

Thinking is a production of Nature, therefore, part of Nature; whereas it is only through Thought that we have a grasp of Nature. Writ large, in Schelling's metaphysical scheme the Absolute is the Identity of the subjective and objective, the Identity of the ideal and the real. The Absolute, which is 'both subject and object—of itself ... posits its sole reality in an absolute that is both cause and effect of itself—in the absolute identity of the subjective and the objective, which we call nature, and which in its highest potentiality is again nothing else but self-consciousness.'[35]

Reason allows for the progress from the unconscious, the non-ego, to the conscious. Reason is the venue in which '... nature first returns completely to itself, which makes clear that nature is originally identical with what we recognize within ourselves as intelligence and consciousness.'[36] A famous phrase that Hegel later used to express this idealistic stance is: 'What is rational is actual;

and what is actual is rational.'[37] Indeed, because Being is one, whatever is actual is self-identical—particular things are not different in essence, but are differentiated 'powers' of infinite or absolute Identity.

There are preconscious forces in Nature that are revealed to Consciousness through a process of self-objectification of individuals, who are themselves the product of those forces. However, for Schelling bridging the gap between finite individuals and the infinite Absolute requires the assistance of the Arts, which, while part of the natural or material world, unite with the spiritual or conscious to reveal the Absolute. The artistic genius while acting consciously is not just highly skilled but also unknowingly serves as a vehicle for unconscious powers, thereby manifesting the identity of the ideal and the real. Just as the artist produces his or her art object, so Consciousness produces its object, Reality. With art, the true and the beautiful are indeed one. Schelling's theory has been called 'aesthetic idealism'. Because of his giving the arts this central role in his philosophy and his extolling of Nature, Schelling had considerable influence on the Romantic movement in German literature and the other arts.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770–1831): Born in Stuttgart, the son of a government official, Hegel entered the Lutheran seminary at Tübingen in 1788 to prepare for the church. Although his interest in religious topics never died, he recognized early that he was unsuited to the life of a pastor and became a private tutor upon graduation in 1793, hoping in this way to have the time and means to study and develop his philosophical ideas. During this period, he wrote a number of essays, most dealing with theological topics, and in 1801 he published his first book *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* {# 59}, which argued for the superiority of the latter. Having obtained a small legacy after his father's death, he moved to Jena in 1802 where his seminary friend Schelling, who was a professor of philosophy, helped him to become a *Privatdozent,* i.e.,

unsalaried lecturer. For a brief period, they together published the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*. Although Hegel became an extraordinary professor (i.e., without a chair) at Jena in 1805, he had to abandon this in 1806 due to personal issues (he was short of funds and had impregnated his landlady) and the temporary closure of the University which followed Napoleon's defeat of Prussia at Jena.

In 1807, Hegel took a job editing a small newspaper, the *Bamberger Zeitung* in Bavaria. In that year, he published *The Phenomenology of Spirit* {# 60}, his most important work. In 1808 he became rector and professor of philosophy at a classical Gymnasium (secondary school) in Nuremberg, a position that he held until 1816. While there he wrote his other major work, the three-volume *Science of Logic* (1812–16) {# 61}. In 1816, Hegel accepted a professorship at Heidelberg University. In 1817, to assist his students, he published the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* {# 63}, a short compendium of his philosophical system, which is divided into three parts: logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of mind. In 1818 he accepted the chair in philosophy at Berlin and held this position until his death. His Berlin lectures were widely attended by students and many others—indeed, he soon became a national institution. Hegel was extremely well read, and his lectures and books have many illustrations drawn from literature. While at Berlin he published only the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1821) {# 66} and greatly expanded editions of the *Encyclopedia* in 1827 {# 64} and 1830 {# 65}. Posthumously, his Berlin lectures on the philosophy of history, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and history of philosophy were edited from student notes and published in the first edition of his collected works {# 67}. He died during a cholera epidemic; however, his health had been poor, and it is now thought that his death may have been due to other causes.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY: Unlike the writings of both Fichte and Schelling, which over time show considerable changes in their key ideas, Hegel's are much more constant. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* presents in detail his core theory of Reality, and his task in later works and lectures was largely to explain and strengthen that theory, as well as to show its implications for areas outside philosophy, for example, in art, politics, and religion.

Hegel believed that the cognitive faculty of Understanding gives us the ability in daily life and in scientific practice to abstract the particular from the whole by distinguishing differences and oppositions. However, he also believed that we have a higher cognitive faculty of Reason which enables us to overcome these oppositions and to become conscious of the whole of reality in the absolute Idea, or simply the 'Absolute', which is the totality of reality or being. The philosopher's role, using Reason, is to overcome apparent oppositions: phenomenal and noumenal, subject and object, infinite and finite, mind and body, and so forth, that prevent us from recognizing the Absolute.

In order to do this, Hegel developed a dialectical logic, most fully in the *Science of Logic*, in which a concept is first considered, then its opposite, and from those a new concept is found that unites the two. However, his notion of concepts is markedly different from that of Kant. Whereas Kant had argued that the concepts or categories with which we understand sensible objects are part of the toolbox of our mind, Hegel argued that these concepts are not simply mental but are part of Reality in itself.

For example, he begins the *Science of Logic* with the concept 'being', which cannot be understood without its opposite 'non-being'. How do we resolve this opposition? Through the dialectical process we discover a concept 'becoming' which combines them. Hans Küng aptly sets out this process: 'Behind it lay the basic insight ... that I cannot state the truth absolutely clearly and distinctly merely in *one* sentence, but really need three, dialectically affirming, denying, surpassing: this is how it is, and yet not so, in fact there is more to it. And so on. In this sense truth lies in the totality, not in the individual steps, theses, propositions or elements of which it is made up.'[38]

The task of philosophy is to reveal the teleological process of self-actualization of the Absolute as it 'creates' finite objects, including humans, and becomes fully conscious of itself, through the consciousness of their minds. The Absolute is not something that stands *above* finite things, for the world of things *is* its self-creation. Hegel's philosophy is referred to as absolute idealism because its concepts are ideal, with the ideal or subjective having ontological priority over objects. Nature is the objective expression of absolute Mind or Spirit.[39] It is mind-like in that Spirit is the world-process, but the Absolute itself is substantial. Spirit creates its opposite, Nature, and then through a dialectical process which Hegel calls 'sublation' this opposition is ultimately resolved in the self-consciousness of the Absolute.[40]

If the dynamic process of reasoning were to continue to its ideal end, the philosopher would have a full comprehension of reality in grasping the Absolute. That is to say, as finite humans come to self-consciousness this process reveals the self-consciousness of the Absolute because we are part of the totality which the Absolute actualizes. Just as, for us, when subject and object become one in self-consciousness, so the Absolute is consciousness that includes its own objectivity—all of reality. In the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* Hegel writes: 'In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* I have presented consciousness as it progresses from the first immediate opposition of itself and the subject matter to absolute knowledge. This path traverses all the forms of the *relations of consciousness to the object* and its result is the *concept of science*.'[41]

This dynamic process of Nature is purposive and hierarchical. Here and elsewhere Hegel sees triadic movement and order: organisms such as plants are simply nutritive, while animals are not only nutritive but sensitive and act from motives, and humans do all of these, but we also think and reason. The higher contains the lower. Purpose or teleology is shown in the functionality or fitness of the lower to the higher.

Consciousness has a history according to Hegel and he also names it Reason. In the first phase of Reason consciousness, both finite and absolute, the subject becomes aware of its object as something outside of itself. In the second phase, self-consciousness arises as the subject becomes aware of itself. Finally, at the level of realized Reason, consciousness sees Nature as an objective expression of the Spirit with which it is now united. Further, while the subject sees Nature as the self-manifestation of God, he or she does so with anthropomorphic and pictorial images of a deity and an incarnated saviour. At the highest level, however, absolute knowledge is reached where this truth is apprehended philosophically. The philosopher is aware of the self as a moment in the life of the infinite Spirit. That is, at this level the finite subject participates in the self-thinking Absolute; indeed, the infinite or absolute Idea only thinks itself through the finite mind of the philosopher.

Clearly Hegel, like Fichte and Schelling, has crossed the epistemological 'boundary' which Kant said we must not cross if we want to avoid uttering metaphysical nonsense.[42] For Hegel the unfolding Spirit or Absolute *knows* itself—and there is nothing else to know.



ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788–1860): Schopenhauer was the son of a wealthy merchant.[43] Originally intended for the family firm, he received a very cosmopolitan private education and only studied at the Universities of Göttingen and Berlin after his father's premature death. He derived very little from the philosophy lecturers he heard at Berlin, one of whom was Fichte; however, he also took a wide variety of science courses, first at Göttingen and then at Berlin, which did benefit his later work.[44] His dissertation became his first publication *On the Fourfold Root of the Principal of Sufficient Reason* (1813) {# 68}, a work in epistemology that he insisted must be read before one tackled his major work. For a period of time he lived with his widowed mother in Weimar, a cultural center, where he came to know Goethe who regularly attended his mother's fashionable literary salon.[45] As a consequence, he wrote the short book *On Vision and Colours* (1816) {# 70} in which he sought to improve Goethe's massive *On the Theory of Colours* (1810). Not surprisingly, Goethe was not pleased that this brash young man thought he had 'improved' his theory.

Schopenhauer read voraciously in seven languages and having private means he was able to devote his life to study and writing. His major work *The World as Will and Representation* (1819) {# 71} was published when he was only thirty. Some years passed before he published *On Will in Nature* (1836) {# 73}, which is largely concerned with providing evidence from the natural sciences for his metaphysics of Will, and two lengthy essays on ethics submitted to prize competitions, *On the Freedom of the Human Will* (1839) {# 74, 75} and *On the Basis of Morals* (1841) {# 75}. In 1844, he published a second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, {# 72} which amended the original text in many places and added an equally lengthy second volume consisting of essays that explored, argued for, or expanded the topics of the first edition.[46] However, neither attention nor fame came to Schopenhauer until very late in his life when his oddly titled two-volume collection of more popular studies and essays *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851) {# 76} was noticed critically by the Englishman

John Oxenford in *The Westminster Review* for April 1853. Oxenford's article, 'Iconoclasm in German Philosophy', was in turn noticed and translated into German, with the result that in this roundabout way Schopenhauer was 'discovered' thirty-five years after he published his *magnum opus*. That this lack of attention never stifled his quest to independently develop his ideas says much for his dedication to philosophy.

Schopenhauer was a very cultured man: he visited the major museums of Europe many times, regularly attended concerts and operas, played the flute well, had an extensive knowledge of Western literature as well as the religious heritage of the East, was very well informed of developments in the sciences, and had deeply studied all periods of western philosophy. He was often seen in Frankfurt walking his small poodle Atma, whom the local children called 'Young Schopenhauer'. Indeed, he had a much higher opinion of dogs than of most humans. He led a very ordered life and died in Frankfurt in 1860, now enjoying his growing fame and confident that he had solved the 'riddle of existence'.

Unlike Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, Schopenhauer's writing is crystal clear, although sometimes repetitive and digressive. He had a writer's natural gift, but he also made great effort to achieve clarity of argument and style. The tortuous prose of the German Idealists was one reason why he held them in contempt. However, he tolerated poor writing in Kant because of the importance of what he had to say.

Schopenhauer is unusual among philosophers in that his writings had a considerable impact on non-philosophers, for example, among writers: Turgenev, Tolstoy, Zola, Hardy, Guy de Maupassant, Conrad, Proust, Thomas Mann, Beckett, Hesse, and Borges; composers: Wagner, Brahms, and Mahler; psychologists: Freud and Jung; and even physicists: Einstein and Schrödinger. Ironically, although Wagner praised Schopenhauer extremely highly, Schopenhauer had a rather poor opinion of Wagner's music, preferring Mozart and Rossini.

SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY: Schopenhauer maintained that Plato and Kant were the only two titans of philosophy. He wrote: 'Kant is probably the most original mind ever produced by nature. To think with him and in his manner is something incomparable to anything else, since he possessed a degree of clear and quite particular soundness of mind as has never been granted to

another mortal.'[47] In a letter he said that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was 'the most important book ever written in Europe.'[48] Of himself, he said: '... the root of my philosophy already lies in the Kantian philosophy, especially in the doctrine of the empirical and intelligible character, but generally that, as soon as Kant throws more light on the thing in itself, it looks through its veil as *will*, to which I have explicitly drawn attention in my *Critique of the Kantian Philosophy* and consequently have said that my philosophy is only the thinking-through-to-the-end of his.'[49] Schopenhauer saw himself as Kant's only worthy successor. Admirer as he was, however, he found much of Kant's work seriously flawed, and this *Critique*, a lengthy appendix to his own major work, is a brilliant and unflinching critical attack.[50]

Unlike the three German Idealists who thought Kant was wrong to posit the existence of the thing in itself, Schopenhauer thought Kant's greatest achievement was the distinction he made between appearance and thing in itself, or, as Schopenhauer puts it, between the empirical and the intelligible. However, where he differs from Kant is that he felt he had discovered the underlying nature of the thing in itself—it is *Will*, and the essence of will is endless striving, especially in the organic realm a will-to-life.[51] The title of Schopenhauer's major book reveals this core thought: *The World as Will and Representation*. 'Representation' is the world as experienced, Kant's appearance or *phenomena*, while 'Will' is actuality, Kant's *noumena*. While Kant left the thing in itself as an unknown 'something', Schopenhauer asserts the thing in itself is will, although he insisted, we could never fully *know* the character of will.

In self-consciousness we are aware of our bodies as objects. To satisfy needs we will our bodies to act in a certain way. Our bodies in action are thus objectified will. If we extend this discovery to the world at large, we arrive at actuality as objectified will. This must be a single will, because individual objectified wills are imprisoned in space and time, forms of our cognitive faculties, and thus are incapable of going beyond representations. Will is reality or, better, universal actuality, and thus is not individuated. Will is not *a* thing, even a supreme thing, it is everything.

Humans, the highest organism, possess reason, which primarily acts in the service of their physical and other needs, e.g., nourishment and procreation. Building upon their immediately intuited sensible experiences, humans form concepts that assist them in satisfying their desires, e.g., nutritious food or an attractive partner. However, to this point they are not able to go beyond

representation to the thing in itself. So how is metaphysics possible and how do they know that reality is will? Schopenhauer argues that while intellect primarily serves to satisfy needs, humans are also capable of briefly rising above this to a contemplative level where they can have some grasp of will. Cognitive intuitions occur through either outer or inner sensibility, the first of objects and the second of ourselves willing.

A key instrument for this is aesthetic contemplation, where we have a disinterested, will-less engagement with objects of art.[52] Indeed, artists have a 'genius' which allows them to convey Platonic Ideas, the universal in the particular, forms or levels of the adequate objectivation of will. Through the medium of their works, others can gain some insight into will.[53] The fine arts vary in their ability to do this and Schopenhauer ranks them by their power to do so: architecture, the visual arts, and the literary arts, with tragedy, the supreme literary form, ranking highest because it portrays 'the terrible aspect of life ... misery of humanity, the triumph of wickedness ...'[54] Music, as compared to other arts, is even more exalted because it is a direct rather than a mediated embodiment of will.

Schopenhauer found will manifested in countless natural phenomena, for example, the instinctive behaviour of animals. Organisms of all kinds evidence striving, a will-to-life, as a blind and unbridled force in Nature. We humans strive for happiness but find that despite our successes there is no cessation of our desires. Furthermore, satisfaction of my desires often must come at a cost to yours. The world is one of conflict, animals of one species prey on another, and the powerful take advantage of the weak. Thus, Schopenhauer arrives at his theory of metaphysical pessimism, going so far as to say it would be better if we had never been born.

What can one do to still one's willing? One must deny the will, so that intellect no longer serves motives for action. Schopenhauer, drawing here as elsewhere on his deep reading of Eastern religious thought, argues that asceticism can help to still the blind striving that is will, at its highest arriving at a *negation of will.*

Schopenhauer's favourite term to describe his immediate predecessors was 'charlatans', and his remarks about them are ill-tempered and needlessly personal: '... according to my judgement, *Fichte, Schelling* and *Hegel* are not philosophers, lacking as they do the first requisite for being counted as such, seriousness and honesty in research. They are merely sophists ... they have excelled in

one thing, which is the art of charming the audience and passing themselves off for what they are not; which undoubtedly calls for talent, just not philosophical talent.'[55] Schopenhauer was especially scornful of Hegel: 'If one intentionally wants to make a young man stupid and wholly incapable of thought, then there is no better proven means than the diligent study of Hegel's original works.'[56] In contrast, despite his sharp criticisms, he compared the effect of studying Kant's writings to that of a 'cataract operation on a blind person.'[57]

POSTFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THE PRECEDING INTRODUCTION and the Catalogue that follows are based not only upon my reading of some of the works in question, particularly those of Kant and Schopenhauer, but also on standard reference works and bibliographies, as well as specialized monographs and essays. Were this an academic work, detailed references would be given; however, in a catalogue of this kind I believe such references would serve few of its expected readers, indeed, they might burden their reading. Consequently, other than for direct quotations I have not given specific references.

In addition to using such sources, in writing the individual catalogue entries I have learned much from the book descriptions and catalogues of the many booksellers who have offered these books for sale. Given that it has taken nearly fifty years to acquire these books, I could not possibly recall to whom I might owe detailed information about a particular publication. However, I do owe great thanks to these booksellers. Although they have a pecuniary interest in what they do, for most of them antiquarian bookselling is much more than a job, it is a calling. Long hours are spent not only in finding rare books to sell but in researching their contents and circumstances of publication. There would be little interest in a list of all the dealers in England, Germany, the United States, and elsewhere from whom I acquired these books; however, I

would be remiss if I did not mention my friend Rudi Thoemmes, who has been the source of a disproportionate number.

I would also like to thank the staff of The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library for their assistance, and most importantly, for their perhaps misplaced confidence that letting an 'amateur' undertake this project would not result in disaster. Finally, without the incredible support of my wife Virginia the building of the Walsh Philosophy Collection would not have happened.

(Endnotes)

1 Gary Dorrien. *Kantian Religion and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology.* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. ix. For philosophers 'modern' begins in 1637 with the publication of René Descartes' *Discourse on the Method.*

2 Pietism was an evangelical revivalist movement in Lutheranism that began in the seventeenth century and which emphasized one's having an authentic inner spirituality, an experience of the reception of the gift of divine grace which leads to *Herzensänderung* or a change of heart that would bring about personal moral reform and assure one of salvation. The Collegium Fridericianum was founded by strict Pietists. Although Kant left most of pietism far behind, the idea of a personal 'change of heart' plays a role in his ethical and religious philosophy.

3 To give these amounts some perspective; in the late eighteenth century, a Prussian Thaler contained approximately 0.537 ounces of silver, a very senior Prussian civil servant earned about 2000 Thalers per annum, and a student would require about 50–60 Thalers to get himself through the academic year.

4 Quoted in L. W. Beck, 'Immanuel Kant 1724–1804', *Makers of Modern Thought*, ed. Bruce Mazlish (New York, 1972), p. 221.

5 Laplace's *Exposition du systême du monde* (Paris: Cercle-Social, 1796).

6 *Correspondence, Akademie* edition 10:132.

7 Kant argues '... that the conditions for the possibility of experience as such are simultaneously conditions for the possibility of objects of experience and hence have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment.' (*CPR* A158/B197)

8 'Intuition' must not be understood here in its common usage as a 'quick and ready insight', but rather as 'immediate apprehension or cognition'. *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.*

9 'For otherwise an absurd proposition would follow, *viz.*, that there is an appearance without anything that appears.' (*CPR* Bxxviii) This is the position Kant took in the 1787 second edition of the *CPR*; however, in the 1781 first edition he affirmed a stance seemingly closer to Berkeley's subjective idealism: '... if I removed the thinking subject then the whole corporeal world would have to go away, since this world is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of, and a kind of presentations of, ourselves as subject.' (*CPR* A383)

10 Kant had many early critics, but this point was made most effectively by Gottlob Ernst Schulze in his *Aenesidimus* (1792), where he argued that Kant, by doing so, had set out a 'dogmatic metaphysics', and contrary to what Kant had claimed he had not really refuted Hume's scepticism regarding causality.

11 '... we may call transcendental only the cognition that these presentations are not at all of empirical origin, and the possibility whereby they can nonetheless refer a priori to objects of experience ... The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs therefore, only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the reference of these cognitions to their object.' (*CPR* A57/B81)

12 'Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B, though connected with concept A, lies quite outside it. In the first case I call the judgment *analytic*; in the second, *synthetic* ... Analytic judgments could also be called *elucidatory.* For they do not through the predicate add anything to the concept of the subject ... Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, could also be called *expansive.* For they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been thought in that concept at all.' (*CPR* A6–7/B10–11)

13 Pluhar translates *vorstellung* as 'presentation' (*cf.* p. 22, footnote 73 of *CPR* for his rationale), although many others prefer 'representation' (*cf.* Schopenhauer's

World as Will and Representation exhibit item #101). Literally *vorstellung* means 'something put before', e.g., perceptions. Patricia Kitcher defines it as 'the most general term for any mental state that is about an object.' (Introduction, *CPR*, p.xxiii) As such, it would include not just perceptions, but also, judgments, beliefs, etc. For example, my belief that 'Kant is a better philosopher than Hegel'. It is also sometimes translated as 'idea', i.e., something of which we are aware.

14 Kant's 'Table of Categories' includes: *Judgments* of *Quantity*: unity, plurality, totality; ... of *Quality*: reality, negation, limitation; ... of *Relation*: inherence & subsistence, causality & dependence, community; ... of *Modality:* possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, necessity/contingency. Kant makes clear that there are also a number of *a priori* derivative categories or concepts, but that these twelve are a complete table of the 'root concepts' from which the others can be 'easily' derived. (*CPR* A80–83/B106–109)

15 Concepts, of course, have varying levels of generality, e.g., 'thing', 'animal', 'dog', 'black lab'.

16 'The limits of knowledge are no limitation on certainty, since there can be no higher certainty for us than that which assures us of our moral self, or our own autonomous personality ... The shadow that lies over theoretical knowledge ... is illuminated for us in acting.' (Ernst Cassirer. *Kant's Life and Thought.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 262–3)

17 Kant gave a stark warning regarding the impossibility of theoretical reason solving the problem of the compatibility of natural causality and human freedom: '... freedom can never be comprehended, nor even can insight into it be gained. It is valid only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being that believes itself to be conscious of a will.' (*G* 4:459)

18 '*Faith* ... is reason's moral way of thinking in assenting to what is not accessible to theoretical cognition. It is the mind's steadfast principle to assume as true what we must necessarily presuppose as a condition for the possibility of [achieving] the highest moral final purpose ... To have faith ... is to have confidence that we shall reach an aim that we have a duty to further ... Faith is free assent, not to something for which we can find dogmatic proofs ... nor to something to which we feel obligated, but to something that we assume for some aim in accordance with laws of freedom.' (*CJ* 5:471–2)

19 'Now insofar as the concept of an object also contains the basis for the object's actuality, the concept is called the thing's *purpose*, and a thing's

harmony with that character of things which is possible only through purposes is called the *purposiveness* of its form.' (*CJ* 5:180)

20 Suppose one viewed Édouard Manet's *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* or his *Olympia* and felt lustful feelings towards the female nudes in those paintings; such feelings would surely be pleasurable; however, the 'interest' one has in respect of the paintings would disqualify this as a judgment of taste.

21 *A History of Western Philosophy.* Volume VII: *Fichte to Nietzsche.* (London: Burns and Oates Limited, 1963), p. 1.

22 *Cf.* Fichte's published 'Juridical Defence': *Der Herausgeber des Philosophischen Journals gerichtliche Verantwortungschriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus.* (Jena: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1799). Fichte was a co-editor of the *Philosophisches Journal* of Jena. The Walsh Philosophy Collection copy is not exhibited due to space limitations.

23 Fichte *Early Philosophical Writings.* Translated by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 71. In a 1793 review of G. E. Schulze's *Aenesidemus.*

24 'Fichte, Johann Gottlieb', *D18GP*, p. 322b.

25 *Die Wissenschaftslehre, in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse, dargestellt.* (Berlin: J. E. Hitzig, 1810). The Walsh Philosophy Collection copy is not exhibited due to space limitations. The most important revision of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* was given in his lectures of 1796–1799, which he did not publish; however, they have since been edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale: Fichte. *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy: (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo (1796/99)* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992).

26 *Sonnenklarer Bericht an das größere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. Ein Versuch, die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen.* (Berlin: in der Realschulbuchhandlung, 1801). The Walsh Philosophy Collection copy is not exhibited due to space limitations.

27 Quoted and translated by Daniel Breazeale in, 'Fichte's *Aenesidemus* Review and the Transformation of German Idealism', *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 34, No. 3 (March 1981), 548.

28 'Posit' translates the common German verb '*setzen*', which has many meanings; however, in Fichte's work it seems to mean some combination of the following mental acts: 'to put forth', 'to assume', 'to presuppose', 'to reflect upon'. His *Nova Methodo (1796/99)* lectures begin: '*Postulate:* Construct the *concept of the "I"* and observe how you accomplish this.' (*Foundations*, p. 65)

29 'The primary task of Fichte's system of philosophy ... is to reconcile freedom with necessity, or, more specifically, to explain how freely willing, morally responsible agents can at the same time be considered part of a world of causally conditioned material objects in space and time.' Breazeale, Dan, 'Johann Gottlieb Fichte', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2024).

30 *Correspondence. Akademie* edition 12:370–1. The open letter was occasioned by a review which incidentally stated that Fichte had, in effect, superseded Kant; and which challenged Kant to publicly state his 'opinion of the work of his worthy pupil'. (*Correspondence*, p. 560, footnote 1) Needless to say, Kant's declaration did not please Fichte.

31 In 1805, Fichte again gave public lectures on the topic of a scholar's duties, which were published as *On the Nature of the Scholar and his Appearances in the Realm of Freedom.* (*Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten, und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freihet. In öffentlichen Vorlesungen, gehalten zu Erlangen, im Sommer-Halbjahr 1805* (Berlin: in der Himburgischen buchhandlung, 1806). This book was one of his more popular, it was translated many times, and has remained in print. The Walsh Philosophy Collection copy is not exhibited due to space limitations.

32 Published in 1802–1803 there were only three issues.

33 Caroline (1763–1809) was herself a noted intellectual. Educated by tutors and her father, the renowned orientalist Johann David Michaelis, she first married the physician Johann Böhmer in 1784, but was widowed in 1788. A free spirit, she was imprisoned by the Prussians for her sympathies with the French and her revolutionary activities. In 1796, pregnant with the child of one of those revolutionaries, she married the literary critic and philosopher August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845), a professor at Jena. Their home became a literary and intellectual center. Not long thereafter she began a rather open affair with Schelling, eleven years her junior, whom she married in 1803 a few weeks after receiving a divorce from Schlegel. Her health was often poor, and she died of dysentery in 1809.

34 Five periods, if one counts the years 1794–1797, when he was heavily under the influence of Fichte, as a separate period.

35 *System of Transcendental Idealism.* Translated by Peter Heath. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), p. 17.

36 *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (Tübingen, 1800). Quoted in Ulrich Vogel 'Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling', *D18GP*, p. 992b.

37 *Elements of the Philosophy of Right.* Translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 20. Earlier, in 1801, Hegel puzzlingly wrote: 'The Absolute itself is the identity of identity and non-identity.' *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy.* Translated by H. S. Harris & Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press), p. 156.

38 Hans Küng, *Does God Exist?* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1980) p. 31.

39 Hegel's term '*Geist*' is variously translated Mind or Spirit; however, when it is the latter it should not be taken in a religious sense as an entity with a supernatural character.

40 Sublation (*aufheben*) is: (a) a raising up to a higher concept; (b) which sets aside two lower concepts which are in opposition to each other; (c) while preserving the content of each in the higher concept.

41 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic,* Translated and edited by George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 28.

42 Schelling's greatly altered late philosophy was driven by his recognition of the fundamental mistake that he, Fichte, and Hegel had all made in their philosophical systems. Schelling had a 'growing suspicion that the stress on the "system" itself had blinded the post-Kantians ... to the incommensurable difference between thought and existence, a mistake Kant himself had never made ... All the post-Kantians had in effect confused logic with existence; they had labored under the illusion that a coherent, consistent system of thought was necessarily identical with the way the world had to be ... That we had to *think* of the world in a certain way could not imply that the world had to *be* that way.' (Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 320)

43 Heinrich Schopenhauer (1747–1805) was a shipping agent and wholesale merchant, specializing in the foreign trade of grain and other goods. The family's business had long been in the Hanseatic city of Danzig, however, he moved the business, at considerable loss, to Hamburg in 1793 when the free city of Danzig was forced to become part of Prussia. He had 'liberal' sympathies, was well travelled, and an Anglophile. A depressive, his body

was found in the canal behind the family home and he is thought to have taken his own life. Arthur revered his father's memory, and likely inherited his depressive illness.

44 Schopenhauer first studied medicine from 1809 to 1811 at Göttingen but his interest shifted to philosophy. Because Göttingen had few lecturers in philosophy, he moved in 1811 to the recently founded university in Berlin which already had a reputation for philosophy.

45 Joanna Schopenhauer (1766–1838) was many years younger than her husband and after his premature death she moved to Weimar and led the life of an attractive, fashionable widow, while becoming a successful author of novels, short stories and travel diaries—in 1831 her collected works in 24 volumes were published. She and Arthur frequently quarreled and after 1814 they never saw each other again.

46 A third edition, with many relatively minor amendments and additions to both volumes, was published in 1859. This edition is also in the Walsh Philosophy Collection but is not exhibited.

47 Arthur Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays.* Translated and edited by Sabine Roehr and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), vol. I, p. 153.

48 Quoted in Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 21.

49 *Parerga and Paralipomena*. vol. I, pp. 120–21.

50 Schopenhauer's 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy' received very high praise from Sir Karl Popper (1902–1994) who wrote that it '... is one of the most lucid and worthwhile philosophical writings ever published in the German language.' (In a letter to Ernst Gombrich quoted in the latter's 'Personal recollections of the publishing of *The Open Society*', p. 17–27 of Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong (editors), *Popper's Open Society After Fifty Years* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999)). Schopenhauer also wrote a lengthy attack on Kant's ethical theory in the second part of *On the Basis of Morals.*

51 The *will* is 'not only willing and deciding ... but also all striving, wishing, fleeing, hoping, fearing, loving, hating ...' Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation.* Translated and edited by Judith Norman, Alastair Welchman, Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2018), vol. II, p. 226.

52 All other engagement is 'interested', that is action *in service* of our wills.

53 'If the whole world as representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the clarification of this visibility.' *and* 'The Ideas [are] the pure mirror of the world.' *World as Will and Representation.* vol. I, pp. 295, 314.

54 *World as Will and Representation.* vol. I, p. 280.

55 *Parerga and Paralipomena.* vol. I, pp. 22–23.

56 *Parerga and Paralipomena.* vol. I, p. 24 footnote.

57 *World as Will and Representation.* vol. I, p. 8.

Exhibition Catalogue

IMMANUEL KANT

{1} *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Herr von Leibniz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedienet haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kraft der Körper überhaupt betreffen.* **Königsberg: gedruckt bey Martin Eberhard Dorn, 1746 [1749].**


Gedanken
von der wahren Schätzung
der
lebendigen Kräfte
und
Beurtheilung der Beweise
derer sich
Herr von Leibnitz und andere Mechaniker
in dieser Streitsache
bedienet haben,
nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen
welche
die Kraft der Körper überhaupt
betreffen,
durch
Immanuel Kant.
Königsberg,
gedruckt bey Martin Eberhard Dorn. 1746.

Kant's extremely scarce first publication *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* had no publisher but was printed at Kant's own expense by the Königsberg printer Martin Dorn. Kant began writing it in 1744, while still a student, and completed it in 1746 but printing was not finished until 1749. An early biographer wrote that this was because Kant was too poor to pay fully for the printing and needed help from his uncle Richter to complete doing so. Because of these circumstances, it is believed that very few copies were printed, and the book can only have had minimal circulation

without a bookseller/publisher to distribute it to other booksellers at the Leipzig Book Fair.

Living Forces is concerned with resolving the dispute between Leibnizians and Newtonians as to the proper measurement of force. Ernst Cassirer commented that despite it being a student effort, it shows great maturity and points forward to Kant's interest in universal method:

> Here the question was no longer the discovery and confirmation of individual, definite facts, but rather a fundamental conflict in the interpretation of the recognized and accepted phenomena of motion in general; here not just isolated observations and data but the principles on which the examination of nature is founded ... What is noteworthy in this maiden paper is that the first step Kant takes into the realm of natural philosophy immediately turns into an inquiry into its method ... Kant called his first work ... a 'treatise on method', as he later ... termed the *Critique of Pure Reason* ... the change which the meaning of this designation had undergone for him comprises his whole philosophy and its development.[1]

{2} *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt.* Königsberg und Leipzig: Johann Friederich Petersen, 1755.

The *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* put forward the nebular hypothesis of the origin of the solar system—the theory that the solar system formed out of a spinning cloud of gas, which gravitationally collapsed over a lengthy period into stars and planets. Kant's theory was received with near silence, until it was independently discovered and argued for forty years later by Pierre-Simon Laplace in his *Exposition du systeme du monde* (1796). Indeed, for a young scholar it was amazingly comprehensive: Kant '... formulated the nebular hypothesis..., explained the appearance of the Milky Way, argued for the existence of an infinite number of galaxies like our own, and predicted the existence of a planet between Mars and Jupiter and of others beyond Saturn.'[2]

The book is extremely rare because: 'It had an untoward fate in the hands of the publisher. He became bankrupt at that very time, and his stock was 'sealed up' and legally appropriated, so that, as Borowski says: "The work had the peculiar fate of not coming into the hands of the public nor even of King Frederick II, to whom it was dedicated ..." The book thus remained for years entirely unknown.'[3] 'Most copies ... seem to have been condemned to decay by mould, dust, and worms in the new owner's warehouse.'[4]


Allgemeine
Naturgeschichte
und
Theorie des Himmels,
oder
Versuch
von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge
des ganzen Weltgebäudes
nach
Newtonischen Grundsätzen
abgehandelt.
Königsberg und Leipzig,
bey Johann Friederich Petersen, 1755.

{3} *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erweisen.* Königsberg: Johann Jacob Kanter, 1762.

An important early work in Kant's philosophical development and his first publication on the subject of logic, marking the starting point of his critique of metaphysics and traditional scholastic logic. Written in a few hours, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* is a sharp critique of syllogisms, which had been the backbone of traditional scholastic logic and metaphysics for centuries, and the classification of the syllogism into four chief forms or figures. The central premise of Kant's argument, with particular relevance to his mature work, is:

> ... identification of reasoning with a form of judgement. This was part of Kant's more general theory, announced at the close of his tract, that the 'higher faculty of knowledge' can be analysed into forms of judgment. Rejecting the traditional classification of the faculty of knowledge into concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, Kant argued that concepts are only a form of immediate judgment as syllogisms are a form of mediate. This analysis clearly prepared the ground for the later 'metaphysical deduction' of the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. By considering the genesis of that view in the *False Subtlety* ... Kant arrived at his identification of the understanding with judgment not by uncritically accepting, but by sharply attacking the traditional logic.'[5]

Johann Jacob Kanter (1738–86) was Kant's publisher from 1762 to 1770. He was a very successful and ambitious entrepreneur who began as a bookseller at the age of 22 and soon expanded into publishing, moving his business to a large enough location that his shop became a center for the gathering of the intellectual community of Königsberg. Indeed, Kant both lived and gave lectures on the second floor of Kanter's bookshop until 1769.

{4} ***Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes.*** **Königsberg: Johann Jacob Kanter, 1763 [1762].**

The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God is one of Kant's more important pre-critical works. First, he rejects the Cartesian version of the ontological argument: that the perfections of a 'greatest possible being' must include existence. Kant refuted the argument, by arguing that existence is not a predicate, i.e., a property or attribute of a subject.

Kant's positive argument was based on what he held to be a requirement; that what is 'real' in possibility must be grounded by an absolutely necessary being, God. A possible thing requires consistency of its properties; this must be not just a logical consistency, but a real consistency; which can only be grounded in something actual; God is the unique ground of the real element in possibility. Kant would certainly not have made such an argument a decade later, after he had developed his Critical Philosophy.

This copy, as are some others, is bound with Daniel Weymann's (1732–95) critique *Bedenklichkeiten über den einzig möglichen Beweisgrund des Herrn M. Kant's zu einer Demonstration das Daseins Gottes. Zweiter Theil der philosoph. Labyrinthe* published in the same year by Kanter.

{5} ***Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen.*** **Königsberg: Johann Jacob Kanter, 1763.**

Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy once again illustrates the breadth of Kant's interests. He gives many examples of negative magnitudes in the natural sciences and mathematics. In doing so, Kant argues that while mathematical concepts may be usefully incorporated in

philosophy, philosophy is not a deductive enterprise like mathematics. The importance of the work in Kant's writings is that it shows his movement away from the rationalist tradition in philosophy, especially from Leibniz and Wolff, the dominant metaphysicians of the time.

{6} ***Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen.*** **Königsberg: Johann Jacob Kanter, 1764.**

For someone who had limited exposure to the arts, other than literature, Kant had a long interest in aesthetics, treating the topic most fully in the first part of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Twenty-six years before that work, he published *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, a much shorter work which bears little relationship to his mature work on the subject. It is less comprehensive; more importantly, it is not based on the epistemological foundation that Kant later developed for all forms of experience, not just aesthetic experience. Kant is chiefly concerned in *Observations* with analyzing the distinctions between feelings of the sublime and the beautiful as part of a more general human psychology. In doing so he connects such feelings with moral feelings and activity by differentiating various personality types, e.g. a reserved vs. outgoing person.

This was, perhaps, Kant's most popular work, going through eight printings during his lifetime. Light-hearted in tone, it includes comments, typical of the age, on the differences between the sexes and between races. In the year of its publication, the forty-year old Kant was first offered a professorship at Königsberg, however not that in 'metaphysics and logic' which he wanted, but rather in 'rhetoric and poetry', which chair he declined despite what would have been a large increase in his income.

{7} ***Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik.*** **Riga und Mietau: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1766.**

Kant chose to publish *Dreams of a Spirit Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics* anonymously, perhaps because of concern that its subject was not one a serious

philosopher should write about. It is ostensibly a somewhat satirical and amusing attack on the mystical religious claims of Emanuel Swedenborg. However, it has a much more serious intent, which is to question the unfounded and sometimes equally fantastic claims of metaphysics. Kant recognizes that metaphysical questions are deeply rooted in human nature. That is to say, he is not opposed to metaphysics as such, but argues that it must be based on solid foundations and recognize its limitations.

It was first published by Johann Jacob Kanter in Königsberg, but then almost simultaneously by his partner Hartknoch in Riga. This was all but certainly because when Kanter published *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* he was fined 10 thalers (60 thalers was the approximate annual expenses for a student at university) by the senate of the University of Königsberg for not having gotten prior approval from the academic censor, which may be why the reprintings were published in Riga, which had been part of Russia since 1721, and which was another cosmopolitan Hanseatic port with a large German community.

After Kant emerged from his 'silent decade', during which he did not publish, Johann Friedrich Hartknoch (1740–89), a former student of Kant, replaced Kanter as Kant's publisher in 1781 and remained so until 1788. Kant had become dissatisfied with Kanter, who now was active in several businesses besides publishing, because he did such a poor job of handling his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics.

{8} ***De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis. Dissertatio pro loco professionis log. et metaph. ordinariae rite sibi vindicando. Quam, exigentibus statutis academicis, publice tuebitur Immanuel Kant. Respondentis munere fungetur Marcus Hertz,...; contra opponentes Georgium Wilhelmum Schreiber,...; in auditorio maximo horis matutinis et pomeridianis consuetis die XX. AUG. a. MDCCLXX.***
Regiomonti [i.e., Königsberg]: Impensis Io. Iac. Kanteri, [1770].

In 1770, Kant finally received his long-awaited appointment as *ordinarius* Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Königsberg—he had applied unsuccessfully for it twelve years earlier. *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and*

the Intelligible World, in the required Latin, is his Inaugural Dissertation. Kant defended it on 20 August 1770, and he chose Marcus Herz (1747–1803) as the official Respondent. Although a medical student (medicine was the only faculty open to Jews in Prussia), Herz attended all of Kant's lectures. Kant's choice was criticized by other members of the faculty because Herz was not only Jewish but also came from a very modest background; indeed, soon thereafter he had to leave the University because of a lack of funds. Two years later Herz resumed his medical studies elsewhere and eventually he became a distinguished Berlin doctor, lecturer, and author.

DE
MVNDI SENSIBILIS
ATQVE
INTELLIGIBILIS
FORMA ET PRINCIPIIS.
DISSERTATIO PRO LOCO
PROFESSIONIS LOG. ET METAPH. ORDINARIAE
RITE SIBI VINDICANDO.
QVAM,
EXIGENTIBVS STATVTIS ACADEMICIS,
PVBLICE TVEBITVR
IMMANVEL KANT.
RESPONDENTIS MVNERE FVNGETVR
MARCVS HERTZ, Berolinensis,
Gente Ivdaeus, Medicinae et Philosophiae Cultor.
CONTRA OPPONENTES
GEORGIVM WILHELMVM SCHREIBER, reg. bor. art. stud.
IOHANNEM AVGVSTVM STEIN, reg. bor. l. v. c.
ET
GEORGIVM DANIELEM SCHROETER, elbing. s. s. theol. c.
IN AVDITORIO MAXIMO
HORIS MATVTINIS ET FOEDERIBVS CONSVETIS
DIE XX. Avg. A. MDCCLXX.
REGIOMONTI,
Impensis Io. Iac. Kanteri.

The work is transitional, looking back towards Kant's earlier work, but, more importantly, being the first step in his critical philosophy. 'It is not easy to over-estimate the importance of the *Dissertation* for a comprehension of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It shows what the new conception originally had in view, and something of the impetus of the discovery still attaches to it ... Here, we have the new philosophy in its youthful form. It is the long-sought new method of metaphysics, the transcendental method.'[6]

Kant initially thought what he first intended to call *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* would appear shortly after the Inaugural Dissertation, but over a decade was needed to work out the ideas that were later published in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The work is of legendary rarity. Even Kant, in a letter to Herz, complained that the publisher J. J. Kanter failed in his responsibilities: 'Herr Kanter sent out my Dissertation rather late and in small numbers, and without even listing it in the Leipzig Book Fair Catalogue ... It depresses me a little to think that this work must so quickly suffer the fate of all human endeavors, namely oblivion; for with all its errors it seems unworthy of reprinting.'[7]

{9} *Critik der reinen Vernunft.* Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1781.

Kant's *magnum opus* and the most influential work in modern philosophy, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was initially poorly received, both because it was difficult to understand and because its ideas were so radical. It was published in an edition of 1000 copies and although it at first sold very slowly, it went out of print within just a few years and in 1786 Kant was already busy preparing the new edition requested by his publisher. 'Informed by [Johann Georg] Hamann in September 1780 that Kant had almost completed this work, Hartknoch wrote offering his services; he would produce Kant's book with speed and taste and could undertake that it would be widely distributed.'[8] Hartknoch had the book printed in Halle and it was available for the Easter book fair. He offered much broader distribution than Kanter had done and this was important to Kant as he wanted his new philosophy to reach as many readers as possible.

The appearance of the first *Critique* had a tremendous impact on first German and then all Western philosophy. The noted philosopher Moses Mendelssohn spoke of the 'all-crushing' Kant. Heated arguments for and against Kant's work took place, conservative opponents charging him with many sins, including atheism, and supporters seeing his work as the critical moment in a movement towards freedom of thought. Indeed, passions were such that 'in Jena two students fought a duel because one accused the other of not understanding the *Critique*, claiming that he needed to study it for thirty years before he could hope to understand it and then for another thirty years before being allowed to comment upon it.'[9]

Kant had been educated in the rationalist tradition stemming from Descartes, Leibniz, and most immediately, Christian Wolff, but he had also read the empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. It was Hume's account of causality that 'interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my enquiries.' (*PFM* 4:260) Kant believed that his project and achievement were analogous to the Copernican Revolution, which had revolutionized thought by orbiting the planets about the Sun rather than the Earth; in Kant's case, he argued that before we ask what the nature of the world is, we must reorient our thinking, and first give a critique of our cognitive faculties: What is it possible for us to know? In particular, in the domain of metaphysics?

Critik
der
reinen Vernunft
von
Immanuel Kant
Professor in Königsberg.
Riga,
verlegts Johann Friedrich Hartknoch
1781.

Kant's revolution consisted in reversing the principle that our knowledge must conform to its objects; instead, we must ask 'whether we shall not better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition.' (*CPR* Bxvi) Rather than asking how sense impressions give rise to our ideas, as in empiricism, we must examine the conditions of our having the experiences that we have. Finally, it follows that we do not have access to a knowledge of things *in themselves*, which, as it were, would have to somehow come to us from outside the strictures of our own faculties. Nor can we have knowledge of things that transcend those faculties: whether God exists; whether our souls are immortal; whether our actions are free or determined by natural causes. On questions such as these, Kant said that we must remain agnostic; however, it was not irrational for us to 'hope' that they might be true, indeed, they might well have a moral necessity.

{10} ***Critik der reinen Vernunft. Zweyte hin und wieder verbesserte Auslage.*** **Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1787.**

Kant was frustrated by the prevalent misunderstanding of the first edition of the *Critique* and to try remedy this he made many changes in the second edition, the so-called 'B' text of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, entirely recasting the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and The Paralogisms of Pure Reason, and adding new material, most notably the Refutation of Idealism, in order to clear up misunderstandings of the 'A' text of 1781. The 'B' text is the basis for all subsequent editions, although scholarly editions and translations usually include omitted or differing 'A' text either in the resulting main text or in footnotes.

On the title-page of the first edition, Kant is styled 'Professor in Königsberg', here a new honour is added: 'Professor in Königsberg, der Konigl. Academie der Wissenschaften in Berlin, Mitgleid.' Kant was made a Member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences in December 1786.

{11} *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können.* Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1783.

Prolegomena

zu

einer jeden

künftigen Metaphysik

die

als Wissenschaft

wird auftreten können,

von

Immanuel Kant.

Riga,

bey Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.

1783.

ben, allein von dem, was sie an sich selbst seyn mögen, wissen wir nichts, sondern kennen nur ihre Erscheinungen, d. i. die Vorstellungen, die sie in uns wirken, indem sie unsere Sinne afficiren. Demnach gestehe ich allerdings, daß es ausser uns Körper gebe, d. i. Dinge, die, obzwar nach dem, was sie an sich selbst seyn mögen, uns gänzlich unbekant, wir durch die Vorstellungen kennen, welche ihr Einfluß auf unsre Sinnlichkeit uns verschaft, und denen wir die Benennung eines Körpers geben, welches Wort also blos die Erscheinung jenes uns unbekanten, aber nichts desto weniger wirklichen Gegenstandes bedeutet. Kan man dieses wol Idealismus nennen? Es ist ja gerade das Gegenthell davon.

Daß man, unbeschadet der wirklichen Existenz äusserer Dinge von einer Menge ihrer Prädicate sagen könne: sie gehöreten nicht zu diesen Dingen an sich selbst, sondern nur zu ihren Erscheinungen, und hätten ausser unserer Vorstellung keine eigene Existenz, ist etwas, was schon lange vor Lock's Zeiten, am meisten aber nach diesen, allgemein angenommen und zugestanden ist. Dahin gehören die Wärme, die Farbe, der Geschmack ꝛc. Daß ich aber noch über diese, aus wichtigen Ursachen, die übrigen Qualitäten der Körper, die man primarias nennt, die Ausdehnung, den Ort, und überhaupt den Raum, mit allem was ihm anhängig ist, (Undurchdringlichkeit oder Materialität, Gestalt ꝛc.) auch mit zu blossen Erscheinungen zähle, dawider kan man nicht den mindesten Grund der Unzulässigkeit

This is Arthur Schopenhauer's copy used for detailed study (extensive pencil underlining and marginalia throughout) and the source text for an English translation that he unsuccessfully proposed.

Kant expected the *Critique of Pure Reason* to have a revolutionary impact on philosophy when it was published in 1781; but instead, it largely mystified its readers. In order to overcome the difficulties that his great work was having in terms of accessibility and popularity in the philosophical community, Kant published the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forth as a Science*, which was intended to clarify his arguments in a much briefer format. Composing the *Prolegomena* forced Kant to come to terms with difficulties that became exposed through his adoption of a synthetic method in the *Critique*; therefore, he used an analytic method in the *Prolegomena*.

Schopenhauer held very definite views on other philosophers, concluding that Plato and Kant were the only two titans of philosophy. Of these two, Kant's influence on Schopenhauer's thought was certainly the greater, and Schopenhauer saw himself as Kant's only worthy successor, however, he was also highly critical of his predecessor's work, as his close reading of the *Prolegomena* shows. In 1818, in his 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy', Schopenhauer said that it is 'the finest and most comprehensible of all Kant's major works . . .'[10]

The importance Schopenhauer set by the book is well illustrated in a letter of 21 Dec 1829, written in reply to a piece in the *Foreign Review and Continental Miscellany* which expressed the desirability of translating the major works of Kant into English. In his long reply, written in flawless English to a British publisher, Schopenhauer proposes himself as a suitable translator and states that:

> . . . the whole substance of Kant's philosophy is contained in three works viz.: 1) The Critic of pure reason . . .; 2) Prolegomena to every future metaphysics that shall be able to come forth as a science; 3) the Critic of Judgement . . . All his other writings are of less importance . . . As the Critic of pure reason after its appearance experienced a total neglect from the public, Kant, in order to use the attention towards it & understanding that neglect to be partly owing to the bulk & obscurity of the Critics, wrote the Prolegomena in which he exhibits again the chief tenets of his philosophy, but in another arrangement, simplified & rendered more intelligible, in order to

> conquer the fastidiousness of the public ... Hence there is not the least doubt that the translation of the Prolegomena must precede that of the Critic, being as it were the Epitome thereof ...'[11]

He then outlines his fee: 15 Prussian dollars 'for the translation of every printed German sheet (or 16 pages) of the ancient original edition in 8vo ... giving about £30 for the whole Prolegomena ... I can translate the Prolegomena in 3 months; for the Critic I want a year.' At the foot of the letter is subjoined a specimen passage, translated from the *Prolegomena* and 'of a nature to be in some measure understood even out of context, giving moreover a hint at the proportion his philosophy bears to Locke's and the like.' In this, Schopenhauer's copy of the book, this section (pp. 63 ff.), is suitably heavily underlined and annotated.

{12} 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.' *Berlinische Monatsschrift.* Berlin: Haude und Spener, 11 November 1784.

During his so-called critical period, Kant published his essays in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* or *Berlin Monthly.* It had been founded in Berlin, but moved to Jena, in Saxe-Weimar, to avoid aggressive Prussian censorship. This is the first essay that he published in it and is the first appearance of his most significant contribution to the philosophy of history, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.* The essay 'is characteristic of its time in embodying a belief in human progress and in relying upon a clear-cut conception of human nature ... Kant ... implies that, if the course of human history is to make sense, we must assume the working of some ... teleological principle.'[12] It is here also that Kant first mentions his conception of a federation of states united to secure perpetual peace, a theme which was central to his book *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795).

The Fisher Library is very fortunate to hold a complete run (28 volumes) of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift,* which was published between 1783 and 1796. This fine set has a special place in the history of the University of Toronto Libraries. It was a gift that the University received in 1898 from the Großherzoglichen Bibliothek Schwerin in response to Toronto's international appeal for books to replace those lost in February 1890, when its library, then in University College, was destroyed by fire.

{13} *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.* Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1785.

Grundlegung
zur
Metaphysik
der Sitten
von
Immanuel Kant.
Riga,
bey Johann Friedrich Hartknoch
1785.

Despite its brevity, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is one of the most influential works in the history of moral philosophy. 'If he had published nothing else but the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant would be assured a place in the history of philosophy ... This work is written with an eloquence, depth of insight, and strength of feeling that makes an immediate impact on the reader and put it among the classics of the subject.'[13]

Kant states that humans, being rational beings, are capable of moral insight. In the *Groundwork* his stated goal is to establish the supreme principal of morality. First, an action has moral worth only if it is done from a sense of duty which is freely chosen. Second, the intent of an action does not determine its worth, but the maxim or rule guiding action. Third, a dutiful action is one done with respect for the moral law. Therefore, conduct yourself so that the maxim you follow can become a universal law. Such an imperative is categorical, it must be followed, although freely by all rational beings. Among other things, Kant here asserted the equal dignity of all human beings.

{14} *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.* Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1786.

Kant had educated himself deeply in both mathematics and science, and he intended the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* as a first step towards a projected but never completed metaphysics of nature. Some have thought of it as an appendix to the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

Kant had an unusually restrictive notion of 'science', eliminating even chemistry because, unlike physics, it lacks a basis in pure reason or metaphysics and cannot be treated mathematically which he believed was required to achieve certainty. In short, a 'pure natural science' must be based on *a priori*

principles. He then treats of several concepts in physics, including matter, attraction, and motion; in this last case, discussing Isaac Newton's laws of motion and their relation to experience. This has been one of Kant's least read books, but in recent years it has gained much greater attention.

{15} *Critik der practischen Vernunft.* Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1788 [1787].


Critik
der
practischen Vernunft
von
Immanuel Kant.
Riga,
bey Johann Friedrich Hartknoch
1788.

Arguably, together with the *Groundwork,* the *Critique of Practical Reason* is the foundation for much of modern ethical theory. Kant asserts that the demands of morality are built into the very concept of rationality. He argues that genuine moral principles, maxims that guide our actions, because they are grounded in practical reason, can be universal and thus objectively valid, unlike those moral decisions or actions that arise from desire and thus from self-love. For Kant, the fundamental principle or Categorical Imperative is to: 'So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle of universal legislation.' (*CPrR* 5:30) 'The practical rule is therefore unconditional, and hence is conceived a priori as a categorical proposition by which the will is objectively determined absolutely and directly (by the practical rule itself, which therefore is here a law). For *pure [and] in itself practical reason* is here directly legislative. The will is thought as independent of empirical conditions and hence, *qua* pure will, as determined *by the mere form of the law.*' (*CPrR* 5:31)

Such a law, however, must be autonomous or freely chosen by the agent, unlike theoretical reason which is determined fundamentally by sensory intuition. Practical reason, on the other hand, determines the will freely. The relationship between the *ideas* of theoretical or speculative reason and practical reason, i.e., morality, is that practical reason demands or must postulate *immortality, freedom,* and the *existence of God.*

The *Critique of Practical Reason* contains the first appearance of Kant's famous statement: 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing

admiration and reverence, the more frequently and persistently one's meditation deals with them: *the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.*' (*Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir.*) (*CPrR* 5:161)

{16} *Critik der Urtheilskraft.* Berlin und Libau: Lagarde und Friederich, 1790.


Critik
der
Urtheilskraft
von
Immanuel Kant.
Berlin und Libau,
bey Lagarde und Friederich
1790.

Fichte referred to the *Critique of Judgement* as 'the crown of the critical philosophy.' After an Introduction in which Kant gives an extensive overview of his system to date, it is divided into two parts, the first and longer part concerns aesthetics and the second teleology. These seemingly diverse subjects are connected through the concepts of 'purpose' and 'purposiveness'.

Aesthetics fulfills an essential systematic function in the Kant's thought, bridging the gap between reason and nature and thus serving as a complement to the practical. He seeks to join the dimensions of human experience which he had articulated in the two previous *Critiques*. A number of the conceptual foundations Kant had earlier laid down are strained as he tries to demonstrate that aesthetics mediates between the realms of sensibility and reason, by arguing that aesthetic intuition ranges over both realms. The key being the claim that the two realms have the same form. However, as Kant considers the aesthetic judgment of the products of man's artistic invention, he cannot fit them into the format of a teleology of nature—instead, the beautiful has purposiveness without purpose. It does not aim at anything, and yet it can only be understood as being in accord with purposes. In contrast, in nature the order of things can only be understood as the product of purpose.

The publication details for this book do not reflect well on Kant. His regular publisher Hartknoch had died on April 1st and his son, who succeeded to the business, wrote to Kant to inform him of this and to say that he and his mother looked forward to continuing to serve him. In August, he wrote again to report that he was doing new printings of both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason*. He also said that he had found in his father's

papers, a note concerning a future work on aesthetics, and he ask Kant to again publish it with the Hartknoch firm. Kant replied on September 5th, making no commitments, but saying 'he would not gladly break old connections.' Young Hartknoch replied on September 29th that he was looking forward to publishing the work. However, unbeknownst to Hartknoch, Kant had already begun negotiations with Lagarde, a more prominent firm who promised to publish the work quickly and to give it broad distribution. Hartknoch only learned of this after the *Critique of Judgement* was published. Disappointed, he wrote to Kant: 'I am just a beginner, whose chief support was your preeminent writings, and hoped to do honor to my business by the continuation of your favor, and now, at the beginning of my career, I see myself forsaken by one of the oldest and worthiest friends of my blessed father.'[14] Hartknoch continued to do reprintings of the works by Kant his father had published, regularly sending him his authorship royalties.

{17} *Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Critik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll.* **Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1790.**

The philosopher Johann Augustus Eberhard (1739–1809) was a leading Wolffian, indeed from 1778 to 1809 he held the Chair at the University of Halle once occupied by Christian Wolff. In 1789, he and other critics of Kant founded the *Philosophisches Magazin*, the main goal of which was to challenge Kant's philosophy. The *Magazin* published many articles attacking Kant's ideas, leading to a long debate between Kant, Eberhard, and their respective allies. Eberhard argued that the good ideas in Kant were simply those of Leibniz and that the rest were mistaken.

Kant, of course, was outraged at this charge of unoriginality and his sharp rebuttal: *On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One*, argued that Eberhard had not only failed to understand Kant's philosophy, but that he clearly did not understand Leibniz either. In addition to Kant's comments on the Leibnizian tradition, the book contains clarifications of Kant's views on the role of intuition in mathematics, the principle of sufficient reason, and the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Kant's relationship with the Berlin publisher Lagarde lasted for only the *Critique of Judgement*. Friedrich Nicolovius (1768–1836), another former student, became his publisher and remained so until Kant's death in 1804. Nicolovius had Kant's books printed in Leipzig in large editions and ensured that they were shown at the major book fairs. Also, of benefit to Kant was that Nicolovius, like Kant's first publisher J. J. Kanter, allowed Kant to borrow books liberally from his near-at-hand bookshop, which Lagarde, in Berlin, certainly could not do.

{18} *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Bloßen Vernunft.* Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1793.


Die
Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen
der bloßen Vernunft.
Vorgestellt
von
Immanuel Kant.
Königsberg,
bey Friedrich Nicolovius.
1793.

Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason is Kant's principal work on religion. He wrote it by putting together four essays, the first of which, *Über das radikale Böse in der menschlichen Natur*, had appeared the previous year in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, while the third, *Der Sieg des guten Princips über das Böse, und die Gründung eines Reichs Gottes auf Erden*, had already been banned by the Berlin censors.

In order to publish *Religion* Kant did an 'end run' of the Prussian censors. First, he submitted the book to the theological faculty at Königsberg, asking them whether it fell within their jurisdiction. As he hoped would happen, they replied it did not, because it was philosophical not theological. Then, based on that decision, he submitted it for approval to the philosophy faculty of the University of Jena which, being in Saxe-Weimar rather than Prussia, was not subject to Prussian censorship. Kant's book and his adeptness in getting it 'approved' led to a royal reproof in October 1794 from the religiously conservative Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia (1744–1797) in which Kant was accused of 'distorting and disparaging' Christianity. As a result, he was ordered to no longer teach or write on religion and was threatened with 'unpleasant measures' should he not comply. However, this command did not occur until after Kant published a quickly revised second edition in the same year.

Kant's aim is to demonstrate to his primarily Lutheran readers that there need be no conflict between faith and reason, although this required some progress in both beliefs and practices to bring them into harmony with *rational* morality. Enlightened reason and a less literal reading of scripture could achieve the goal of free, tolerant, moral, and unifying religious practice. The book has four parts: concerning the doctrine of sin and the problem of evil; the presence of a principle of goodness in individuals; the struggle of individuals, however, to overcome a propensity towards evil within an 'ethical community'; and a critique of ecclesiastical institutions, wherein Kant distinguishes true service to God, primarily by leading a moral life, and counterfeit service, primarily by liturgical and emotional excesses.

> Kant's *Religion* was not just a theoretical treatise, meant as a contribution to the philosophy of religion; it was also a political act ... [and] Kant's declaration of loyalty to Lessing and Mendelssohn. Kant's *Religion*, Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*, and Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem* were all valiant attempts to introduce into Prussia the kind of religious freedom that had by then already been achieved in the United States. Lessing and Mendelssohn were dead. Kant carried on the fight. That he was concerned not only with religious freedom but ultimately with full-fledged civil freedom, is clear.[15]

{19} ***Ueber die von der Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin für das Jahr 1791 ausgesetzte Preisfrage: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? Herausgegeben von Friedrich Theodor Rink.*** **Königsberg: Goebbels und Unzer, 1804.**

What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? was written by Kant in 1793 in answer to a prize essay question posed by the Berlin Academy, however, he did not complete it and it was not submitted to the Berlin Academy. It remained unpublished until Rink's edition here. Rink's editorial efforts have been criticized because he did not provide sufficient information regarding the materials he used or indicate where he

inserted marginal notes from Kant's manuscript. Sadly, Kant's manuscript has been lost.

Kant writes that the history of metaphysics begins with dogmatism, before moving to scepticism, from which it is put on the right path by 'critical philosophy', i.e. Kant. Seen systematically, the first stage is theoretico-dogmatic, a 'doctrine of science'; the second a 'doctrine of doubt'; and lastly a practico-dogmatic stage, a 'doctrine of wisdom'. In doing so, Kant provides an overview of his own system, while criticizing in particular the metaphysical pretensions of Leibniz and Wolff.

{20} *Kleine Schriften.* Neuwied: J. T. Haupt, 1793.

Growing interest in Kant's work, the greed of publishers, and the absence of copyright laws, led to many pirate or counterfeit editions of his writings. Copyright was not introduced in Prussia until 1837 and even then, it could be avoided simply by publishing a pirated text in *another* German state, such as Saxe-Weimar. This, the first collection of any of Kant's works, was published without Kant's knowledge. It contains six articles from the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* and one from *Der Teutsche Merkur.*

{21} *Zerstreute Aufsätze.* Frankfurt und Leipzig: [?], 1793.

Another collection of Kant's shorter works again published without his knowledge and in this case without even a publisher's name. Of the ten essays, all but two previously appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift.*

{22} *Zwo Abhandlungen über moralische und politische Gegenstände.* Frankfurt und Leipzig: [?], 1795.

First edition thus, comprising expanded versions of two essays that had previously appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*: *'Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis'* (Sep. 1793) and *'Das Ende aller Dinge'*, (June 1794). In 'On the Common Saying: That May Be

Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice' Kant responds to Christian Garve's (1742–1798) criticism of his ethics as being acceptable in theory but unworkable in practice. To the original 83–page journal article are added two new sections subtitled 'Against Hobbes' and 'Against Moses Mendelssohn', making 120 pages in all. Of the second, he wrote, 'The essay I will send you soon is entitled "The End of All Things", which will be partly plaintive and partly funny to read.' (Kant letter of 10 April 1794 to J. E. Biester, editor of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*).[16]

{23} *Zum Ewigen Freiden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf.* Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795.


Zum
ewigen Frieden.
Ein philosophischer Entwurf
von
Immanuel Kant.
Königsberg,
bey Friedrich Nicolovius.
1795.

Toward Perpetual Peace was published a few months after the First Treaty of Basel, which temporarily halted a war between Prussia and France (it began again in 1805). It contains articles of agreement which Kant specified as being necessary for the establishment of peace between states, and which anticipate such later developments as the covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and the charter of the United Nations (1945).

Kant, who knew Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Extrait du projet de paix perpetuelle* (1761), which in turn was based on Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre's *Projet pour render la paix perpétuetlle en Europe* (1713), here details the basis of practical pacifism. The work exemplifies the growing interest in international relations in political thinking. 'It is unique among Kant's writings in that it was written for a wide public, and that its publication can be regarded as a political act.'[17]

The book was an immediate success, quickly prompting a series of translations and counterfeit editions. The first edition was sold out within weeks and Nicolovius published a second, revised edition in 1796, slightly expanded from 104 to 112 pages by the addition of a second appendix.

{24} ***Projet de paix perpétuelle. Essai Philosophique par Emmanuel Kant. Traduit de l'Allemand avec un nouveau supplément de l'auteur.*** **Königsberg: Frédéric Nicolovius, 1796.**

The interest in *Toward Perpetual Peace* was such that a French translation was quickly published in Bern in 1795; however, Kant was dissatisfied with it and he no doubt urged Nicolovius to bring out a better translation for the French market. Beyond France this is also likely the edition that was first read by most people, because knowledge of German was very limited in England and other countries, whereas French was then the *lingua franca* of educated Europeans, as English is today. No information on the identity of the translator is available, however, it seems evident that it was not done by Kant himself, as the translation is not particularly faithful and some of the footnotes have been cut and others left out.

This French language edition is also important because it contains a second supplement not included in the original German edition of the previous year. The supplement *Article secret pour la paix perpétuelle* was later reprinted in the second German edition. Therein Kant recommends that state authorities should consult philosophers on the questions of peace or war.

{25} ***Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre.*** **Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1797.**

The *Doctrine of Right* is Part I of *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* or *The Metaphysics of Morals*, which together with Part II: *Doctrine of Virtue*, is a detailed application of the rational principles of morality established in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The *Doctrine of Right* was published separately in January 1797 and the *Doctrine of Virtue* in August 1797, although copies do appear where they have been bound together.

Kant begins with a long Introduction to both parts of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in which he: (i) repeats his claim that moral laws must be necessary, universal, and have an a priori basis; (ii) discusses the various mental faculties; and (iii) distinguishes ethical (Part I) and juridical (Part II) lawgiving. Kant argues that we should be free to do as we choose, provided that our actions do

not conflict with the freedom of others. This universal principle of right is innate, while other rights are acquired, such as those that arise in the context of family, work, commerce, or society. Kant then discusses the process, beginning with an initial state of nature, whereby first private rights, e.g., regarding property, and then public rights, e.g., political institutions, are acquired. Sovereignty rests with the people but it is vested in the state, which is thereby allowed to enforce a system of laws on its citizens. Furthermore, states or nations have rights, e.g., to defend themselves in war. To minimize the need for this, Kant argues for creation of an international civil society to protect the rights of nations.

{26} ***Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre.*** **Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1797.**

The *Doctrine of Virtue*, Part II of *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* is primarily concerned with the moral principles Kant established in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant distinguishes a doctrine of virtue from a doctrine of right, the latter arising from external lawgiving, whereas virtue concerns our own ethical maxims and cannot arise externally, but only from a self-legislated sense of duty; in the performance of which we have two moral ends, our own moral perfection and the happiness of others. There are duties to oneself as well as duties to others, such as duties of love, e.g., beneficence, and of respect, e.g., to avoid defamation.

This copy contains a title page for the combined parts: *Der Metaphysik der Sitten in zwey Theilen*, presumably for those buyers who wished to bind it with an earlier purchased copy of the *Doctrine of Right*.

{27} ***Der Streit der Facultäten in drey Abschnitten.*** **Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1798.**

Kant's three essays on the dispute between the three 'higher' Faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine and the 'lower' Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Königsberg had been written earlier but blocked by the Religionsexamination-Kommission headed by the Prussian censor-in-chief Johan

Christoph Wöllner (1732–1800). Following the death of Friedrich Wilhelm II in November 1797 and the consequent sacking of Wöllner, their publication as *The Conflict of the Faculties* became possible. In the Preface Kant gives the full text of the 1794 letter of reprimand from Friedrich Wilhelm II regarding *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* and his own reply at that time to Wöllner. In it he defends himself as a scholar and teacher. Now, he is able to rejoice that there is enlightened government again, releasing the human spirit from its chains.

Part I of *Conflict* concerns the relationship between the faculties of Theology and Philosophy, where Kant argues that the latter, although a 'lower' faculty must be recognized as having a proper critical function over the 'higher faculties'. This critical function is based on reason alone and not on statutory authority. In the case of Theology, only if Philosophy can serve this function will objective truth be obtained, for philosophy is erected on knowledge, whereas theology is properly built on belief.

> *Conflict* '... is a mixed bag. Even though Kant tried to unify these three disparate themes into a book ... it is only the first essay [on the relation between the philosophical and the theological faculties] that deals with such a conflict ... The second is indeed an interesting essay [on whether the human race is progressing] but whether it amounts to a discussion of the relation between the faculty of philosophy and the faculty of law may be doubted ... The third essay [ostensibly on the conflict between philosophy and medicine] is highly interesting for understanding Kant's own view of life and death.'[18]

{28} *Ueber die Buchmacherey: zwey Briefe an Herrn Friedrich Nicolai.* Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1798.

On Turning Out Books consists of two open letters to the author and publisher Christoph Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811), deploring the present state of the 'book-making' trade in general and accusing Nicolai, in particular, of unscrupulously cashing in on the public interest in Kant's works. Nicolai had recently published a novel which made fun of Kant's abstruse terminology. However, Kant's satirical target was something broader, the commodification

of philosophy by publishers such as Nicolai: '... he does not need to take into account the inner worth and content of the commodities he publishes, but only the market *to* which, and the fashion of the day *for* which, the in any case ephemeral products of the printing press are brought into lively currency, and can achieve a swift, even if not an enduring, turnover of inventory.'[19]

The first letter is a response to an essay by Justus Moser (1720–94) which attacked Kant and defended a hereditary aristocracy, arguing for it on pragmatic rather than moral grounds. Nicolai had recently published Moser's essay in a collection of his writings. Nicolai responded to Kant's criticisms in his *Ueber meine gelehrte Bildung* (1799).

{29} *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.* Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1798.

The most popular of Kant's private lectures, that is, those which he was not required to give as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, were those on anthropology, which he gave every winter semester from 1772/3 to 1795/6. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* is the last book which Kant edited himself, and it was originally intended as a textbook.

Kant asks: What is a human being? Much of what he writes to answer that question we would now call empirical psychology, organized in three books: Book I is concerned with the cognitive faculty; Book II with the faculty of feeling pleasure or displeasure; and Book III with the faculty of desire. In doing so Kant established a three-fold division of mental experience as opposed to the traditional two-fold division between cognition and appetition. He addresses the faculties of knowledge, pleasure, and desire, and analyses the distinct characteristics of individuals and of groups (sexes, nations, and humanity broadly construed), attempting to identify exactly how humans can be characterised as rational animals. Of particular interest is his treatment, in his discussion of the human faculties, of mental illness, and its implications for a system where cognitive function is central to a notion of being human.

These three Books and faculties correspond to the three *Critiques*, but with the third *Critique* put in the middle place. 'It is his moral and political philosophy that comes last and was most important to him.'[20]

{30} *Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political, and various Philosophical Subjects. By Emanuel Kant,... from the German by the translator of the Principles of Critical Philosophy.* London: Printed for the Translator; and sold by William Richardson under the Royal Exchange, 1798–1799.

{31} *Logic: From the German of Emmanuel Kant ... To Which is Annexed a Sketch of his Life and Writings by John Richardson.* London: Printed for W. Simpkin and R. Marshall, 1819.

together with:

Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic, Which Can Appear As a Science; From the German of Emmanuel Kant,... Translated ... John Richardson. London: Printed for Simpkin and R. Marshall, 1819.

together with:

An Enquiry, Critical and Metaphysical Into the Grounds of Proof for the Existence of God and Into the Theodicy, A Sequel To The Logic And Prolegomena, Translated ... by John Richardson. London: [Simpkin and Marshall], 1836.

The first appearances of Kant in English were translated by John Richardson, a native of Scotland, who began studies in 1794 at Jena and then at Halle, studying with Jacob Sigismund Beck (1761–1840), who had himself been a student of Kant, and Ludwig Heinrich Jacob (1759–1827). Richardson spent much of his life in Germany, settling in Altenburg where in 1797 he became a tutor in the house of Baron von Mühlen. He may well have known Kant himself, there was a correspondence between them, and Kant was certainly aware of his translating work.

The 1798–99 translations were printed in Altenberg but the concession for selling them was given to the publisher Hoffman of Hamburg. 'The first volume ... which came out in May 1798, had a modest circulation in Great

Britain, where it was noted in a couple of literary journals. The second volume ... which came out the following year [does] not seem to have even reached Great Britain, probably due to the military operations of the Second Coalition against France, which heavily involved the city of Hamburg ... [it was] not reviewed and [does] not even appear in the announcements of new books contained in the literary journals of the time.'[21]

In 1800, Richardson moved to Göttingen to study law, however, in 1803, because Hanover was under French occupation, he was forced to return to Great Britain, bringing with him his manuscripts of additional Kant translations. It was only in 1819, however, that these later were published as the *Metaphysical Works of the Celebrated Immanuel Kant*. The 1819 translations 'gained no public attention ... Most of the copies must have remained unsold, since seventeen years later, in 1836, the two volumes were once again put on sale with the same title-page giving the date of publication as 1819 but bound together with a third book entitled *An Enquiry into the Grounds of Proof for the Existence of God*, which was followed by the indication 'printed in 1819, but now first published.'[22] The first volume includes the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *Toward Perpetual Peace*, a number of essays first published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, and two of Kant's 'pre-critical' works; the second volume contains a summary of *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, additional articles from the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, and two further shorter 'pre-critical' works.

{32} *Immanuel Kant's Logik: ein handbuch zu Vorlesungen.* Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius. 1800.

This logic teaching manual was published under Kant's name but compiled at his request by a former student Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche (1762–1842).

> Between 1755 ... and 1796, when he ended his teaching activity, Kant taught logic some thirty times. In accordance with the requirements of the Prussian ministry of culture, his course lectures were built around a recognized text, G. F. Meier's 1752 *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*. Kant did not merely present Meier's views, however, but commented on and criticized these as he thought appropriate; his own copy of

> Meier was full of marginal notes and interleaved with notes on separate bits of paper. When in 1799 he entrusted G. B. Jäsche with this material for the compiling of a logic text, the thought was presumably of a Kantian logic organized around Meier's framework. Since logic plays such a prominent role in the Critical philosophy, one would expect the Jäsche *Logik* to be viewed as an important tool for the interpretation of the Critical philosophy. But dissatisfaction with it was evident right from its original publication in 1800.[23]

This dissatisfaction arose because of concern that the book might not accurately reflect Kant's views.

It has three parts: (i) the Introduction, which takes up about half of the book, considers logic generally and in terms of its place in Kant's system; (ii) a Universal Doctrine of Elements, in which concepts, judgments, and inferences are treated; and (iii) a Universal Doctrine of Method, which considers definitions, both nominal and real, the analytic versus synthetic distinction, and the analysis of concepts.

{33} *Immanuel Kant's physische Geographie. Auf Verlangen des Verfassers, aus seiner Handschrift herausgegeben und zum Theil bearbeitet von D. Friedrich Theodor Rink.* **Königsberg: Göbbels und Unzer, 1802.**

Kant lectured frequently on 'physical geography', what we might now call 'earth sciences' and which in his time encompassed a broader range of topics than it would today. These lectures were very popular and in 1801 Gottfried Vollmer began the publication in Mainz and Hamburg of an unauthorized edition, which was prepared from student lecture notes by Johann Jakob Wilhelm Vollmer. This greatly angered Kant, who protested against Vollmer's illegitimate procedure, in the Intelligenzblatt of *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* and in *Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*.[24] Despite this, Vollmer continued to publish more of his 4–volume edition through 1801–05, and in later reprints.

In response to the fact that his lectures were being misused in this way, Kant arranged for his close friend Friedrich Theodor Rink (1770–1821), to edit

a proper version from Kant's own manuscript of his lecture notes. In addition, Rink had access to several sets of students' notes (Vollmer had access to three). Rink decided to bring the work 'up-to-date' with his own additions, later reversed this decision and withdrew most, but not all, of his additions, but he did not have time to edit all of Kant's marginalia before the book had to go to press. So, while this is Kant's work, it is imperfect.

Rink was a lecturer and then associate professor of oriental languages at Königsberg, eventually also becoming a full professor of theology. He left Königsberg in 1801 for a chaplaincy and rectorate in Danzig, and brought with him a small collection of Kantiana, including at least four sets of lecture notes: two on geography and one each on pedagogy and theology. Rink clearly enjoyed Kant's trust, with whose permission he published this authorized edition of the lectures on geography, as well as what became a remarkably popular one-volume edition of Kant's lectures on education (see next). Rink also wrote an early biography of Kant (1805).

{34} *Ueber Pädagogik. Herausgegeben von D. Friedrich Theodor Rink.* Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1803.

Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy* is his only contribution to educational theory. As Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Konigsberg he also lectured privately on subsidiary subjects, such as education. Eventually he gave his lecture notes to his friend Friedrich Theodor Rink (for whom, see previous), and they were published a year before Kant's death.

His book is not a systematic study of educational theories, but a collection of thoughts and maxims. It shows the influence of *Émile*. Just like Rousseau, he writes about 'education according to nature', but stresses that children should be treated as children and not as adults in miniature. According to Kant, man is the only creature to need education, which includes nurture, discipline, and moral training with a view to the formation of character and instruction. Education of small children needs to contain a large element of discipline, whereas older children should be encouraged to think for themselves. 'The greatest and most difficult problem to which man can devote himself is the problem of education. For insight depends on education, and education in its turn on insight.'[25]

Kant preferred public schools to private tutors, which he himself had been for several years, because children have to learn to cooperate with others and to tolerate other people's opinions. Overall, Kant had a thoroughly positive view of education, despite the very negative memories he had of his time as a pupil at the Collegium Fridericianum. He was convinced that with its help human nature would be continually improved, which in turn would allow the prospect of a happier human race in the future. To achieve this, he suggests that 'pedagogy', the science of education, should be given academic status and be studied at universities.

{35} *Immanuel Kant's Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre.* Leipzig: Carl Friedrich Franz, 1817.

Kant may have only given four lecture courses specifically on religion or natural theology; however, the topic formed a part of his professorial lectures on metaphysics, which he gave every year. In about 1783–4 he gave a course of lectures on religion. They are edited here by Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz (1772–1838) from manuscripts that had been in the possession of Friedrich Theodor Rink. Pölitz has titled them as *Lectures on Philosophical Theology.*

Kant discusses many central concepts of scholastic theology, e.g., God as *ens realissimum* or supreme being, however, he cautions against anthropomorphism in understanding this. As he does in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* he criticizes the traditional theoretical proofs for the existence of God. He then discusses moral theology: God's moral attributes, moral faith, divine causality, and revelation. Again, as in the *Critique* and elsewhere, he argues that only morality can lead us to an adequate conception of God. Kant then treats the 'problem of evil', creation, and divine providence. Kant was raised in a deeply Pietist home and attended Lutheran schools, so it is noteworthy that herein he rejects the doctrine of 'predestination'.

Pölitz was a professor at Leipzig and other universities. He was an avid book collector and upon his death gave to the Leipzig City Library 13,360 volumes. He was a prolific author of popular works, but sadly his editing of this and the following volume of Kant's lectures was not done with sufficient care.

{36} ***Immanuel Kant's Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik. Zum Drucke befördert von dem herausgeber der Kantischen Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre. Nebst einer Einleitung, welche eine kurze Übersicht der wichtigsten Veränderungen der Metaphysik seit Kant enthält.*** **Erfurt: Keyserschen Buchhandlung, 1821.**

Kant gave courses of lectures on metaphysics nearly continuously. Indeed, it is estimated that he gave such lectures fifty-three times, beginning in 1755/6 as a *Privatdozent* for fifteen years, and thereafter as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics until he retired in 1796. Lecturers in Prussian universities were required, at that time, to base their lectures on a standard text and Kant chose the very traditional but extremely popular *Metaphysica* of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62), which was first published in 1739 and reached a seventh edition in 1779.

Karl Pölitz (for whom, see previous) edited the lectures from three such courses probably given in the 1770s and 1780s. It is likely that Pölitz purchased these manuscripts from the estate of Rink. Politz begins the book with his own short account of the changes in metaphysics since Kant. Baumgarten's book is structured into four parts: ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology; that is to say: being in general, the world, the soul, and God. Kant's lectures covered these topics, but not always with the same order or emphasis.

{37} ***Immanuel Kant's Sämmtliche Werke.*** **Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838–42.**

This *Complete Works* in twelve volumes was edited by Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz (1805–1879), whose history of the Kantian philosophy is volume twelve, and Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert (1799–1869). After two years in the chair at Halle, in 1833 Rosenkranz became Professor at Königsberg. He was, however, not a Kantian, but an enthusiastic follower of Hegel, on whom he published several important studies, including a biography, and editions of Hegel's works.

Histories of German philosophy, even today, frequently assert that Kant had become *passé* by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, interest in him having been nearly extinguished by enthusiasm for the German Idealists: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This can hardly be true if one considers commercial evidence from the book trade; there were many reprintings of single works by Kant for years thereafter and publishers competed, at considerable financial risk, to issue his works. Clearly there was continuing demand from readers for Kant in Germany and elsewhere.

Remarkably, in addition to this edition of Kant's *Complete Works*, there was another edition in ten volumes edited by Gustav Hartenstein (1808–90), a professor at Leipzig, which was published in 1838–39 by a competing Leipzig publisher Modes and Baumann. Also, a new edition of Hartenstein's edition was published in 1867–68, but this time in eight volumes and with Leopold Voss as the publisher. Another eight-volume edition was edited by Julius Hermann von Kirchmann (1802–84), a jurist and philosopher, which was published (1868–80) in various combinations of its many parts, by different publishers in each of Berlin, Leipzig, and Heidelberg.

{38} *Verzeichniss der Bücher des verstorbenen Professor Johann Friedrich Gensichen : auch die demselben zugefallene Bücher des Professor Kant.* Königsberg: Gedrucht in der Hartungschen Hof: und academ. Buchdruckerei, [1808].

At his death, Kant left his books to his friend and dinner companion Johann Friedrich Gensichen (1759–1807), a professor of mathematics. After Gensichen's death, his library was sold at Königsberg on 25 April 1808. Kant's books were the main attraction as can be seen from the cover page of the Sale Catalogue, which lists the books previously belonging to Kant on pages 3–15. They comprise 377 lots arranged in descending size from folios to duodecimos.

Kant's library seems somewhat small for a well-read academic. As well, it does not contain some of the books he is known to have read. There is at least one reason for this: Kant usually published his work with bookseller/publishers and in addition to the normal cash honorarium for a manuscript Kant's compensation sometimes included very liberal borrowing privileges from their bookshop shelves for his use. This was especially easy for Kant during the

several years he lived on the second floor of Kanter's bookshop. Indeed, his publishers were under instruction to watch for new books at the annual Leipzig book fair that would interest Kant. A common practice among bookseller/publishers was to obtain a good part of their stock by trading their publications for those of other bookseller/publishers at the fairs. As well, Kant was a note taker, had an extremely good memory, and rarely quotes passages from other philosophers, so having to return a book to a bookseller's shelf was not a great detriment to his own writing.



Verzeichniß
der
Bücher
des
verstorbenen Professor
Johann Friedrich Gensichen,
wozu
auch die demselben zugefallene Bücher
des
Professor Kant
gehören,
welche den 25. April 1808. Nachmittags um 2 Uhr
und in den folgenden Tagen, in der Sud-Inspector-
Wohnung auf dem Collegio Albertino, im Kneip-
hofe, gegen baare Bezahlung in Courant öffent-
lich veräußert werden sollen.

Königsberg,
gedruckt in der Hartungschen Hof- und academ.
Buchdruckerei.

Other than for major sales of great collections, early-nineteenth century book auction catalogues are rare, and particularly so when they involve the library of a major intellectual. For a list of the books in Kant's library arranged by subject and with complete bibliographical information see Arthur Warda's, *Immanuel Kant's Bücher.*[26] Besides philosophy, Kant's library contained primarily books on the natural sciences and mathematics, with very little literature or theology.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

{39} ***Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung.*** **Königsberg: Im Verlag des Hartungschen Buchhandlung, 1792.**


Versuch
einer
Critik aller Offenbarung.
Königsberg 1792.
Im Verlag der Hartungschen Buchhandlung.

The *Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation*, Fichte's first book, established his reputation. After finishing his university studies in 1784, Fichte was only able to find employment as a private tutor. In 1790, one of his students ask him about Kant, of whom Fichte had little knowledge. In order to respond to the student, Fichte began to study Kant's works and he was stunned by what he read, so much so that in the summer of 1791 he travelled to Königsberg to meet his new hero. Kant's reception, however, was somewhat cool. In order to gain Kant's interest, Fichte went away and in five weeks drafted the *Essay*, which he inscribed to 'The Philosopher'. Kant read and expressed warm interest in Fichte's manuscript and arranged for his own publisher to publish it. However, for an unknown reason, Fichte's book was printed without any author's name, leading many to suppose that it was a long-anticipated book on this topic from

Kant. When he said that he was not the author and praised Fichte's book, this resulted in its success and Fichte's early fame. Indeed, not long after, with Goethe's help, he found himself a professor at Jena in May 1794.

In the *Essay* he largely develops Kantian ideas on religion, in particular that morality requires a belief in God, the complete embodiment of the moral ideal. The moral law is an expression of God's law. However, recognition of this does not require revelation, for practical reason can arrive at such knowledge autonomously. No alleged revelation can be such if it contradicts the moral law so discerned. What revelation adds is that fulfillment of the moral law is also an expression of the will of God.

{40} *Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftlehre oder der sogenannten Philosophie, als Einladungsssschrift zu seinen Vorlesungen über diese Wissenschaft.* Weimar: Im Verlage des Industrie Comptoirs, 1794.


Ueber den
Begriff der Wiſſenſchaftslehre
oder
der ſogenannten Philoſophie,

als
Einladungsſchrift zu ſeinen Vorleſungen
über dieſe Wiſſenſchaft

von
IOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE,
deſignirten ordentlichen Profeſſor der Philoſophie
auf der Univerſität zu Jena.

Weimar,
Im Verlage des Induſtrie-Comptoirs
1794.

Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre or of So-called Philosophy, as a Letter of Invitation to his Lectures on this Science was Fichte's first statement of his own 'philosophy', a term he avoided and replaced with *'Wissenschaftlehre'*, a neologism that he coined and which is usually translated as Doctrine or Theory of Science. His subsequent philosophical writings are largely devoted to regularly changing presentations of his *Wissenschaftslehre.*

On the Idea of a Theory of Science considers philosophy as a whole, the 'concept' of its title, and is primarily a preamble to what Fichte intends to later provide in his full philosophy or *Wissenschaftslehre.* He argues that such a 'science of science' needs a first principle: '... that cannot be proven within the *Wissenschaftslehre* but has to be presupposed for this to be possible as a science ... [T]his first ... principle of all science and knowledge—simply cannot be proven ... It therefore must surely be certain: certain in itself, through itself, and for its own sake.'[27] Fichte would come to find that principle in a self-positing 'I' or ego which in positing itself also posits the 'not-I', that which limits it.

Fichte believed that Kant had erred in deeply divorcing the object of cognition from our apprehension of it, giving the thing in itself a seemingly separate existence.

> To complete Kant's work, Fichte set himself to demonstrate that all the necessary conditions of knowledge can be deduced from a single principle, from which a complete system of reason can be constructed. The act of cognition presupposes an existence, an ego, which comes about through what Fichte called *Tathandlung*, a deed-act, a process which happens, although cognition of it is not possible. To this is opposed the non-ego, which limits the ego to that which it can apprehend. From these oppositions Fichte builds up his system.[28]

Fichte considered this the most understandable of his theoretical works, and there was a revised second edition in 1798 with mainly minor corrections, other than for the removal of one short concluding section and the addition of a new preface and appendix.

{41} *Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten.* Jena und Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1794.

Fichte's interests extended well beyond the discipline of philosophy. Shortly after coming to Jena as professor of philosophy he gave a course of five public lectures in May-June of 1794 on 'Morality for Scholars'. The lectures attracted a very large and enthusiastic audience. In the lectures he set out his view of the function of the scholar in society, and by implication what he hoped to achieve as Jena's new professor. Indeed, he certainly had an elevated view of his role, writing near the end of the penultimate lecture: 'My life and destiny do not matter at all, but infinitely much depends upon the results of my life. I am a priest of truth. I am in its pay, and thus I have committed myself to do, to risk, and to suffer anything for its sake.'[29]

They were soon published as *Some Lectures concerning the Scholar's Vocation*. Subsequently, in the Winter term of 1794–95 he continued to lecture on the topic, but these later lectures were never published.

Fichte's central point is that the scholar or educated person should use knowledge for the betterment of mankind. However, the lectures have a

broader scope, the first is on human nature generally and is titled the 'Vocation of Man as Such', a title he uses again for a later book. The second is on 'Man's Vocation in Society' and the third is on the 'Difference between Classes in Society'. It is only with the fourth lecture, 'Concerning the Scholar's Vocation' that he addresses directly the precise title of the book. In the fifth he discusses 'Rousseau's Claims' concerning certain of the topics raised by Fichte.

Some of Fichte's radical political ideas came through in the lectures, as a result of which the short book was badly reviewed by establishment figures; however, the younger generation was and remained very enthusiastic.

{42} *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer.* Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1794/95.

Foundations of the Entire Theory of Science is the sequel to *On the Idea of a Theory of Science* (1794). Together, it and the soon published *Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Theory of Science* (1795) form the most exhaustive published version of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre.* Publication was in two parts; Part I was offered for sale in September 1794 and Part II was available by the midsummer of 1795.

Both this and the following work have an unusual sub-title: *Manuscript for the use of his Listeners.*

> Fichte had not originally intended to publish this work at all, which was written less than a year after his first tentative efforts to articulate for himself his new conception of transcendental philosophy. The *Foundations* was originally intended to be distributed in fascicles to students attending his private lectures during his first two semesters at Jena where the printed sheets could be subjected to analysis and questions and supplemented with oral explanations ... However, he soon authorized a public edition of the same, in two volumes.[30]

Due to these intentions and circumstances, it is likely that printing numbers were small and that there was limited distribution.

Fichte recognized that what he was now publishing was not fully satisfactory; in an advertisement for the book he wrote: 'The author believes he owes it to the public to declare explicitly that the present work ... is incomplete in

his own eyes. It will still be several years before he can hope to present this work to the public in a worthy form.'[31]

{43} ***Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen, als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer.*** **Jena und Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1795.**

Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftlehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty is essentially the completion, i.e., Part III of *Foundations of the Entire Theory of Science* (1794/95). As such, it requires prior reading of the former to be understood. Indeed, much of it provides a clearer restatement of Part II of *Foundations*, which primarily concerns the theoretical portion of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the knowing subject or 'I'. However, it extends beyond this to practical epistemological questions such as how the subject recognizes the particular within the manifold of sensory intuition. Kant's forms of sensibility, space and time, are deduced from Fichte's original first principle of the 'I' positing the 'not-I'. The subject intuits that no object is 'spatial' without a relation to other spaces, nor a moment 'temporal' without relation to other moments.

{44} ***Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien des Wissenschaftslehre.*** **Jena & Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1796/97.**

The Foundation of Natural Right in accordance with the Theory of Science is an exposition of the principles of natural law in which Fichte sets forth his theory of the sovereignty of the people and social contract; it constitutes the groundwork for a reconciliation of the individual and society, of liberalism and socialism. Notably, he distinguishes between the realm of ethics and that of 'right', the latter being a theory of justice which does not depend on the categorical imperative (of Kant) or the moral law. Fichte's unique collectivist concept influenced later socialist philosophers. Again, he builds on his theoretical philosophy:

> Fichte's transcendental account of natural right proceeds from the general principle that the I must posit itself as an *individual* in order to

posit itself at all, and that in order to posit itself as an individual it must recognize itself as 'summoned' or 'solicited' by *another* free individual —summoned, that is, to limit its own freedom out of respect for that of the freedom of the other. The same condition applies, of course, to the other; hence, mutual recognition of rational individuals turns out to be condition necessary for the possibility of I-hood in general.[32]

{45} *Das System der Sittenlehre Nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre.* Jena und Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1798.

Fichte's *The System of Ethics in accordance with the principles of the Theory of Science* integrates the discussion of moral duties into the systematic framework of his transcendental theory of the human subject. Here again, the self-positing of the 'I' must include its being 'embodied will' and, therefore, its moral nature. The major philosophical themes include the practical nature of self-consciousness, the relation between reason and volition, the reality of one's own body and those of other people, and the practical necessity of social relations between humans.

His critics from the theological faculty held that the *System of Ethics* and other writings, in particular his essay 'On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World', radically reinterpreted the idea of God and thereby offended the traditional orthodoxy of the time. Fichte's view was that religious belief properly arose from moral considerations and that God's existence could not be separated from the moral order of the world. Not surprisingly, except perhaps to Fichte, such ideas led to accusations of atheism against him and the loss of his professorship at the University of Jena in 1799.

{46} *Die Bestimmung des Menschen.* Berlin: Vossischen Buchhandlung, 1800.

The Vocation of Man was intended for a general audience. Initially it was poorly received, but it became one of Fichte's more widely read books despite an obscurity in expression which he just could not seem to escape. The originality of


Die
Bestimmung
des
Menschen.
Dargestellt
von
Johann Gottlieb Fichte.
Berlin,
in der Vossischen Buchhandlung.
1800.

Fichte's ethical system consisted in the synthesis he saw between, on the one hand, the autonomous ethics of Kant and the French Revolution, and on the other, a social and anti-individualist ethics. He also thought his subjective idealism liberated us from naturalistic determinism. However, the cost of this is that all is transformed into the 'I' with the result that only an ethical life based upon the commands of duty can save us from the downfall caused by such a retreat into self-consciousness and preserve a contact with reality. *Vocation* is divided into three books: Doubt, Knowledge, and Faith. The second, Knowledge, is written in the form of a dialogue between 'I' and 'Spirit'.

{47} ***Die Grundzuge des gegenwartigen Zeitalters. Dargestellt von Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in Vorlesungen, gehalten zu Berlin, im Jahre 1804–5.*** **Berlin: Im Verlage der Realschulbuchhandlung, 1806.**

The Characteristics of the Present Age are lectures delivered in 1804/5 at Berlin in which Fichte took a somewhat negative but not despairing view of the present epoch of time. Again, he attempts to show the implication of his 'system of freedom', developed in his theoretical and practical philosophy, for a speculative philosophy of history.

In his philosophy of history, the life of mankind is divided into five epochs, of which the 'present age' is the third. In the first, Reason Acts as Blind Instinct, and the second is that of Liberation from Reason as Instinct. The fundamental idea of the third epoch is the Life According to Reason. However, this is still set back by factors such as instinctual forces, mysticism, and slovenliness of mind. This third epoch, however, evidences the hope flowing from the Enlightenment for social change and the development of the State required to lead to the final stage. The goal of the life of mankind is to freely order all their relations with others according to Reason.

{48} *Reden an die deutsche Nation.* Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1808.



Addresses to the German Nation is a series of fourteen addresses delivered by Fichte after Prussia's disastrous defeat at the Battle of Jena in 1806. It is widely regarded as a founding document in the history of German nationalism. The essays are mainly concerned with questions of national identity (particularly the relationship between language and nationality) and problems of education. Here Fichte puts into practice his theory of the scholar's role first presented in *Some Lectures concerning the Vocation of the Scholar* (1794) and again in *On the Nature of the Scholar* (1806).

Fichte believed that scholars have a moral responsibility to use their knowledge to further society and he saw the German nation and specific aspects of German culture as being uniquely qualified to do this, in particular, by implementing a system of national education that would lead not only to Germany's own moral renewal but also, by serving as an example, help bring this about in other nations. In making his case, Fichte argues that specific characteristics of the German nation make it fundamentally different from other nations and, thereby, the best suited among nations to perform the task of inaugurating a new epoch in world history. Needless to say, similar ideas bore very bad fruit in the twentieth century.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING

{49} ***Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft ... Zweite durchaus verbesserte und mit berichtigenden Zusätzen vermehrte Auflage.***
Landshut: Philipp Krüll, 1803.

The second edition of *Ideas Toward a Philosophy of Nature: as Introduction to the Study of this Science* is revised throughout and greatly enlarged by additions and corrections—being nearly twice the length of the 1797 first edition. In it Schelling first used the term 'absolute idealism' in reference to his philosophy.

In his first book *On the Possibility of a Form for all Philosophy* (1794) Schelling had attempted to provide an ultimate foundation for Kant's philosophy. He was also influenced by Spinoza's monism and by Fichte's emphasis on the subject or positing 'I'. Out of this mix he developed his *Naturphilosophie* which sought to account for the identity of thought and nature, concluding that nature was visible mind and mind was invisible nature. He thought that this idea was supported by Spinoza's monism—a single substance, God *or* Nature, with the sole attributes of Thought and Extension.

To preserve freedom of the will, this account needed to overcome the problem of the acting subject being encased in a deterministic world. How can nature and freedom co-exist? It could do so if reality was due to the subject's

activity; however, this could not be a finite subject, but must be an absolute, or all-inclusive consciousness.

{50} ***Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie: Zum Behuf seiner Vorlesungen.*** **Jena und Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1799.**


Erster Entwurf
eines Systems
der
Naturphilosophie.

Zum Behuf seiner Vorlesungen

von

F. W. J. Schelling.

Jena und Leipzig,
bey Christian Ernst Gabler.
1799.

First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature: for the Purpose of his Lectures gives yet another example of the shifting shape of Schelling's philosophy:

> [He] believed that the fundamental aim of the sciences was the interpretation of nature as a unity, and therefore the proper study of all science was force. He tried to show that mechanical, chemical, electrical, and vital forces were all different manifestations of the same underlying force in *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* ... Schelling depicted this force as 'pure activity'. He saw nature as an infinite self-activity, realizing itself in finite matter but forever unexhausted, forever short of completely realizing itself. He felt that he had thus found a parallel in the physical universe for Kant's idea of the moral universe as practical reason forever striving toward an unattainable ideal.[33]

{51} ***Einleitung zu seinem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie. Oder: Ueber den Begriff der speculativen Physik und die innere Organisation eines Systems dieser Wissenschaft.*** **Jena und Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1799.**

Following the publication of *First Outline of a System* ... (see previous) Schelling, under the influence of Goethe, felt the need to clarify and develop an aspect of *Naturphilosophie* that he had neglected—the role of experiment and observation. He met nearly daily with Goethe from mid-September to

mid-October of 1799 to discuss the former work, and Schelling here states emphatically that experiment is essential to the discovery of the laws of nature. The result is the *Introduction to his First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature; or, About the Concept of speculative Physics and the inner Organization of a System of this Science.*

{52} *System des transcendentalen Idealismus.* Tubingen: J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1800


System
des
transscendentalen
Idealismus
von
Friedr. Wilh. Joseph Schelling.
Tübingen,
in der J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung
1800.

The System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling's best-known work, treats several philosophical themes, including the role of the unconscious in artistic creativity, and the nonrational powers of the subconscious, becoming in the work of art the fullest and purest product of the mind. Indeed, art shows most fully the identity between conscious productivity (mind) and unconscious productivity (nature).

Samuel Taylor Coleridge in his *Biographia Litteraria* (1817) wrote: 'In Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* and the *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, I first found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled out for myself, and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do ... God forbid that I should be suspected of a wish to enter into a rivalry with Schelling for the honors so unequivocally his right, not only as a great original genius, but as the founder of the philosophy of nature, and the most successful improver of the Dynamic system.'[34]

{53} *Bruno, oder über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge. Ein Gespräch. Herausgegeben von Schelling.* Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1802.

Written as a pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Schelling's *Bruno, or On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things. A Conversation* evokes Giordano Bruno as a precursor of sorts for his *Naturphilosophie.* An important work from early in

Schelling's second, or identity-philosophy period. It is said to mark his break with Fichte's subjective idealism and move to absolute idealism. Schelling asserts that everything emanates from an original monistic unity, the unconditioned ground of finite entities. The world of things, Nature, is the self-revelation of the Absolute, which is the unity or identity of thought and being. Besides Bruno the dialogue uses a number of historical personages who speak on their own account or are stand-ins, e.g., Lucian = Fichte.

Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), a Neapolitan who was first a Dominican priest, left his order in 1576 and spent most of the remainder of his life wandering about Europe. During this time, he wrote several books, all of which were highly original and controversial for among other things expressing a quasi-mystical worship of Nature. In 1592, Bruno was arrested by the Venetian Inquisition as a heretic. He was held in a Roman prison for seven years before being burned at the stake in the Campo de' Fiori, a market square. Since 1883, there has been a large monument to him on the exact spot where he burned.

{54} *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studium.* Tübingen: Cotta, 1803.

Lectures on the Method of academic Study, better known as *University Studies,* consists of lectures Schelling delivered in 1802 when he was a professor at Jena. Not long before he had discovered the Absolute, discussed in the first lecture on Absolute Knowledge, which became the core of his philosophy. Schelling wrote in the Preface that the lectures did not 'cast new light on basic principles' but by being in a more 'accessible style' they would reach a wider public than his other works and thereby improve understanding of the sciences.

{55} Autograph Letter Signed to Karl Eschenmayer, 11 July 1803 at Cannstadt.

This is a personal letter to Schelling's friend, the physician and philosopher Karl Eschenmayer, with whom he may have become friends when both were studying at Tübingen; Schelling in theology (1790–95) and Eschenmayer medicine (1793–96). It reads:



Seit einigen Wochen befinde ich mich hier zu Land. Einer meiner sehnlichsten Wünsche ist, Sie, verehrter Freund, zu sehen. Wäre es ihnen möglich, mich hier zu besuchen, so lange ich mich im Bade befinde, welches noch gegen 14 Tage seyn wird? Sonst komme ich nach Kircheim, obgleich erst im folgenden Monat: wozu mich auch das Verlangen einladet, den Herrn von Paber, diesen würdigen Mäecenas, kennen zu lernen. Lassen Sie mich wissen, ob es ihnen möglich ist, mich hier zu besuchen, und ob man Sie Mitte oder Ende August in Kirchheim findet?

> (I've been in this country for a few weeks. One of my dearest wishes is to see you, dear friend. Would it be possible for you to visit me here while I am in the baths, which will be for about another 14 days? Otherwise I will come to Kirchheim, although not until the following month: to which I am also drawn by a desire to get to know Herr von Paber, this worthy Maecenas. Let me know if it is possible for you to visit me here and if you can be found in Kircheim in mid or late August?)

This was a tumultuous time for Schelling; he had received an appointment early in the year to the University of Würzburg, but more significantly he had left Jena in the Spring and married Caroline Schlegel (1763–1809) on June 26th. The wife of the Jena philosopher August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767–1845), she had carried on a quite public affair with Schelling for some time and her marriage had only been dissolved a few weeks before. At the end of June, the newlyweds went to Cannstadt for a thermal cure for several weeks. Its springs have been in use since Roman times. Cannstadt straddles the Neckar River and is now considered a borough of Stuttgart.

Adolph Karl August Eschenmayer (1768–1852) was a native of Württemberg. In his Tübingen dissertation *Säze aus der Natur-Metaphysik auf chemische und medicinische Gegenstände angewandt* (1797) he tried to provide the natural sciences with a secure philosophical foundation. Two works in natural philosophy which took Fichtean lines followed in 1801: *Deduktion des lebenden Organism* and *Spontaneität = Weltseele oder das höchste Prinzip der Naturphilosophie.* Schelling criticized Eschenmayer in his essay *Ueber den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie* (1801) and Eschenmayer responded with the book *Die Philosophie in ihrem Übergang zur Nichtphilosophie* (1803). His several later books are on psychology (1817), ethics (1818), natural philosophy (1832), and philosophy of religion (1819–20, 1825, 1840), the last topic including a commentary on Hegel's views (1834).

Eschenmayer worked as a general practitioner in Kirchheim from 1797, later becoming the personal physician of the Duchess of Württemberg. He became a professor of medicine in 1811 and of practical philosophy in 1818 at Tübingen, positions he held until 1836.

{56} ***Philosophie und Religion.*** **Tübingen: I. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1804.**

This is the first work of Schelling's which shows the significant influence on his ideas of the German philosopher and mystic Jakob Böhme (1575–1624). Böehm's writings had considerable impact on German idealism generally and also on romanticism in the arts.

> Schelling's ... dissatisfaction with his early versions of identity theory derives from his rejection of Spinozism. Spinoza regards the move from God to the world of 'conditions' as a logical consequence of the nature of God. Schelling becomes convinced that such a theory gives no reason why the absolute, the 'unconditioned', should manifest itself in a world of negative 'conditions' at all. Schelling is therefore confronted with explaining why there is a transition from the absolute to the finite world. In *Philosophy and Religion* ... he claims, like [Friedrich Heinrich] Jacobi, that there is no way of mediating between conditioned and unconditioned, and already makes the distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' philosophy, which will form the heart of his late work. Explicating the structure of the finite world leads to 'negative philosophy, but much has already been gained by the fact that the negative, the realm of nothingness, has been separated by a sharp limit from the realm of reality and of what alone is positive.' The question which comes to concern Schelling is how philosophy can come to terms with a ground which cannot be regarded as the rational explanation of the finite world.[35]

{57} ***Ueber das Verhältniß der bildenden Künste zu der Natur. Eine Rede zur Feier de 12ten Oktobers als des Allerhöchsten Namensfestes Seiner Königlichen Majestät von Baiern, gehalten in der öffentlich Versammlung der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in München.*** **München: Philipp Krüll Universitätis-Buchhändler zu Landshut, 1807.**

On the Relation of the Fine Arts to Nature. A speech in celebration of the 12th of October as the supreme naming festival of His Royal Majesty of Bavaria, delivered

at the public meeting of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Munich, an uncommon shorter publication, displays both Schelling's interest in the relationship between the fine arts and nature, but also, perhaps more importantly, Schelling's place within the political and cultural establishment. In 1806 he had moved from Würzburg to Munich, where he lived for most of the remainder of his life.

The King of Bavaria at this time was Maximilian I Joseph (1756–1825) who ruled Bavaria from 1806 to 1825. He was sympathetic with the Enlightenment and with the French, indeed, he was an ally of Napoleon in the war against Prussia until 1813, when he switched sides. He was a patron of the Arts: in 1808, he upgraded what had been a Munich drawing school to a status as the Royal Academy of Fine Arts; in 1810, he ordered the construction of the National Theatre, in front of which there stands a large statue of him; and he made many improvements to the physical infrastructure of Munich.

{58} *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit, und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände.* [in] *Philosophische Schriften. Erster Band.* Landshut: Philipp Krüll, 1809.

Schelling's famous *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, and related subjects*, better known simply as *On Human Freedom*, is possibly the most important single work he ever published. Indeed, according to an overenthusiastic Slavoj Zizek it is 'One of the candidates for the greatest philosophical book ever written.'[36]

Schelling seeks to avoid Spinoza's determinism by seeing human freedom not as a power to master nature but rather as a capacity to do evil—to choose, even if we choose wrongly. This possibility of 'evil' is determinative of the existence and character of human nature. He writes: 'Man is placed on a peak: he has within himself the capacity for spontaneous movement toward good or toward evil; the bond holding these principles in him is not necessary, it is free. He stands at the point of divergence; what he chooses, it will be his deed, but he cannot remain undecided ... The essence of man is essentially *his own deed*.'[37]

The *Freiheitsschrift* was published for the first time as the fifth part (pp. 397–511) of the first volume of a projected multi-volume edition of Schelling's *Philosophical Works*, however, no further volumes appeared.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

{59} ***Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie in Beziehung auf Reinhold's Beyträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustands der Philosophie zu Anfang des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 1stes Heft.*** **Jena: Seidler, 1801.**

Hegel's rare first book was published shortly after he joined his former Tübingen roommate Schelling in Jena. Although they later became opponents, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* is primarily a defense of Schelling's views, which had recently been criticized by Karl Leonard Reinhold. Hegel argues that the cognitive faculties of understanding, reflection, and reason must work together, and that Fichte's system in holding that the 'not-I' is posited by the 'I' fails to overcome its one-sided subjectivity, whereas Schelling's system is balanced between the objective and the subjective, being based on a transcendental intuition as to their identity in the Absolute. It is reflection which mediates between the objective and the subjective. However, Hegel would soon (1807) say that Schelling's system lacked a logic that would demonstrate the *internal necessity* of the union of the subjective and the objective, and as a result Schelling would bitterly come to no longer regard Hegel as a faithful supporter but as a disloyal rival.

{60} *System der Wissenschaft;...erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Bamberg und Würzberg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807.


System
der
Wissenschaft
von
Ge. Wilh. Fr. Hegel,
D. u. Professor der Philosophie zu Jena, der Herzogl. Mineralog. Societät daselbst Assessor und mehrerer gelehrten Gesellschaften Mitglied.
Erster Theil,
die
Phänomenologie des Geistes.
Bamberg und Würzburg,
bey Joseph Anton Goebhardt,
1807.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is Hegel's first major work and is generally considered his most important. 'It begins with a dialectical discussion of sense perception in which it is argued that knowledge of physical things presupposes the view that the physical world consists of forces interacting according to laws ... Knowledge of such a world is really a type of self-knowledge, since in penetrating to the forces behind phenomena we become aware of what we ourselves have devised and put there.'[38] However, Hegel's thinking subject turns out to be monistic, one unique thinking subject, the Idea. This leads to a highly systematic philosophy, paralleling the development of *Geist*, Spirit or Mind. In the Preface he writes that 'the true is the whole' and thus only in the complete system are contradictions sufficiently resolved. Indeed, the completed system or Idea does not correspond with reality, it *is* reality. That is to say, Hegel is what is known as an objective idealist, arguing for the identity of the Real and the Ideal.

Hegel describes the *Phenomenology* as both the introduction to and the first part of a system. His *Logic* (1812–16) followed, but the philosophy of Nature and other anticipated aspects of the 'system' found fruition only in the summary form of the *Encyclopedia* (1817) and in lectures. The *Phenomenology* received poor reviews—most readers admitted they could not understand it, or if they had understood it, it was clearly wrong. Despite this early reception, it has perhaps had as great an influence on subsequent thought and action as any single work of philosophy. Hegel spawned not only orthodox followers, but Young Hegelians, neo-Hegelians, analytic-Hegelians, and many other derivative schools, e.g., key aspects of Existentialism. As only 750 copies were printed, the first edition is uncommon.

{61} *Wissenschaft der Logik.* Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812, 1813, 1816.


Wissenschaft
der
Logik.

Von
D. Gr. Wilh. Friedr. Hegel,
Professor und Rector am Königl. Bayerischen Gymnasium
zu Nürnberg.

Erster Band.
Die
objective Logik.

Nürnberg,
bey Johann Leonhard Schrag
1812.

The *Science of Logic* was written while Hegel was headmaster and instructor in philosophy at a Classical Gymnasium in Nuremberg. He published it at a turning point in his career, as in 1816 he became chair of philosophy at Heidelberg.

The *Logic* presents the first statement of Hegel's fully developed system, in particular his elaboration of the dialectical process of human thought and existence. It is divided into three main parts: the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of the Concept, the first two being part of the Objective Logic and the third, the Subjective Logic. These titles reflect Hegel's obsession with triads, which carries over into all parts of the book and which are fundamental to his methodology. In dialectical logic a concept is posited, development leads to its opposite, and finally, a higher concept unites the two. However, this higher concept in turn leads to its opposite, and so on. In the movement of 'thought' concepts develop and criticize themselves. 'Hegel's belief [is] that the forms of subjective logic (concept, judgment, inference, as well as truth, dialectic, etc.) constitute the structure of things as much as that of our thought about things.'[39]


Wissenschaft
der
Logik.

Von
D. Gr. Wilh. Friedr. Hegel,
Professor und Rector am Königl. Bayerischen Gymnasium
zu Nürnberg.

Erster Band.
Die
objective Logik.

Zweytes Buch.
Die Lehre vom Wesen.

Nürnberg,
bey Johann Leonhard Schrag
1813.


Wissenschaft
der
subjectiven Logik
oder
die Lehre
vom Begriff

von
Dr. Georg Wilh. Friedr. Hegel,
Professor und Rector am Königl. Bayerischen Gymnasium
zu Nürnberg.

Nürnberg,
bey Johann Leonhard Schrag.
1816.

Following an Introduction in which he outlines his general concept of Logic and notes connections with his *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the logics of other philosophers, in particular Kant, Hegel begins in Book I with Being, rather than the 'I' of Fichte and Schelling, because, he argues, this is the only presuppositionless concept on which to found

a philosophy. This Book has three sections: Determinateness of Quality, Magnitude or Quantity, and Measure. And, each of these sections is broken into three chapters, and these into three..., and so forth.

Book II, the Doctrine of Essence, also has three sections: Reflection, Appearance, and Actuality, which again divide into triadic parts ... and so forth. Book III, the Doctrine of the Concept again has three sections: Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Idea. This last section has three chapters, the first two are Life and Cognition, the oppositions of which lead to a third, the Absolute Idea, which overcomes all oppositions.

Despite its obscurity, the dialectical method of the *Logic* has had great impact, including in a political direction Hegel did not anticipate. Utilizing key features of Hegel's dialectical logic, the Young Hegelian, Karl Marx (1818–83) replaced Hegel's idealist conception of reality with his own Dialectical Materialism. In turn, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) wrote: 'It is impossible completely to understand Marx's *Capital* ... without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's *Logic*.'[40] And, in 1937, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) wrote a major essay 'On Contradiction', which applied Marx's and Lenin's methodology and ideas to the circumstances of the Communist revolution in China.

{62} ***Wissenschaft der Logik ... erster Theil, dei objective Logik; erster Band, die Lehre vom Seyn.*** **Stuttgart und Tübingen: J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1832.**

This is the second edition of the first part of the *Logic*, the only part which Hegel was able to revise. The new Preface is dated 7 November 1831 and Hegel died on 14 November 1831. It is very uncommon, which suggests either relatively few copies were printed, or sales were poor.

{63} ***Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse : zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen.*** **Heidelberg: August Ostwald, 1817.**

{64} ***Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen ... Zweite Ausgabe.*** **Heidelberg: August Oswald, 1827.**

{65} ***Encyclopädie der philosphischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen … Dritte Ausgabe.*** **Heidelberg: Verwaltung des Osswald'schen Verlags (C. F. Winter), 1830.**

Encyklopädie
der
philosophischen Wissenschaften
im Grundrisse.

Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen
von
D. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
Professor der Philosophie an der Universität
zu Heidelberg.

Heidelberg,
in August Oswald's Universitätsbuchhandlung.
1817.

Encyclopädie
der
philosophischen
Wissenschaften
im Grundrisse.

Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen
von
Dr. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
ordentl. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität
zu Berlin.

Zweite Ausgabe.

HEIDELBERG,
Druck und Verlag von August Oswald.
1827.

Encyclopädie
der
philosophischen
Wissenschaften
im Grundrisse.

Zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen
von
Dr. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
ordentl. Professor der Philosophie an der K. Friedr.
Wilh. Universität zu Berlin.

Dritte Ausgabe.

Heidelberg,
Verwaltung des Osswald'schen Verlags.
(C. F. Winter.)
1830.

The first, second, and third editions of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* each revised and expanded the preceding. The *Encyclopedia* is divided into three parts; in the first edition the Logic occupies pages 1–126; the Philosophy of Nature pages 127–204; and the Philosophy of Mind pages 205–88. The first part parallels the *Science of Logic* (1812–16) and is sometimes known as the 'Lesser Logic'; the second part is substantially new material which develops Hegel's ideas in the context of the developing natural sciences, with which he was very well informed; and the third part treats topics contained in and related to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807).

It is 'the only complete, matured, and authentic statement of Hegel's philosophical system.' So stated, William Wallace (1843–97) whose widely praised and long used translation of the first part was first published in 1874. However, as the *Encyclopedia* is only an outline, intended as a textbook for the guidance of Hegel's students, who were also attending his lectures, it requires reference to his other works for its full understanding. Hegel does not so much change the ideas of the *Phenomenology* or *Logic* as develop and elucidate them in new examples and in wider contexts. But, particularly in the first edition, its paragraphs can be extremely brief, because Hegel intended to expand upon them in his lectures. In the later editions, Hegel added Remarks to these paragraphs

which were intended to also help non-student readers capture the sense of a paragraph.

A second edition of the *Encyclopedia*, published in 1827, was greatly expanded; indeed, the length of the book is doubled, and it includes a new Preface. The third and final edition of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, is again enlarged, but to a lesser extent.

This copy of the first edition was owned by the noted philosopher Harold H. Joachim (1868–1938), with his signature and is dated Merton College, Oxford, July 1894, where Joachim was a tutor and fellow. Joachim was both the nephew *and* son-in-law of the legendary violinist Joseph Joachim (1831–1907) and he was himself an accomplished violinist much sought after for Oxford music-making.

{66} *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse.* Berlin: Nicolaischen Buchhandlung, 1821 [1820].


Grundlinien
der
Philosophie des Rechts.

Von

D. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,

Ordentl. Professor der Philosophie an der Königl. Universität zu Berlin.

Berlin, 1821.
In der Nicolaischen Buchhandlung.

The Foundations of the Philosophy of Right or Natural Right and Political Science in Outline was intended as a textbook to accompany Hegel's lectures. The term 'recht' covers not only jurisprudence but political theory and moral philosophy. In spite of the year '1821' on the title page, it was in fact printed in October 1820, Hegel having rushed it into print because he feared that the censors might delay publication for several months. In the *Philosophy of Right* he gives:

> ... a complete system, in which the concept of a sociology dominated by the idea of a State is laid down. It turns away from the apparent chaos of the democratic advocates of individual right in favour of an overwhelming sense that liberty cannot exist apart from order, and that the vital connexion of all parts of the body politic is the source of all good. As the family is, without contract, the instinctive realization of the moral life, so, equally without

> contract, the State is the fullest expression of the moral spirit, where interdependence is combined with free will. The State is the perfection of man as a finite entity, whence the spirit moves into the absolute existence of art, religion and philosophy.[41]

The work had a great influence on the Young Hegelians, i.e., 'left' Hegelians who were opposed by the more conservative 'right' Hegelians. The leading Young Hegelians were Bruno Bauer (1808–82), Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72), David Friedrich Strauss (1808–74), and Karl Marx, who wrote a *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'* (written ca.1843, but not published until after Marx's death). The 'right' or 'old' Hegelians, in contrast, endorsed what they interpreted, perhaps mistakenly, as Hegel's approval of the undemocratic, hierarchical, authoritarian Prussian state. In fact, Hegel was more likely a cautious liberal, fearing the results of disorder and political fanaticism, but recognizing that each state has a unique history and the potential for progress.

{67} *Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten.* Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1832–45.

Works. Complete Edition by an Association of Friends of the Deceased. Only four books by Hegel were published in his lifetime, therefore, much of his work appears here for the first time: most importantly, his Berlin lectures in volumes 9–15 and early published (in journals and other periodicals) and unpublished shorter writings.

After Hegel's death in 1831, his Berlin lectures on the philosophy of history, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and history of philosophy were edited and first published in this edition. They were variously edited from Hegel's own lecture notes, where these were available, and student notes, including those of Hegel's son Karl. Obviously given such sources, one cannot be certain that the resultant volumes accurately or fully convey Hegel's ideas, as he might have expressed them in books; none the less, they are thought to be critical to a full appreciation of the scope of his thought.

For exhibition, I have selected Volume 9 from the first edition of Hegel's collected works in eighteen volumes, which volume contains the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* that Hegel delivered in 1822, 1828, and 1830.

Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801–93), who supervised the various editors of the volumes, was Professor of Philosophy at Berlin and the founder of the Berlin Philosophical Society as well as the first editor of its official organ *Der Gedanke* (1860). Michelet himself edited the volumes on the philosophy of nature and the lectures on the history of philosophy.

Because volumes were published individually over many years when editing was completed, the set is rarely found complete in first editions, as is this set. More frequently, one sees made-up sets, often of the first and various later editions.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

{68} ***Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde: Eine philosophische Abhandlung von Arthur Schopenhauer, Doctor der Philosophie.*** **Rudolstadt: Commission der Hof. Buch. und Kunsthandlung, 1813.**

The inscription in this presentation copy of Schopenhauer's scarce first book, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Philosophical Treatise* —'Herrn Consul Kabrun, als ein Zeichen seiner Hochactung und Ergenbeit / vom Ver*f*asser.' (Mr. Consul Kabrun, as a sign of his respect and achievement / from the author)—is made to Jakob Kabrun (1759–1814) a leading Danzig merchant and friend of Schopenhauer's father. It was to Kabrun that the sixteen-year old Arthur was first apprenticed (1804) when it was intended that he would prepare for inheriting his father's Hamburg trading firm.

Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation takes as its theme the Principle of Sufficient Reason: that is, that nothing is without a ground or reason why it is rather than is not; or, to put it in more Schopenhauerian terms: every *consequent* has a *ground*. Schopenhauer delineates four distinct kinds of explanatory principle: the sufficient reason of becoming, of knowing, of being, and of acting, only the first of which had usually been considered as encompassing this important Principle.


Herrn Consul Kabrun, als ein
Zeichen seiner Verehrung und Ergebenheit
vom Verfasser.

Ueber
die
vierfache Wurzel
des
Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde.

Eine philosophische Abhandlung
von
Arthur Schopenhauer,
Doctor der Philosophie.

450.
550

Rudolstadt,
in Commission der Hof- Buch- und Kunsthandlung.
1813.

In the work there is a detailed and powerful discussion of causality, in which he criticizes Kant's treatment of causality. Although this is an early work, Schopenhauer advised, to the end of his life, the need to read the *Fourfold Root* as a propaedeutic to understanding his mature philosophy.

Copies of Schopenhauer's first publication and indeed any presentation copies of his works are quite rare. Only 500 copies of this work were printed, and these at Schopenhauer's own expense. The publisher went bankrupt shortly after its publication and most copies were pulped—little is known as to how many were actually sold, but it is likely to have been few.

Copies were presented by the author to Goethe, a social friend of his mother Joanna Schopenhauer, Friedrich August Wolf (the classicist), Friedrich Schleiermacher (the theologian), Karl Leonhard Reinhold (the Kantian), Gottlob Ernst Schulze (his philosophy teacher at Göttingen), Karl Böttiger (archaeologist, classicist, headmaster of the Weimar gymnasium), and F. J. Fromann (Jena bookseller and publisher). 'Yet another, for reasons of filial piety, went to a friend of his late father, Herr Kabrun in Danzig, to whom Arthur had been apprenticed for a short while at the time of his confirmation.'[42]

{69} ***Ueber die Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom Zureichenden Grunde. Eine philosophische Abhandlung ... Zweite, sehr verbesserte und beträchtlich vermehrte Auflage.***
Frankfurt: Joh. Christ. Hermann'sche Buchhandlung, 1847.

The 'Second, Quite Improved and Considerably Enlarged Edition' of Schopenhauer's *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* contained substantial changes: whole sections are removed, others added, and the revision of others is extensive. A major feature is its more extensive discussions of causality and cognition, and several in-depth and sharp criticisms of Kant.

{70} ***Ueber das Sehn und die Farben. Eine Abhandlung.***
Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1816.

Schopenhauer's *On Vision and Colours: A Treatise* was inspired by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's controversial *On the Theory of Colours* (1810), a massive work on which Goethe had worked for many years and which contradicted the commonly accepted colour theory of Isaac Newton. Indeed, Goethe made an enormous effort on this work and he considered it to be his most important.

Goethe frequented the Weimar salon of Schopenhauer's mother which allowed the young Schopenhauer, thirty-eight years junior to Goethe, to make his personal acquaintance and to discuss Goethe's ideas with him. Schopenhauer always held Goethe in awe, but just as with his other genius Kant, his concern for the truth was greater than his esteem for either. Goethe who had expected the clearly very intelligent Schopenhauer to write in fulsome support of a work on which he had laboured for many years, was very surprised that his youthful protégé chose to modify Goethe's theory, thereby, eliminating some of what Schopenhauer saw as its problems. Goethe was not pleased, and their personal relationship cooled as a result.

Schopenhauer also published a revised version in Latin in 1830 as *'Commentatio exponens Theoriam Colorum Physiologicam, eandemque primarum'* in the third volume of *Scriptores ophthalmologici minores*, edited by Justis Radius.

The Walsh Philosophy Collection also holds the second German edition (1854). The differences between the two editions are relatively minor, primarily consisting of a new Preface and the addition of many cross-references to the

second editions of *On the Fourfold Root* (1847) and *The World and Will and Representation* (1844), and the first edition of *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851) where relevant topics are also discussed, sometimes more fully.

{71} *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: vier Bücher, nebst einem Anhange, der die Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie enthält.* Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1819 [Dec 1818].


Die
Welt
als
Wille und Vorstellung:
vier Bücher,
nebst einem Anhange,
der die
Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie
enthält.
von
Arthur Schopenhauer.
Leipzig:
F. A. Brockhaus.
1819.

The World as Will and Representation is Schopenhauer's *magnum opus*, begun when he was twenty-four and finished when he was thirty. It was published in December 1818 in 750 copies; however, ten years later Schopenhauer inquired as to sales and was told by Brockhaus that they still had 150 copies and that most of the others had been sold as wastepaper. Perhaps no more than 100 or so copies were sold. Eduard Grisebach recounted the dispersal history of the book as follows: 'On February 9, 1820 not even 100 of the original 750 copies had been sold. On November 29, 1828 there were still 150 copies in the warehouse. During those intervening eight years it is known that the publishers mulched a considerable number of this edition for needed paper. In 1830 the records show that another 97 copies were destroyed for the same reason.'[43]

Never lacking in self-esteem if not arrogant, Schopenhauer believed that he had solved all major philosophical problems and indeed 'solved the riddle of the world'. He was influenced by his reading of Plato, Kant, whom he held in great esteem although he sharply criticized aspects of his work, and Buddhism, themes from which he was influential in introducing to Europe. In contrast to Kant, who asserted that we could not give an ultimate metaphysical account of reality, Schopenhauer argues that Kant's thing-in-itself, the World, is Will, which he describes as a multi-faceted force or striving present in nature, which has a multitude of manifestations at various levels of reality. We, for example, are fundamentally willing beings, driven by an unchosen will for life. His philosophy is pessimistic, in that he holds, like Buddhism, that this ceaseless striving inevitably leads to suffering. Salvation can only come through a denial of

the will. Only through art can one temporarily suspend attachment to the world and attain release from willing. Music, in particular, directly manifests the nature of will. However, it is only through extreme asceticism that one can fully silence the will.

Schopenhauer's work has profoundly influenced the history of ideas and culture more broadly, for here is the dark side of the nineteenth century, from which emerge Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Freud, and a large body of literary, musical, and artistic work, including such figures as Wagner, Mahler, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Proust, Hardy, Conrad, and Mann. For example, Wagner wrote in his Autobiography: 'For years Schopenhauer's book was never completely out of my mind ... I had studied it from cover to cover four times. It had a radical influence on my whole life.'[44] Similarly, Tolstoy wrote to his closest friend Fet: 'You said that he wrote something or other on philosophical subjects, not too badly. What do you mean, something or other? It's the whole world in an incredibly clear and beautiful reflection.'[45] Or, Thomas Mann in his semi-autobiographical novel *Buddenbrooks*: '... in which, sixteen years ago I lay stretched all day on the curiously shaped chair or sofa reading *The World as Will and Representation*. Lonely, undisciplined youth, yearning for both life and death—how it swallowed the magical potion of this metaphysics, whose deepest being is eroticism, and in which I recognized the spiritual source of Wagner's Tristan music! One only reads once like that, it never recurs.'[46]

{72} ***Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Erster Band, Vier Bücher nebst einem Anhange, der die Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie enthält. Zweiter Band, welcher die Ergängzungen zu den vier Büchern des ersten Bandes enthält. Zweite, durchgänging verbesserte und sehr vermehrte Auflage.***
Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1844.

The second edition of Schopenhauer's major work was extensively expanded: a second volume is added, comprising fifty new supplementary chapters, their combined length being greater than that of the first volume. The supplementary essays elucidate and expand upon the topics in the four Books of volume one. The chapters match-up as follows: Book I of volume one with chapters 1–17 of volume two; Book II with 18–28; Book III with 29–39; and Book IV with 40–50.

There are also minor revisions throughout the first volume; significantly, the appended critique of Kant was substantially revised. In 1826, Schopenhauer was surprised to discover that the first edition (1781) of the *Critique of Pure Reason* differed in several important respects from the second edition (1787), which he previously relied upon. After detailed study, Schopenhauer greatly preferred Kant's first edition, believing that Kant had wrongly moved away from his 'idealism' in the second edition. This is reflected in the new version of his appended critique of Kant.

Like the first edition, this second is scarce, 500 copies of volume one and 750 of volume two were printed, but their sales were again so poor, that Brockhaus declined to publish Schopenhauer's *Parerga und Paralipomena* (1851) when it was offered to him. Ironically, that book proved to be Schopenhauer's first commercially successful publication. The Walsh Philosophy Collection also holds the third and last edition (1859). By this time there was growing interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy and Brockhaus published an edition of 2,230 copies, perhaps making back some of what he had lost on the first two editions.

{73} ***Ueber den Willen in der Natur. Eine Erörterung der Bestätigungen, welche die Philosophie des Verfassers, seit ihrem Auftreten, durch die empirischen Wissenschaften erhalten hat.*** **Frankfurt-am-Main: Siegmund Schmerber, 1836.**

Schopenhauer was very well informed regarding the sciences of his time; not only physics, chemistry, and biology, but also more specialized areas such as optics, botany, and neurology. He wrote *On Will in Nature* to illustrate how recent developments in science supported his metaphysical theory that Will was the essence of reality. The subtitle *A discussion of the corroborations that the author's philosophy has received from the empirical sciences since its appearance* states this clearly.

Brockhaus declined to publish the book due to the commercial failure of *The World as Will and Representation*, so Schopenhauer needed to find a new publisher and was only able to do so by agreeing to waive the author's usual honorarium. It is very scarce, as only 500 copies were printed and five years after publication 375 of these remained unsold.[47] The Walsh Philosophy

Collection also holds the second and last edition (1854) which was revised and enlarged, primarily by brief additions to the text and additional footnotes.

{74} ***Kan Menneskets Frie Villie Bevises af Dets Selvbevidsthed?: En med det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers = Selskafs større Guldmedaille belonnet Priss = Afhandlung.*** **Trondhejm: Trykt af Tønnes Andreas Høeg, 1840.**

From time to time, scientific and other intellectual societies, would have open prize essay competitions, in which they would invite replies to a question they posed. In April 1837, Schopenhauer saw an advertisement in a journal for such a competition from the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences. Their question, posed in Latin, was *'Num liberum hominum arbitrium e sui ipsius conscientia demonstrari potest?'* Or, 'Can the freedom of the human will be proved from self-consciousness', i.e., is our consciousness that when we make choices we are doing so 'freely' evidence that we are *in fact* doing so freely? Schopenhauer's response was the essay 'On the Freedom of the Human Will'. He submitted his long essay and won the gold medal in January 1839. He was also made a member of the Society.

Schopenhauer believed that causation was universal in nature. More specifically, he argued that the individual will was not free because all our actions are the result of character, which we cannot really change, and motives which result causally from circumstance and character. The Society published the essay from Schopenhauer's manuscript. He had no role in the publication; indeed, he did not know of this scarce Trondheim edition until after he had published *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, which contained it, a year later.

{75} ***Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik: Behandelt in zwei academischen Preisschriften.*** **Frankfurt: J. C. Hermann'sche, 1841.**

The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics contains Schopenhauer's two specifically ethical studies: *Ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens (On the Freedom of the Human Will)* and *Ueber das Fundament der Moral (On the Basis of Morals).*


Die
beiden Grundprobleme
der
Ethik,
behandelt
in zwei akademischen Preisschriften
von
Dr Arthur Schopenhauer.
Frankfurt am Main,
1841.

The first essay had won the gold medal of the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in 1839 (see previous). The second essay Schopenhauer submitted to the Royal Danish Society of Sciences in 1840 in response to its invitation for essays in a similar prize competition.

In this case, the Danish Society denied Schopenhauer its prize, although his essay was the only one submitted, because they decided that his personal insults of other philosophers, particularly the German Idealists, especially Hegel, were so offensive as to disqualify him. Schopenhauer later learned that the main judge was himself a Hegelian. On the title page of this combined publication Schopenhauer wrote of the first essay that it was 'crowned with a prize' and of the second '*not* crowned with a prize.'

Schopenhauer's is a descriptive ethics radically at odds with rationally based, prescriptive ethical theories. He criticizes Kant's ethics, arguing that *compassion* not duty is the basis of morality, and in so doing presents a virtue ethics in which passion and desire are viewed as the keys for explaining different moral characters, behaviours, and world views.

The Walsh Philosophy Collection also holds the second edition (1860), which has quite a number of changes, most of which are short rewordings or additions to the text; as well, there are additional references to other authors, ancient and modern, that support his views.

{76} *Parerga und Paralipomena: Kleine philosophische Schriften.* Berlin: A. W. Hayn, 1851.


Parerga und Paralipomena:
kleine philosophische Schriften,
von
Arthur Schopenhauer.
Erster Band.
Berlin,
1851.

This was Schopenhauer's most widely read book and that which first brought him fame, leading to study of his earlier writings. Again, Brockhaus refused to publish it even though Schopenhauer asked for no honorarium. It was only with the help of an early follower, Julius Frauenstädt (1813–79)

that Schopenhauer found an alternative publisher. Just 750 copies were printed and for his honorarium Schopenhauer received 10 copies.

Parerga and Paralipomena was meant not just for philosophers but for a broader public. It succeeded, in part because an Englishman, John Oxenford, wrote a very positive review in April 1852 for the *Westminster Review.* A year later he wrote for it a general overview of Schopenhauer's philosophy 'Iconoclasm in German Philosophy'. A translation of this into German was published in the *Vossische Zeitung*, and suddenly Schopenhauer was all the rage and there was great demand for not only this work, but for his earlier publications.

The unusual transliterated Greek title of the two-volume work literally means 'subordinate work and things left out'. Some of its essays, would have fit well in his earlier work, but others are in a quite different style or have different subject matters. Volume One contains six essays, two of the most interesting of which are 'Sketch of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real' and 'Fragments for the History of Philosophy', which both provide a good insight into his assessment of his predecessors. Another is the notorious 'On University Philosophy', which savages German professional philosophers. The last essay is the lengthy 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life' which became so popular that there were many publications of this work on its own. Volume Two consists of thirty-one chapters, the first sixteen of which are supplements to his earlier work, whereas the remainder range through a number of topics: Sanskrit literature, mythology, literary criticism, physiognomy, etc. and the notoriously misogynistic 'On Women'. Schopenhauer never married, but he did have various dalliances and affairs. The volume concludes with a small group of poems written by Schopenhauer, mostly in his early years.

The Walsh Philosophy Collection also holds the second edition (1862) which was edited by Frauenstädt, who was not only one of Schopenhauer's first and most enthusiastic disciples but also his literary executor.

{77} ***Balthazar Gracian's Hand = Orakel und Kunst der Weltlugheit. aus dessen Werken gezogen von Don Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa; und aus dem Aus Spanischen original treu und sorgfältig übersetz von Arthur Schopenhauer.***
Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1862.

Schopenhauer was interested in aphorisms, i.e., short maxims, often on the wisdom of life. Balthazar Gracián (1601–58), a Spanish Jesuit writer known for his satires, epigrams, aphorisms, etc., was one of Schopenhauer's favourite authors. Schopenhauer was also a polyglot with a command not only of Greek and Latin, but also five European languages, including Spanish. He completed this translation of Gracian's *Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia*, or, *The Hand Oracle and the Art of Worldly Wisdom*, in the 1830s, but it was only published two years after his death. Schopenhauer 'endorsed Gracián's recommendation for a cautious approach to relationships with others ... his recognition that we need to free ourselves from worldly illusions [and his] view that worldly wisdom serves as the means for negotiating through the roughness and vicissitudes of everyday life.'[48]

CRITICS AND SUPPORTERS OF KANT: 1785–1804

{78} **Moses Mendelssohn. *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes.* Erster Theil. Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voss und Sohn, 1785.**


Moſes Mendelsſohns
Morgenſtunden
oder
Vorleſungen
über das Daſeyn Gottes.
Erſter Theil.
Berlin, 1785.
Bey Chriſtian Friedrich Voß und Sohn.

A disciple of Leibniz and Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86) overcame prejudice against Jews to become affectionately known as the 'Jewish Socrates'. He was born in Dessau, the son of a poor copier of Jewish scrolls, and died in Berlin, a noted European intellectual. Despite his diminutive, hunchback frame he became an imposing figure, due to his learning and engaging personality. He is the major figure of what is known as the 'Jewish Enlightenment', arguing for modernization within the Jewish community while continuing to be an observant member of the synagogue. In justifying his religion to hostile critics, he became one of the most outstanding Jewish philosophers. Early in his career he was elected to the Berlin Academy, but his appointment was never confirmed due to his religion. He was a close friend of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), who is said to have modeled the character of Nathan in

Nathan the Wise on Mendelssohn, and he was greatly respected by his philosophical contemporaries, such as Kant, whom Mendelssohn famously referred to herein as the 'all-crushing Kant' (*des alles zermalmendenen Kant*).

In *Morning Hours or Lectures on the Existence of God*, Mendelssohn sets out to justify his beliefs about God, in the face of criticism from Jacobi and in the light of Kant's critical philosophy. Although he accepts both the argument from design and the ontological argument, in this work he had to admit that belief in God could no longer be considered confirmed by reason alone, however, he argued that common sense justified our continued belief, while we wait for thinkers who will have the ability to restore metaphysics to its pre-Kantian glory. 'In this work, Mendelssohn appears like a man who has been left behind, and who is sullenly watching the onward march of progress. He says modestly that he is quite unable to follow the younger spirits, like Tetens, Lambert, and Kant, the giant who destroys everything before him, in particular, metaphysics; and yet in his heart he is glad when the younger Reimarus writes to him that Kant is not really very important.'[49] The book is also important because of the Jacobi/Mendelssohn controversy regarding Lessing's alleged Spinozism, as it includes a chapter on Spinoza and arguments against pantheism.

{79} Johann Georg Heinrich Feder. *Ueber Raum und Caussalität zur Prüfrung der Kantischen Philosophie.* Göttingen: Johann Christian Dieterich, 1787.

Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740–1821) was born near Bayreuth and educated at Erlangen. He became a professor of philosophy at Göttingen in 1768. He had been instructed in the Wolffian tradition but was also influenced by British empiricism. He became the leading figure in the anti-Kantian school known as the *Popularphilosophen*, which emerged in Göttingen in the 1780s. He was also responsible for the *Philosophische Bibliothek*, an anti-Kantian journal, which published from 1788 to 1791, and which was a key source in Germany for foreign and especially British philosophy.

Space and Causality as a Test of the Kantian Philosophy criticizes from an empiricist standpoint Kant's account of space, causality, and epistemology more generally. It is divided into two sections: the first examines the ultimate grounds for human knowledge both of space and of the physical world, while

the second discusses causality and how it can be known. It is a thorough and detailed attack on the epistemology and the transcendental idealism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the latter of which Feder mistakenly understands to be similar to Berkeley's subjective idealism.

{80} Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gespräch.* Breslau: Gottl. Loewe, 1787.


David Hume
über den Glauben
oder
Idealismus und Realismus.
Ein Gespräch
von
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi.
Breslau,
bey Gottl. Loewe.
1787.

One of Kant's most severe early critics was Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) who was not an academic but an independent scholar, critic, and public intellectual. The son of a wealthy Düsseldorf merchant it was intended that he would enter the family business and he was educated by private tutors and apprenticed towards that end. However in 1772, having made a rich marriage, he entrusted the business to his brother and took up a political post, the demands of which allowed him to pursue his broad intellectual interests, much of which was devoted to criticism of others, among whom were Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.

David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism, a Dialogue is not really about Hume, but uses Hume to attack Kant. He agreed that Kant's thing-in-itself could not be known but argued that it must be taken on faith. However, Jacobi also tried to clear himself of the charge of irrationalism that resulted from his own emphasis on the primacy of faith or belief over reason. This charge arose from what he claimed were misunderstandings of his earlier writings, in particular that an appeal to Hume meant that Jacobi shared Hume's scepticism; *au contraire*, he wrote, I am a realist. In *Dialogue* he also rejects Kant's subjectivism, strict distinction between the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, and his theory of the categories.

{81} **Christian Ludwig Schübler.** ***Versuch der Einrichtung unseres Erkenntnissvermögens durch Algeber*** **[sic]** ***nachzuspüren, durchgehends mit Rücksicht auf die Kantische Philosophie.*** **Leipzig: [?], 1788.**

Christian Ludwig Schübler (1754–1820), who studied law at Jena and Erlangen, was the son of a councillor and grandson of a mayor of Heilbronn and he himself became its mayor in 1802. He was a polymath with a wide knowledge of the sciences and literature; indeed, he published a drama, a novel, and a poem, as well as books on mathematics, electricity, musical instruments, weights & measures, and agronomy. The poet Friedrich Schiller used his extensive library when he was his house guest. After the takeover of Heilbronn by Württemberg, Schübler took positions in Ellwangen and Stuttgart.

In his *Attempt to Trace how Algebra established our Cognitive Faculty, always with Regard to the Kantian Philosophy* 'Schübler follows out to its consequences Kant's view, that all mathematical knowledge proceeds only by construction of concepts. He thinks that Kant's statements, especially in the *Aesthetik* and *Analytik*, would prove this claim to apodeictic certainty best.'[50]

{82} **Adam Weishaupt.** ***Ueber die Gründe und Gewisheit der Menschlichen Erkenntniß. Zur Prüfung der Kantischen Critik der reinen Vernunft.*** **Nürnberg: Grattenauerischen Buchhandlung, 1788.**

Adam Weishaupt (1748–1830) studied law, the profession of his father, receiving his doctorate in 1768 from Ingolstadt and ultimately becoming there a professor of both law and practical philosophy. He was central to the founding of the 'Order of the Illuminati', whose goal was to reform society according to the principles of the Enlightenment, particularly by influencing public figures and government officials. However, when the Prince-elector Karl Theodor banned the Order in 1785, Weishaupt had to flee to Regensburg, where in 1787 he came under the protection of Duke Ernst II of Gotha who also named him a court councillor. Disappointingly, late in life Weishaupt developed anti-democratic views.

On the Reasons and Certainty of Human Knowledge is an important attack on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Although Weishaupt referred to himself as an Idealist, he was opposed to many key features of Kant's rationalism and idealism, while agreeing that we can only know phenomena and not things in themselves. Weishaupt published two additional books on Kant in the same year, and was 'perhaps, the subtlest and most thorough defender of English Empiricism of his time.'[51] He developed his own views and criticisms most fully in his three-volume *Ueber Wahrheit und sittliche Vollkommenheit* (1793–97).

{83} Georg Andreas Will. *Vorlesungen über die Kantische Philosophie*. Altdorf: Monathischen Verlag, 1788.

Vorleſungen
über
die Kantiſche
Philoſophie
gehalten
von
Prof. Will
Altdorf,
im Monathiſchen Verlag 1788.

Georg Andreas Will (1727–98) began as a follower of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, the leading Wolffian and author of the required metaphysics textbook that Kant used in his lectures. Indeed, as a student at Halle he received the personal encouragement of Wolff. He returned to his native Altdorf where he taught philosophy, rhetoric, poetry, and *belles-lettres* for fifty years eventually becoming rector of that University.

Will understood himself simply as a neutral commentator: 'I do not want to be called a Kantian, but even less do I want to refute Kant ... I only want to provide an idea of the Kantian philosophy.'[52] He discusses Kant's sources and the reception of his work. He explains Kant's concept of philosophy and how he divides the discipline, gives a summary of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as well as Schulze's interpretation of it, and then a brief overview of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. He concludes with a detailed list of the contents of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and a very brief notice of the relevant literature since its publication.

{84} Gottlob Ernst Schulze. *Grundriß der philosophischen Wissenschaften.* Wittenberg und Zerbst: Samuel Gottfried Zimmerman, 1788, 1790.


Grundriß
der
philosophischen
Wissenschaften
von
Gottlob Ernst Schulze,
Erster Band.
Wittenberg und Zerbst,
bey Samuel Gottfried Zimmermann.
1788.

Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761–1833), was perhaps the most influential early critic of Kant. He was successively professor of philosophy at Wittenberg, Helmstedt, and Göttingen. At the last, Schopenhauer was one of his students. The first volume of *Outlines of the Philosophical Sciences* deals with 'psychology', but in doing so Schulze also gives an account of logic and ethics. The second volume treats metaphysics in three parts: ontology, natural theology, and transcendental cosmology. The work contains the beginnings of Schulze's later position of realism; he argues that the basic elements of knowledge are sense data, which means that knowledge is ultimately subjective, however, Schulze insists that it reflects an objective world. His comments regarding Kant are fair but critical.

Schulze's best-known work is *Aenesidemus*, which appeared anonymously in 1792. In it, he argued against Kant's philosophy and Reinhold's defense of it. In particular, Schulze said that Kant failed to fully answer Hume's skepticism, and he charged Kant with the illicit use of the category of causality in his viewing the thing in itself as the *cause* of our experiences of things. In short, Kant's idealism was grounded in a contradiction. The philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were driven in large part by their attempts to overcome this contradiction.


Briefe
über die
Kantiſche Philoſophie
von
Hn. Karl Leonhard Reinhold
Zum Gebrauch und Nuzen für Freunde
der Kantiſchen Philoſophie geſammelt.
Mannheim,
bei Heinrich Valentin Bender
1789.

{85} Karl Leonhard Reinhold. *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie ... zum Gebrauch und Nuzen für Freunde der Kantischen Philosophie gesammelt.* Mannheim: Heinrich Valentin Bender, 1789.

{86} Karl Leonhard Reinhold. *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie*. Leipzig: Georg Joachim Göschen, 1790, 1792.

Of Viennese origin, Karl Leonard Reinhold (1728–1823) was educated for the Roman Catholic Church but escaped from his order in 1784 and fled to Weimar, where he converted to Protestantism. In 1784 Reinhold was invited to contribute to Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur*. His first article, 'Gedanken über Aufklärung' anticipated Kant's famous 'Was ist Aufklärung?' ('What is Enlightenment?') by several months.

These *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* are probably his most valuable contribution to the early study of Kant, and they resulted in Reinhold's appointment in 1787 as professor of philosophy at Jena, which became the leading centre for Kantianism, at least until Reinhold moved to the Danish city of Kiel in 1794, where he stayed until his death. Schopenhauer wrote that Reinhold was 'Kant's first apostle, [who] said that only after intensely studying the *Critique of Pure Reason* five times had he penetrated its proper meaning.'[53]

Preceding their first official publication in Leipzig the next year, the letters first appeared in C. M. Weiland's *Der Teutsche Merkur* in 1786–87. Reinhold had recently married Weiland's daughter. There are eight letters collected in the first edition, which discuss the need for a critique of reason, Kant's attitude to questions about the existence of God and its demonstrability, the connections between religion and morality, immortality of the soul, and the nature of thinking substances as conceived by Kant. Reinhold treats Kant's critical philosophy as an attempt to offer a new approach to epistemology and the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a treatise on the structure of consciousness. Although Reinhold's simplification of Kant did much to enhance his popularity, his possible overemphasis on epistemology at the expense of ontology may have detracted from a full understanding.

The two-volume second edition is revised and greatly expanded: the 1789 edition has 280 pages, whereas the second edition has a combined 850 pages. Reinhold subsequently developed his own philosophy in a direction that moved away from Kant towards a focus on the philosophy of language.

{87} Johann Schultz. *Prüfung der Kantischen Critik der reinen Vernunft. Erster Theil.* Könisberg: G. L. Hartung, K. Preuss, Hofbuchdrucker und Buchhandler, 1789. Zweyter Theil. Könisberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1792.

Johann Schultz (1739–1805) was born near Königsberg and died there after having long served as Professor of Mathematics at the University. Schultz wrote a number of books on a range of mathematical topics, including a prize essay on infinity (1788) which anticipates features of Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers (1895). As an aside, a romantic attachment between Schultz's wife and Fichte, hastened the latter's departure from Königsberg.

He first came to Kant's attention when Schultz, still a pastor in Löwenhagen, reviewed Kant's 1770 Inaugural Dissertation in a Königsberg periodical. Soon thereafter, in a letter to Marcus Herz, Kant wrote: 'Honest Pastor Schultz, the best philosophical brain I know in this neighborhood, has grasped the points of the system very well.'[54] Disappointed by the earliest reviews of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant sent a copy to Schultz and asked for his evaluation. Schultz praised the book and Kant encouraged him to publish his review, which he did in 1784 as *Elucidation of Professor Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. While having high esteem for Kant's thought, Schultz's treatment did not hesitate to criticize where he thought it appropriate. Indeed, some of the changes in Kant's second edition were prompted by Schultz's criticisms. As late as 1797, Kant was still recommending this 1789/92 *Examination of the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason* as the definitive account of his thought.

The first volume is concerned with expounding the Introduction and a portion of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first *Critique*, Schultz differing somewhat as to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Thereafter, a good part of this first part is taken up with answering Kant's critics, and nearly all of the second volume is devoted to that task.

{88} Salomon Maimon. *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie, mit einem Anhang über die symbolische Erkenntniß und Anmerkungen.* Berlin: Christian Friedrich Voß und Sohn, 1790.

Schlomo ben Jehoshua (1752/4–1800) was born in Polish Lithuania and as a child was recognized as a prodigious Talmudic scholar and student of Kabbalah. Over the objections of his family, he left for Germany in his early twenties where he later assumed his surname in honour of Moses ben Maimon (1138–1204). Living as a wandering beggar he was befriended by Berlin members of the Jewish enlightenment in the early 1780s. During this period, he began his intensive study of philosophy, the sciences, and languages. And there, he was helped and befriended by Moses Mendelssohn.


Versuch
über die
Transscendentalphilosophie
mit einem
Anhang
über die
symbolische Erkenntniß
und
Anmerkungen
von
Salomon Maimon,
aus Litthauen in Polen.

Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis
Obsidet. — — —
Virgil. Aen. lib. III, v. 420.

Berlin,
bei Christian Friedrich Voß und Sohn.
1790.

Essay on Transcendental Philosophy with an Appendix on Symbolic Cognition and Annotations is Maimon's first and perhaps most important work, which 'severely criticized Kant's attempt to refute Hume's skepticism ... [arguing] that Kant understands experience differently from Hume. For Kant, experience is empirical knowledge—organized information about the sensible world. But for Hume, experience is an unorganized body of sensory impressions. Kant has not refuted Hume because Hume need not concede that we have experience in Kant's sense, so he need not concede that its necessary conditions are justified.'[55]

Kant's former student and friend Marcus Herz forwarded Maimon's draft text to Kant before its publication, and Kant replied: '... one glance at the work made me realize its excellence and that not only had none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Herr Maimon does but also very few men possess so much acumen for such deep investigations as he ... [His] book contains ... so many acute observations that he could have published it at any time.'[56]

Indeed, Maimon's '... critique of Kant shaped the post-Kantian debate.'[57] 'He is perpetually making new turns, getting new points of view, finding new paths, for the statement of his agreement with and his divergences from the views of Kant.'[58]

Maimon's own philosophy was perhaps overly eclectic, he described it as being: 'first peripatetic, then Spinozistic, Leibnizian, Kantian and finally skeptical, Maimon declared that at last he "observed that all these systems contain something true, and are in certain respects equally useful."'[59]

{89} **Friedrich Gottlob Born.** ***Versuch über die ursprünglichen Grundlagen des menschlichen Denkens und die davon abhängigen Schranken unserer Erkenntniß.*** **Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1791.**

Friedrich Gottlob Born (1743–1807) was born and studied in Leipzig. He taught there as an extraordinary professor (unsalaried) until leaving in 1802 to assume a pastoral position. Born was not just an early supporter of Kant's thought, but also a translator of his writings into Latin, the language that scholars outside of Germany would more likely be able to read than German: *Opera ad philosophiam criticam* in four volumes (Leipzig, 1796–98).

Essay on the original Foundations of Human Thinking and the Limitations of our Knowledge is largely an exposition of Kant's 'whole system, often verbally coincident with Kant's own utterances, but avoiding the repetitions, though unfortunately not the difficulties, of the master's style. Those objections of the opponents of Kant, with which Born was acquainted, are quoted word for word, and referred to misunderstanding and confusion of ideas, an attempt being made to refute them.'[60]

The work is divided into three books: the first is concerned with the general sources of human knowledge, with Born here examining Kant's treatment of space and time, and the nature of pure understanding and pure reason; the second discusses the extent of the uses of reason, understanding, and sensibility, examining Kant's transcendental idealism and arguments from the second two *Critiques*; and the third book discusses the limits of both practical and theoretical knowledge.

{90} **Johann Christian Zwanziger.** ***Kommentar über Herrn Professor Kants Critik der reinen Vernunft.*** **Leipzig: Georg Emanuel Beer, 1792.**

{91} **Johann Christian Zwanziger.** ***Commentar über Herrn Professor Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ... Nebst einem Sendschreiben an den gelehrten Hern Censor, in Rücksicht der, dem Verfasser des Commentars, in den gelehrten Gothaischen Zeitungen mitgetheilten kritischen Anmerkungen.*** **Leipzig: Christian Gottlob Hilcher, 1794.**

Johann Christian Zwanziger (1723–1808) was born in Hungary, travelled to Danzig as a young man and lived there for many years. He was thirty-eight when he undertook formal study at Leipzig, studying metaphysics and completing a doctorate on the freedom of the will in 1765. He supported his studies by teaching mathematics and philosophy privately. Later he was employed as a teacher in a Leipzig school, a position he held until his death. Occasionally, he also lectured in Leipzig. Zwanziger was mainly interested in metaphysical problems throughout his life. However, he published little until the appearance of Kant's writings which exercised a strong influence on him, leading him to a prolonged, careful, but highly critical, study of Kant. In addition to his work on Kant's first two *Critiques*, he translated Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* into Latin (1796).

Of the first of Zwanziger's two 'commentaries', that on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Erich Adickes notes that Zwanziger:

> ... follows accurately the course of the *Critique*, [but] generally presents its contents only so far as is necessary for the purpose of his own refutation of it. His book is on this account less a commentary than an opposition work: and, so far as the *Transcendental Aesthetic* [Part I] and *Transcendental Analytic* [Part II, Division 1] are concerned, it is one of the acutest of the eighteenth century ... With special acuteness, Zwanziger lays bare the contradictions which are connected with Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself, if his views are pushed to their logical consequences.[61]

One of Zwanziger's aims was to save both the cosmological (i.e., first cause) and physico-theological (i.e., design) proofs for the existence of God from Kant's devastating criticism. Of this second commentary on the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Adickes again writes that it is 'less a commentary than a very acute opposition work.'[62]

{92} Jacob Sigismund Beck. *Erläuternder Auszug aus den critischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant auf Anrathen desselben*. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1793–1796.

Jacob Sigismund Beck (1761–1840) was first a student and then an intimate of Kant, who later willed Beck the original introduction of the *Critique of*

Judgement in manuscript. Beck taught mathematics at Halle before becoming a professor of philosophy there.

Explanatory Abstract from the Critical Writings of Herr. Prof. Kant, in Consultation with the Same not only contains Beck's most important ideas regarding Kantian philosophy, but also the second volume includes an original contribution by Kant himself (pp. 541–90), which has a special half-title page, entitled 'Anmerkungen zur Einleitung in die Critik der Urteilskraft' ('Notes on the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment').

Explanatory Abstract is not a selection from Kant's works or even a literal summary of his ideas, but Beck's independent exposition and interpretation of those ideas, based on a close reading of Kant. Where Beck did not follow Kant closely, he still felt that his interpretation remained 'Kantian', although Kant did not agree with some of Beck's account.

> In 1791, Beck habilitated at the University of Halle. At Kant's bidding later that same year, Beck began work on a summary of Kant's critical writings. While working on this summary, Beck regularly corresponded with Kant, sending him probing questions regarding central topics in his philosophy. Because of his respect for Beck's intellect and his interest in seeing Beck's project through, Kant was unusually responsive to Beck's questions, placing their correspondence among the more philosophically valuable in Kant's preserved letters.[63]

Kant praised the first volume of this work highly, however, by the time the third volume was published, which carried the subtitle 'Only Possible Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy must be Judged', Kant began to reckon Beck among his hypercritical friends. The extent of Beck's influence on his master, Kant, can best be seen in the latter's *Opus Posthumum*, particularly in Kant's manuscript on the progress of metaphysics since Wolff and Leibniz.

{93} Friedrich Bouterwek. *Aphorismen, den Freunden der Vernunftkritik nach Kantischer Lehre vorgelegt.* Göttingen: Johann Christian Dieterich, 1793.

Friedrich Bouterwek (1766–1828) was one of Kant's most enthusiastic early followers. *Aphorisms presented to the friends of the Critique of Reason according to*

the Kantian Doctrine expounds the contents of Kant's first two *Critiques*. Bouterwek studied law at Göttingen but had many interests, both literary and philosophical. He wrote poems, novels, and numerous literary studies and philosophical works. He first taught Kant's philosophy at Göttingen in 1792.

In this and another work *Paulus Septimius* (1795) he sought to popularize Kant's philosophy, while arguing against its critics that it need not lead to scepticism. However, he would later move away from Kantianism, his own major work *Idee einer Apodiktik* (1799) being an attempt to improve Kant by moving in a more realistic direction.

Today, Bouterwek is best remembered for his work in philosophical aesthetics and his twelve-volume history of European literature *Geschichte der Poesie und Beredsamkeit seit dem Ende des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts* (1801–1819).

{94} **Gottlob Christian Storr. *Bemerkungen über Kant's Philosophische Religionslehre: Aus dem Lateinischen. Nebst einigen Bemerkungen des Uebersetzers über den aus Principien der praktischen Vernunft hergeleiteten Ueberzeugungsgrund von der Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit einer Offenbarung, in Beizeihung auf Fichte's Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung.* Tübingen: J. C. Cottaischen Buchhandlung, 1794.**

Remarks on Kant's Philosophical Theory of Religion is a translation by Friedrich Gottlieb Süskind (1767–1829) of Storr's 1793 Latin commentary on Kant: *Annotationes quaedam theologicae ad philosophicam Kantii de religione doctrinam*, together with the translator's remarks on the *Critique of Practical Reason* and Fichte's *Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation*. Kant's *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* was published in 1793, so this is a very early response.

Gottlob Christian Storr (1746–1805) studied theology and philosophy at Tübingen, where he became a lecturer in philosophy. He argued for a biblically-based supernaturalism and believed this was actually supported by Kant's sceptical argument that denying *knowledge* of things in themselves left room for rational *belief*—leaving both revelation and the supernatural as possibilities, which could be, indeed, were supported by our reading of scripture. Storr maintains that Kant violated his own epistemological principles in positively denying

such things as Divine providence, the Trinity, and the resurrection. Also, Kant's ethical theory overemphasized acting dutifully and is wrong in denying that the hope for happiness is a proper moral motive. Storr's conservative ideas were highly influential for many years, and he attracted critical responses from among others Schelling and Hegel, who had both been his students at Tübingen.

{95} **Karl Philipp Conz. *Abhandlungen für die Geschichte und das Eigenthümliche der späteren Stoischen Philosophie, nebst einem Versuche über Christliche, Kantische und Stoische Moral.* Tübingen: Jakob Friedrich Heerbrand, 1794.**

A native of Württemburg, Carl Phillip Conz (1762–1827) received his Magister in theology from Tübingen in 1783 and became professor of classics there in 1804 and of rhetoric in 1812. He was a cleric, classical philologist, poet, critic, and historian of ideas. In addition to a play and his several books of poetry, he published translations of plays of Aeschylus, Euripides, and Aristophanes, as well as the philosophers Lucretius, Epictetus, Seneca, and Spinoza.

In *Treatises on the History and Peculiarities of later Stoic Philosophy, together with an Essay on Christian, Kantian, and Stoic Morality* Conz compares the ethical systems of Stoicism, Christianity, and Kantianism. The work is divided into three parts. In the first, Conz examines the characteristics of late Stoicism. The second inquires how the stoics approached the idea of life after death and whether this idea was used in their moral philosophy. The third part gives an account of the relationship between Christian morals and that of the stoics and Kant. Here Conz quotes the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* at length, as well as citing the second and third *Critiques* and Fichte's *Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation.*

{96} **Johann Gottlieb Gerhard Buhle. *Einleitung in die Allgemeine Logik und die Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1795.**

Johann Gottlieb Buhle (1763–1821) was a Brunswick-born philosopher, classical philologist and historian. He taught initially at Göttingen but lost his

professorship when the French occupied Hanover. He then moved to Russia in 1804, where he was very influential in spreading Kant's philosophy. In Moscow, Buhle had a number of students and followers. Later, he became librarian to Princess Elena Pavlovna. In 1814, he returned to Germany and was appointed professor of philosophy and law at the Collegium Carolinum in Braunschweig. Buhle's *Introduction to General Logic and the Critique of Pure Reason* is primarily a positive explication of Kant's ideas, but he does criticize Kant and other Kantians, pointing out that 'critical idealism' could itself be a form of dogmatism.

{97} **Andreas Metz.** ***Kurze und deutliche Darstellung des Kantischen Systems, nach seinem Hauptzwecke, Gange, und innerf e]n Werthe.*** **Bamberg: Göbhardtischen Buchhandlung, 1795.**

Andreas Metz (1767–1839) studied from 1786 to 1792 in a seminary in Würzburg, Bavaria, when he was ordained as a priest. He began lecturing at Würzburg in 1798, ultimately becoming professor of Logic, Metaphysics, and Practical Philosophy, but lecturing as well on mathematics and physics. He was one of a small group of 'Catholic Kantians', who welcomed Kant's thought, at least until his *Critique of Pure Reason* was place on the Index of Forbidden Books by the Vatican in 1827; it was still in the final published edition of the Index in 1948.

His *Brief and Clear Presentation of the Kantian System* was intended to introduce and explain Kant's system, or as Erich Adickes says of the book, much of which was in Kant's own words; it was '... well adapted to the purpose of sparing persons engaged in practical life the reading of Kant's writings and of giving them a brief and intelligible account of his system, as other works of the same kidney ... The greatest utility of the book lay in this, that it was written by a Roman Catholic, and was suited to the spreading of Kant's philosophy throughout Catholic Germany, and to the dissipation of many prejudices which had there arisen against it.'[64]

{98} **Daniel Jenisch.** ***Ueber Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen des Herrn Professor Kant in der Metaphysik, Moral und Aesthetik. ein Acceßit der Königl. Preuß. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin ... nebst einem Senschreiben des***

Verfaßers an Herrn Professor Kant über die bisherigen günstigen und ungünstigen Einflüße der kritischen Philosophie. **Berlin: Friedrich Vieweg dem älteren, 1796.**

Daniel Jenisch (1762–1804?) studied at Königsberg, travelled widely, and served as a minister before becoming a professor in Berlin. He published many books on many subjects between 1786 and 1804 before disappearing mysteriously: '... did he commit suicide, did he enter a monastery, or did he begin a new life as a radical printer.'[65]

In *On the Reason and Value of Professor Kant's Discoveries in Metaphysics, Morals, and Aesthetics* Jenisch compares Kant's philosophy with previous systems. He distinguishes between unconditioned transcendental idealism, according to which things in themselves cannot be in agreement with our modes of thinking; and conditioned transcendental idealism, according to which nothing decisive can be made out with any certainty concerning the reality of the agreement. He favors the latter kind of idealism. However, Hume's scepticism is, in Jenisch's opinion, not overcome. 'Although Jenisch boasted about being one of Kant's early scholars, he was never a fully convinced Kantian. He remained sceptical about Kant's attempts at the secularization of moral philosophy. But his main objections concerned formal aspects of Kant's philosophy, especially his 'technical, metaphysical, scholastic' style.'[66]

{99} **Salomon Maimon.** ***Kritische Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Geist oder das höhere Erkennniß-und Willensvermögen.*** **Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer, 1797.**

Critical Investigations into the Human Spirit or the higher faculties of Knowledge and Will is the last major work of Maimon (*cf.* exhibition item 88). In it he rejects Kant's view that practical reason must be given primacy over theoretical reason. Maimon held, in contrast, that these go hand in hand and that it makes no sense to follow Kant's claim that one must deny knowledge to make room for faith. Instead Maimon revives something like the Aristotelian notion that the highest virtue and pleasure is to be found in philosophical contemplation. Indeed, he holds that Kant's moral good is 'good' only because it is true.

{100} **Bernhard Stöger.** ***Kantische Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in einem gedrängten Auszuge. Nebst angehängtem Prüfungsstoffe aus Logik, Metaphysik, Anthropologie und Philosophie der Religion; vorgelegt von Bernard Stöger ... Beantwortet von Joseph Anton Sauter aus Geisingen im Fürstenthume Fürstenberg. Den 7ten August 1797.*** **Salzburg: gedruckt mit Duyleschen Schriften, n.d. [1797].**

Bernhard Stöger (1757–1815) was a Benedictine of Oberalteich and Regensberg monasteries, where he instructed the lower clergy in a wide variety of subjects. In 1785 he became Professor of Logic at Salzburg and preacher in the University church. He returned to Oberalteich in 1801. He taught in local schools after the monastery was closed, before moving to Passau in 1811 as Professor and Rector. He was a prolific author who wrote not only on philosophy but mathematics, language, and other topics.

In *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in a condensed excerpt together with attached examination material from Logic, Metaphysics, Anthropologie and Philosophy of Religion, submitted by Bernard Stöger. Answered by Joseph Anton Sauter ...* Stöger distills the essential ideas of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, closely following its structure. He examines the differences between pure and empirical knowledge, between analytic and synthetic judgements, and gives an account of Kant's transcendental aesthetics, logic, analytic, and dialectic, before proceeding to an overview of the transcendental method. An Appendix gives a general introduction to philosophy, including logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and so on, as they are affected by Kantian considerations.

{101} **Johann Adam Bergk.** ***Briefe über Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, enthaltend Erläuterungen, Prüfung und Einwürfe.*** **Leipzig und Gera: Wilhelm Heinsius, 1797.**

together with:

Johann Adam Bergk. ***Reflexionen über I. Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre.*** **Gera und Leipzig: Wilhelm Heinsius, 1798.**

Johann Adam Bergk (1769–1834) was educated at Leipzig, receiving degrees in both philosophy and law. He is best known as a journalist, where he often wrote under pseudonyms, who had a strong commitment to Enlightenment ideals.

Bound together, these two books are commentaries on the two parts of Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals,* i.e., Part I. Doctrine of Right and Part II. Doctrine of Virtue. Kant's book had been published in 1797, so Bergk's response was quick. He agrees with Kant on most points, but goes into further detail on many of them, both attempting to solve problems and to criticize Kant at some places. 'Bergk writes that only virtue "keeps a man from sinking, when everything else seems to be in ruins." In this work he outlines his theory of how the conscience functions, arguing that it will consume a man and drive him to the point of madness unless he takes the sole route to freedom, that is not to move one step from the path of righteousness and duty.'[67]

{ 102 } **Peter Miotti. *Ueber die Nichtigkeit der kantischen Grundsätze in der Philosophie, nebst einer kurzen Recension, der nach Kant geschriebenen Logik von Professor Kreil.* Wien: gedruckt bey Mathias Andreas Schmidt ... zu haben bey Sebastian Hartel, in der Gingerstrasse, 1798.**

{ 103 } **Peter Miotti. *Ueber die Falschheit, und Gottlosigkeit des Kantischen Sytems: nebst einer Antwort auf A. Kriel's Bemerkungen über die jüngste Schrift des Herrn Miotti / herausgegeben von Miotti.* Wien: gedruckt bey Mathias Andreas Schmidt, k. k. Hofbuchdrucker, 1801.**

Peter/Pietro Miotti (1743–1804) was an ex-Jesuit priest and professor of logic and metaphysics at Gorizia (Görz), a town now in northeastern Italy but then part of the Hapsburg Empire. Perhaps the greatest interest of these attacks on Kant and Catholic Kantians is that their publication in Vienna evidences the rapid dispersion of Kant's thought throughout Europe and the fact that the Catholic Church already saw a need to defend against his ideas.

Both works are rare. In the first, *On the Nullity of the Kantian Principles in Philosophy, together with a brief view of Professor Kreil's Logic, written after Kant,* 'Miotti tries to show, by distortions of meaning and the deduction of forced

conclusions, that Kreil and Kant are 'Reichsaufklärer', revolutionaries, and dangerous enemies to the cause of religion.'[68] The other work that Miotti attacked was August Kreil's *Handbuch der Logik für seine Zuhörer* (1789) which took a Kantian approach to the subject.

Miotti divides the second work *About the Falseness and Godlessness of the Kantian System* into two parts, which deal in turn with the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. He criticizes Kant's arguments and the premises on which they were based point by point, while identifying the ways in which Kant's thought had developed from that of earlier philosophers such as Hume and highlighting the essential aspects of Kantian transcendental idealism, and its applications in theology and ethics. 'In maliciousness of defamation Miotti outdoes even [Benedikt] Stattler. Kant's system gives rise to Materialism, Atheism, Epicureanism, Idealism, Egoism, Fatalism, Mohammedanism, Spinozism,—even to Jacobinism. The only way to free the world of all this misfortune is to—reinstitute the Jesuit order.'[69] The Jesuit order had been suppressed in 1773 by Pope Clement XIV and it was restored in 1814 by Pope Pius VII.

{ 104 } **Friedrich Nicolai.** ***Ueber meine gelehrte Bildung, über meine Kenntniß der kritischen Philosophie und meine Schriften dieselbe betreffend, und über die Herren Kant, J. B. Erhard, und Fichte … Eine Beylage zu den neun Gesprächen zwischen Christian Wolf und einem Kantianer.*** **Berlin und Stettin: [Friedrich Nicolai], 1799.**

Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811) took over a Berlin publishing firm from his father, but he was also an aspiring philosopher. He wrote a number of books, which were much criticized, probably unfairly, by the professional philosophical establishment. *On My Scholarly Education* is his intellectual autobiography, the writing of which was sparked by Kant's attack on him in *Über die Buchmacherey. Zwey Briefe an Herrn Friedrich Nicolai* (1798) (*cf.* exhibition item 28).

> Nicolai raises questions regarding the meaning of abstraction and the difference between a circular argument and a regress and elaborates on his objections to 'a priori' arguments. Although frequently missing the key point in the arguments criticized, he did discover contradictions,

misleading formulations and simple mistakes in the writings of Kant and his followers. These were then eliminated in later editions of their works but, needless to say, without reference to the fact that it was Nicolai who had first drawn attention to them. The vastness of historical knowledge and the tenacity in scrutinizing arguments and quotations demonstrated by Nicolai over years of intensive, not to say obsessive, philosophical studies are undeniably impressive and admirable, most particularly as, fundamentally, he lacked any formal academic education. In his autobiography ... he goes to considerable lengths to justify his unusual and difficult *'cursus philosophiae'*.[70]

{ 105 } Charles Villers. *Philosophie de Kant, ou Principes fondamentaux de la philosophie transcendentale. Par Charles Villers, de la Societé royale des sciences de Gottingue.* Metz: Chez Collignon, Imprimeur-Libraire. 1801 (An IX.)


PHILOSOPHIE
DE KANT,
OU
PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX
DE
LA PHILOSOPHIE
TRANSCENDENTALE.
Par Charles Villers, de la Société royale des sciences de Gottingue.
Hæreat xgnarus scitus desiderio.
Prosod. xjv. Pearson.
PREMIÈRE PARTIE.
A METZ,
Chez COLLIGNON, Imprimeur-Libraire.
1801. (An IX.)

Charles François Dominique de Villers (1765–1815) was a French philosopher and man of letters who took refuge in Germany after the French Revolution broke out. He was instrumental in introducing contemporaneous German thought to France. From 1811 onward he was professor of philosophy at Göttingen.

Kant's Philosophy, or Fundamental Principles of Transcendental Philosophy may well be the first French commentary on Kant. It was published thirty-four years before the appearance of a French translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is also notable that 'the first professional philosophical treatment of Kant [in England], Thomas Brown's article in *The Edinburgh Review* of 1803, was in fact based wholly on' Viller's book, as almost no English philosopher could read German at the time.[71]

{106} **Johannes Kinker.** ***Essai d'une exposition succincte de la Critique de la raison-pure. Par Mr J. Kinker, traduit du Hollandais, par J. Le F.*** **Amsterdam: Veuve Changuion and Den Hengst, 1801.**

The son of German parents, Johannes Kinker (1764–1845) studied medicine and law at Utrecht. After moving to the Hague, he worked as a lawyer and journalist, before becoming, in 1830, professor of Dutch literature and language at Liège. Politically active, he sought the unity of the Northern and Southern Netherlands. In philosophy he was a follower of Spinoza and Kant. He was one of the first to try to introduce Kant's philosophy in the Netherlands and France. He also wrote poetry and parodies and was a prolific author on many topics such as music and literature.

Attempt at a Succinct Exposition of the Critique of Pure Reason contributed greatly to the diffusion of Kant's thought in France. Kinker's account of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and Villers's *Philosophie de Kant* (see previous) provided many French philosophers lacking German with their first acquaintance with the *Critique of Pure Reason* and deeply shaped their perception of Kant's arguments and vocabulary.

Kinker's account was especially instrumental as it formed the basis of Maine de Biran's (1766–1824) interpretation of Kant, which shaped André-Marie Ampère's (1775–1836) reflections on classification and causal structure, which, in turn, elicited the anti-Kantian polemical observations of Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), who attacked the idea of *a priori* knowledge as metaphysical dogma and hailed in contrast French sensationalist empiricism.

The translator Johannes Le Fèvre may have worked from manuscript as there appears to be no prior edition in Dutch; however, Kinker was a contributor from 1799 to 1803 to an Amsterdam journal in which it may have appeared: *Magazyn voor de critische wijsgeerte, en de geschiedenis van dezelve (Magazine for Critical Philosophy and Its History)*.

{107} ***Ueber Immanuel Kant.*** **Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1804.**

- **Erster Band:** ***Darstellung des Lebens und Characters Immanuel Kant's, von Ludwig Ernst Borowski. Von Kant selbst genau revidirt und berichtigt.***

- Zweyter Band: *Immanuel Kant geschildert in seinen Briefen an einen Freund, von Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann.*
- Dritter Band: *Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren. Ein Beytrag zur Kenntniß seines Charakters und häuslichen Lebens aus dem täglichen Umgange mit ihm, von E.A.Ch. Wasianski.*


Ueber
Immanuel Kant.
Erster Band.
Darstellung
des
Lebens und Charakters
Immanuel Kant's
von
Ludwig Ernst Borowski,
Königs. Preuß. Kirchenrathe.
Von Kant selbst genau revidirt
und berichtiget.
Königsberg,
bei Friedrich Nicolovius.
1804.

Ueber
Immanuel Kant.
Zweyter Band.
Immanuel Kant
geschildert
in Briefen
an einen Freund
von
Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann.
Königsberg,
bei Friedrich Nicolovius.
1804.

Ueber
Immanuel Kant.
Dritter Band.
Immanuel Kant
in
seinen letzten Lebensjahren.
Ein Beitrag zur Kenntniß
seines
Charakters und seines häuslichen Lebens
aus
dem täglichen Umgange mit Ihm,
von
E. A. Ch. Wasianski.
Königsberg,
bei Friedrich Nicolovius.
1804.

These, the earliest biographies of Kant, were written by three of his closest associates and were published together in the year of his death. They are still principal works of reference for the student of Kant's life. While there is some overlap, the different relationships of each author with Kant makes it minimal.

The first volume is especially valuable for the reason that the greater part of it, which Ludwig Ernst Borowski (1740–1832) an early student of Kant had written out for lecture purposes, was read through and corrected by Kant himself. Borowski was a high official in the Lutheran Church and a frequent dinner guest of Kant in his later years.

In the second volume, Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann (1767–1843) gives an attractive picture of Kant's personality, suffused with all the warmth of affectionate respect. Jachman was Kant's amanuensis and academic helper during the years 1783 to 1794, when Kant was highly productive. He was also close to Kant's friends, the merchants Joseph Green and Robert Motherby.

The third volume is by Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski (1775–1831), a former student who also served as Kant's amanuensis for a time, and who was his caretaker and daily companion in the last years of his life. He gives a simple and accurate account of these years. Wasianski studied theology at Königsberg and became a deacon there in 1786. He was also the executor of Kant's will.

(Endnotes)

1 Ernst Cassirer. *Kant's Life and Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 26–28.

2 Lewis White Beck. *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 431.

3 Immanuel Kant. *Kant's Cosmogony.* Translated by W. Hastie (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1900), p. lvi.

4 Stanley Jaki. Translator's 'Introduction' to Immanuel Kant. *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981), p. 27.

5 Frederick Beiser, 'Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746–1781' in Paul Guyer, editor, *The Cambridge Companion to Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 38.

6 Friedrich Paulsen. *Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine* (London: John C. Nimmo, 1902), p. 89.

7 *Correspondence*, 7 June 1771, *Akademie* edition 10:123–4.

8 Howard Caygill. *A Kant Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 27.

9 Manfred Kuehn. *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 319.

10 Arthur Schopenhauer. *The World as Will and Representation.* Translated by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman, and Christopher Janaway. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 2018), vol. I, p. 445.

11 Arthur Schopenhauer. *Gesammelte Briefe*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978), pp. 121f.
12 Patrick Gardiner. *Theories of History* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 21–2.
13 W. H. Walsh, 'Kant, Immanuel', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., edited by Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), V, p. 23.
14 Quoted in 'Introduction', *Critique of the Power of Judgment.* Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. xliv-xlv.
15 Manfred Kuehn. *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 371–2.
16 *Correspondence*, *Akademie* edition 11:497.
17 W. B. Gallie. *Philosophers of Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 8.
18 Manfred Kuehn. *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 404–6.
19 Immanuel Kant. 'On Turning Out Books' in *Practical Philosophy,* Translated by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 626, *Akademie* edition 8:436.
20 Manfred Kuehn. *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 407.
21 Giuseppe Micheli, 'John Richardson', *D18GP,* p. 949b.
22 Giuseppe Micheli, 'John Richardson', p. 950a.
23 Hoke Robinson, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 38:4, 2000, 603.
24 Adickes, 105.
25 Immanuel Kant. *Kant on Education (Ueber Pädagogik).* Translated by Annette Churton (Boston: D. C. Heath,1906), p. 11.
26 Arthur Warda. *Immanuel Kant's Bücher* (Berlin: Martin Breslauer, 1922).
27 Fichte. *Early Philosophical Writings*, Translated by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 108.
28 *Printing and the Mind of Man* (London: Cassell, 1967), item 244.
29 Fichte. *Early Philosophical Writings,* p. 176.
30 Dan Breazeale, 'Johann Gottlieb Fichte', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2024.

31 Quoted in Fichte, *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (1796/99)*, Translated by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 7.
32 Dan Breazeale, 'Johann Gottlieb Fichte', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2024.
33 Adam Margoshes, 'Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., edited by Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), VIII, p. 619
34 Quoted in William Mitchell, *Coleridge and the Moral Tendency of His Writings* (New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co., 1844), pp. 19–20.
35 Andrew Bowie, 'Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2024.
36 The back dust-jacket blurb of the translation published in 2006 (Albany: State University of New York Press).
37 Quoted in Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 1.
38 H. B. Acton, 'Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., edited by Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), IV, p. 262.
39 Michael Inwood. *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 271.
40 Lenin, 'On the Question of Dialectics', *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960–), Vol. 38, p. 180.
41 *Printing and the Mind of Man* (London: Cassell, 1967), item 283.
42 Rudiger Safranski. *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 164.
43 Eduard Grisebach. *Edita und inedita Schopenhaueriana* (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1888).
44 Quoted in Bryan Magee, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer,* Revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 360.
45 Quoted in Magee, *Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, p. 403.
46 Quoted in Magee, *Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, p. 411.
47 David Cartwright. *Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer's Philosophy*, Second Edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 12.
48 David Cartwright, *Historical Dictionary,* pp. 118–19.
49 Johann Eduard Erdmann. *A History of Philosophy*, Translated by Williston S. Hough (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1890), vol. II, p. 335.

50 Adickes, 621.
51 Adickes, 307.
52 G. A. Will. *Vorlesungen über die Kantische Philosophie.* (Altdorf, 1788, pp. 12–13).
53 Arthur Schopenhauer. *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays.* Translated by Sabine Roehr and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), vol. 1, p. 152.
54 *Correspondence*, 21 Feb 1772, *Akademie* edition 10:133.
55 Paul Franks, 'Maimon, Salomon', *Routledge Encyclopedia*, Edited by Edward John Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), VI, p. 35b-37a.
56 *Correspondence*, 26 May 1789, *Akademie* edition 11:49–54.
57 Florian Ehrensperger, 'Salamon Maimon', *D18GP*, p. 755b.
58 Adickes, 772.
59 Florian Ehrensperger, 'Salamon Maimon', *D18GP*, p. 758a.
60 Adickes, 894.
61 Adickes, 1019.
62 Adickes, 1020.
63 Julian Wuerth, 'Jacob Sigismund Beck', *D18GP*, p. 78a.
64 Adickes, 1432.
65 Annette Meyer, 'Daniel Jenisch', *D18GP*, p. 596a.
66 Annette Meyer, 'Daniel Jenisch', *D18GP*, p. 596b.
67 Brad Prager, 'Johann Adam Bergk', *D18GP*, p. 97b.
68 Adickes, 2145.
69 Adickes, 2666.
70 Alexander Koenina, 'Friedrich Nicolai', *D18GP*, p. 849a.
71 James Bradley, 'Hegel in Britain: A Brief History of British Commentary and Attitudes', *Heythrop Journal,* XX (1979): 3.